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Abstract 
Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), the French writer and novelist, is one 
of the most important figures in post-war French literature and 
philosophy. The main intention of this study is to figure out his 
position and originality in the field of phenomenology. Since this 
thesis concentrates on the notion of vision in Blanchot’s work, its 
primary context is the post-war discussion of the relation between 
seeing and thinking in France, and particularly the discussion of the 
conditions of non-violent vision and language. The focus will be on 
the philosophical conversation between Blanchot and his 
contemporary philosophers.  
The central premise is the following: Blanchot relates the 
criticism of vision to the criticism of the representative model of 
language. In this thesis, Blanchot’s definition of literary language as 
“the refusal to reveal anything” is read as a reference pointing in two 
directions. First, to Hegel’s idea of naming as negativity which reveals 
Being incrementally to man, and second, to Heidegger’s idea of poetry 
as the simultaneity of revealing and withdrawal; the aim is to prove 
that eventually Blanchot opposes both Hegel’s idea of naming as a 
gradual revelation of the totality of being and Heidegger’s conception 
of poetry as a way of revealing the truth of Being.  
My other central hypothesis is that for Blanchot, the criticism 
of the privilege of vision is always related to the problematic of the 
exteriority. The principal intention is to trace how Blanchot’s idea of 
language as infinity and exteriority challenges both the Hegelian idea 
of naming as conceptualizing things and Heidegger’s concept of 
language as a way to truth (as aletheia). The intention is to show how 
Blanchot, with his concepts of fascination, resemblance and image, 
both affirms and challenges the central points of Heidegger’s thinking 
on language. 
Blanchot’s originality in, and contribution to, the discussion 
about the violence of vision and language is found in his answer to the 
question of how to approach the other by avoiding the “worst 
violence”. I claim that by criticizing the idea of language as naming 
both in Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot generates an account of 
language which, since it neither negates nor creates Being, is beyond 
the metaphysical opposition between Being and non-Being. 
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I Introduction 
Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), the French writer and novelist, is one 
of the most important figures in post-war French literature and 
philosophy. A whole generation of contemporary writers and theorists, 
among them Emmanuel Levinas (1906-95), Georges Bataille (1897-
1962), Roland Barthes (1915-1980), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Paul 
de Man (1919-1983) acknowledge their debt to Blanchot’s thinking.1
From the 1940s onwards, Blanchot’s work has participated in and 
influenced the discussion of all philosophical movements in the field 
of French philosophy: phenomenology in the 1940s, structuralism in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and post-structuralism in the 1960s, including 
the discussion of the relation between philosophy, ethics, and politics 
which has been the prevalent theme in Blanchot’s writings throughout 
his career, and to which French discussion turned in the 1980s. 
Blanchot’s influence on the movements of post-structuralism 
and deconstruction has been remarkable. Citing Ullrich Haase and 
William Large, “What has come to be known as post-structuralism, 
which has had such a decisive impact on Anglo-American critical 
theory, is completely unthinkable without [Blanchot]”.2 Haase and 
Large even claim that “it is difficult to find an idea in Derrida’s work 
that is not present in the writings of Blanchot”.3 Blanchot scholar 
Gerald L. Bruns in his turn writes that “the notions of language that 
turn up in the writings of Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze are directly traceable to Blanchot”.4
1
 See for example L’Œil du bœuf 14/15 (May 1998), which is dedicated to Blanchot.  
2
 Haase & Large 2001, 1. 
3
 Haase & Large 2001, 131. 
4
 Bruns 1997, 286. For example, Paul de Man’s notions of “blindness” and “error” 
and Roland Barthes’s idea of the death of the author refer to Blanchot’s ideas on 
language. Derrida’s ideas of the “undecidability” of language and thought have also 
been influenced by Blanchot’s thinking. The relation between Blanchot and Derrida 
is to be understood as a dialogue. Derrida pays homage to Blanchot, for example, in 
Parages (1986, 55). Blanchot, in his turn, confesses Derrida’s influence already in 
The Infinite Conversation (L'Entretien Infini, 1969), writing that “these pages are 
written at the margin of books by Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Eugen Fink, and 
Jean Granier […] and of several of Jacques Derrida’s essays, collected in L’écriture 
11
As a writer whose texts blur all the existing genre distinctions 
and definitions, Blanchot’s position in the field of literature, criticism 
and philosophy is a complex matter to define. Typical of Blanchot’s 
writing is the linking together of manifold philosophical questions, 
which stretch from the various thinkers in the fields of both 
philosophy and literature. He is known as a difficult writer, who 
defines the task of a literary writer as writing with one’s “eyes on the 
horizon of philosophy”,5 and whose writings are characterized by 
deliberate but cryptic references to such philosophers as Heidegger, 
Hegel, Bataille, Levinas, Foucault, and Nietzsche – to mention a few.  
The main reason for the ambiguity of Blanchot’s theoretical 
texts is that he hardly ever mentions his references. One reason for 
Blanchot’s withdrawal from naming is purely practical: most of his 
essays are originally published in journals, and only afterwards 
collected into volumes.6 A more profound reason for not naming 
references can be found in Blanchot’s idea of writing as anonymity, 
neutrality and exteriority. To write means writing without a proper 
name, without subjectivity: the one who writes gives him/herself up to 
the otherness of writing. “I” do not write, the voice heard in language 
does not belong to me, but to the neutrality of writing. Although 
writing is for Blanchot an endless conversation with other writers and 
et la difference” (IC 452, n. 16. See also “Thanks (Be Given) to Jacques Derrida” in 
Blanchot Reade, 317-323). Common to Derrida and Blanchot is an ethical relation to 
language as something which cannot be analysed by following the logic of 
representation.  
5
 It is almost a convention in Blanchot studies to point out the unconventional nature 
of Blanchot’s writings which causes difficulties in reading him. Emmanuel Levinas, 
Blanchot’s lifelong friend, confesses that “It is not easy to speak of Blanchot” and 
adds that “The best pages that have been devoted to him in recent years have 
fortunately abstained – as I shall –  from claiming to understand a contemporary and 
a Blanchot ‘better than he understood himself’ ” (Levinas 1996, 157), whereas Paul 
de Man predicts “future prominence” for “the little-publicized and difficult writer, 
Maurice Blanchot” (de Man 1971, 61). Thomas Wall, in his turn, notes that 
Blanchot does not “make a contribution to arts and letters in any conventional 
sense”, which makes any reading of his work “unconventionally difficult as well” 
(Wall 1999, 97).   
6
 Most of Blanchot’s essays have appeared originally in the form of book reviews in 
various journals, such as Journal des débats, Critique, and La Nouvelle revue 
française. These essays have been gathered in Faux-Pas (1943), The Work of Fire
(La Part du Feu, 1949), The Space of Literature (L’Espace littéraire, 1955), The 
Book to Come (Le Livre à venir, 1959), and The Infinite Conversation (L’entretien 
infini, 1969).
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philosophers, for him respecting the otherness of the other, or the 
value of friendship, demands not to pull the other into the limelight, 
but instead letting the other withdraw and disappear.7 To be a 
contemporary writer does not mean to be in the role of an eyewitness 
or an observer, but rather to witness through the movement of writing 
that which remains invisible in the bright light of publicity. The task 
of a literary work is not to open an all-seeing perspective on 
contemporary reality, nor to show the nation its way to the future – it 
is to ask its own way of being. From the perspective of literature’s 
refusal to politically commit we can also understand Blanchot’s own 
refusal of publicity; there exist only two or three obscure photographs 
and not a single interview of him – the author whose significant 
contribution to the contemporary field of literature and philosophy has 
been one of the most visible.
The paradoxical relation between visibility and invisibility is 
important in all Blanchot’s writings. Central to Blanchot’s writings, 
both his essays and fictional stories, is the problematic status of 
vision. For Blanchot, that which appears in language is never 
unambiguously present or absent; nor is it possible to objectify that 
which appears. In his stories, Blanchot is interested in that which 
resists becoming visible and knowable, and which we nevertheless 
have to keep trying to attain. The whole of Blanchot’s work could be 
claimed to argue against the idea formulated in The Infinite 
Conversation (L’Entretien Inifini, 1969): “Knowledge: gaze. 
Language: medium wherein meaning remains ideally proposed to the 
immediate reading of the look.”8
Blanchot’s narratives are always at least on one level narratives 
of vision. Characteristic of the experience of vision in Blanchot’s 
stories is the becoming conscious of vision precisely at the moment 
when it is challenged. This sudden incident can be the unexpected 
7
 The concepts of “other” and “otherness” are central in this study. In Levinas’s 
writings, there are at least three versions of other: autre, autrui, and Autrui. In 
Levinas the use of the capital letter in Autre refers to the uncontrollability of the 
other by the self. In Levinas’s ethics, Autre refers normally to infinity or God, 
whereas Autrui refers to the alterity of the other human being.   
8
 IC 252. 
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gaze of the other, as the gaze of the dead woman in The Death 
Sentence (L’arrêt de mort, 1948): this story, which can be read as an 
investigation of the gaze, asks what is it to see another person, and 
what is it to see something invisible, and what is it to testify to the 
presence of the other without light? The unexpected event that hurts 
both the mind and the eyes is in Blanchot often an experience of 
sightlessness, caused by the experience of something exterior or 
impossible to see, as happens to the narrator in The Madness of the 
Day (La Folie du Jour, 1973). In Blanchot’s stories, painful for the 
one who sees is the effort to understand and to grasp the other, the 
exterior; that which remains beyond the scope of both external and 
internal vision. A distinctive feature of Blanchot’s stories is to 
describe situations where not seeing is impossible and painful – as 
happens in Thomas the Obscure (Thomas l’Obscur, 1941/1950) and 
The Madness of the Day (Folie du Jour, 1973). Especially Blanchot’s 
later fragmentary writings challenge the idea of language as seeing, 
revealing, representing and thinking. However, the source of 
inspiration for this study was in the following observation: although 
the suspicion of “the violence of vision” is central in all his writings, 
he nevertheless seems to acknowledge its unavoidability.  
Despite the growing interest in Blanchot’s work during the last 
decades, both in the field of philosophy and literary studies, the 
importance of the persistent theme of visibility and non-visibility in 
his work has so far not been analysed.9 That theme of vision, and 
9
 One can mention the following exceptions. Martin Jay presents Blanchot shortly in 
his study Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, alongside Levinas and Lyotard, as a thinker whose “remarkable work” is 
“preoccupied with visual themes” (Jay 1993, 552-555). Adams Sitney owes some 
general accounts of Blanchot’s non-visual language in his “Afterword” to The Gaze 
of Orpheus (1981), a collection of Blanchot’s essays. Steven Shaviro’s Passion and 
Excess: Blanchot, Bataille, and Literary Theory (1990) notes in passing the 
interrelatedness of visual concerns and the notion of experience in Blanchot. In his 
Radical Passivity. Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben (1999) Thomas Carl Wall 
examines the notion of image in Blanchot in relation to Kant and Heidegger.  
In the field of philosophy, however, I can mention several studies made on the 
dominance of vision which have influenced my study of the relation between seeing, 
language and thinking in Blanchot. Martin Jay surveys in his Downcast Eyes. The 
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (1993) the post-modern 
suspicion of vision particularly in the French philosophical discussion. David 
Michel Levin’s Opening of Vision (1988) as well as his work Philosopher’s Gaze:
14
especially the relation of vision to writing, seemed to be a kind of 
blind spot in Blanchot studies, urged me to take it as the starting point 
of my study in order to figure out Blanchot’s position and originality 
in the post-war philosophical conversation in the field of 
phenomenology on the relations between seeing, language and 
thinking.10
Since this study concentrates on the notion of vision in 
Blanchot’s work, its primary context will be the post-war discussion 
of the relation between seeing and thinking in France, and in 
particularly the discussion of the conditions of non-violent vision and 
language. The most relevant philosophical context for Blanchot’s 
criticism of vision appears, not so surprisingly, to be phenomenology: 
the presence of the central figures of phenomenology (Hegel, 
Heidegger, Levinas) in Blanchot’s work, both at the level of 
vocabulary and of philosophical questions, is undeniable from the 
beginning. My aim is to prove that Blanchot’s analysis of the relation 
between language and vision – as well as his thesis “Speaking is not 
Seeing” (“Parler, ce n’est pas voir”) becomes understandable in the 
context of phenomenology. Although it could have been possible to 
clarify Blanchot’s thinking also through the work of Bataille, 
Merleau-Ponty or Lacan, in defining the framework for this study, I 
have concentrated on names which in my hypothesis have been most 
relevant to the question of vision in Blanchot: Hegel, Heidegger, 
Levinas and Derrida.  
For Blanchot’s generation in France, the main philosophical 
influence after the war came from the phenomenology of Husserl and 
his student Heidegger. As I will argue, especially Heidegger’s analysis 
Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment (1999) have introduced me to the 
philosophical discussion concerning different kinds of seeing.  In relation to 
Heidegger’s criticism of vision, William McNeill’s study The Glance of the Eye. 
Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (1999) has been helpful.   
10
 The studies written on the theme of the “gaze” in Blanchot’s work have 
concentrated on Blanchot’s theory of reading and writing, presented in his famous 
essay “The Gaze of Orpheus” (“Le Regard d’Orphée”) and in the other essays of 
The Space of Literature (L’Espace litteraire, 1955). See for instance Chantal 
Michel, Maurice Blanchot et le déplacement d’Orphée (Saint-Genouph: Librairie 
Nizet, 1997). 
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of the dominance of vision, as well as his criticism of representative 
thinking, influenced enormously Blanchot’s thinking. The way 
Blanchot questions the power of vision participates in the post-
Heideggerian discussion of the ways to escape the metaphysics of 
presence.11 In Derrida’s analysis of the metaphysics of presence, 
vision as the model for knowledge is understood as a mode of 
presence, both as the independence of the present moment from past 
and future, and as the self-presence of and self-certainty of 
consciousness. The object of this kind of vision is in its turn 
independent of any (temporal) context. From the idea that vision is 
knowledge, and that the known can thus be assimilated to the knower, 
it follows also that a thing can become the object of knowledge only 
insofar as it is form, which is in a superior position in relation to 
matter.12
In my hypothesis, Blanchot relates the criticism of vision to the 
criticism of the representative model of language. He affirms 
Heidegger’s analysis, according to which the privilege given to vision 
follows from the analogy made between seeing and presence in 
11
 In his analysis of the history of philosophy Heidegger claimed that in objectifying 
Being metaphysics neither thinks of Being as such nor the difference between Being 
and beings. The task of philosophy is therefore first to reawaken our understanding 
of the meaning of the nowadays forgotten question, and secondly, to ask this very 
question, namely, what do we mean by saying that something “is” or “appears”? For 
Heidegger, the metaphysics of presence culminates in the idea of a representation of 
a self for itself, which denies the meaning of all temporality. In his introduction to 
Heidegger’s thinking Timothy Clark gives the following definition of the term 
metaphysics: “Metaphysics is traditionally the field of philosophy which asks the 
most fundamental questions about what things are. Here ‘fundamental’ means not 
just questions of the empirical kind that could in principle be resolved by experiment 
(such as that of the ultimate composition of matter, or the energy content of the 
universe), but questions which would remain even after all such issues were 
answered. Metaphysical questions would be: ‘what is the nature of number?’; ‘what 
is the distinction between the material and the non-material?’; ‘what is cause and 
effect?’; ‘why is there anything at all rather than nothing?’ and, finally, ‘what do we 
mean anyway when we say of something that it ‘is’ or ask ‘what is…?’ ” (Clark 
2002, 11).
According to Manfred Frank, among the most successful ways to interpret 
“metaphysics” in Heidegger is to understand it to signify “objectifying thinking” 
(Frank 1992, 218).  
12
 See Derrida’s analysis of vision as the model for knowledge in Speech and 
Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (La Voix et le 
Phénomène: introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, 
Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1967).   
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Western metaphysics.13 As Heidegger states, in metaphysics vision 
comes to be the privileged mode of access to beings, since in vision 
things appear most steadily present.14 From the analogy established 
between vision and presence follows in turn the idea of seeing as the 
precondition of knowing, as well as the privilege of form over matter15
– both prejudices which Heidegger relates to the metaphysics of 
presence.16 I will argue that Blanchot’s notion of language opposes the 
representative model of language, according to which, as Derrida 
formulates, “Representative thought precedes and governs 
communication which transports the ‘idea’, the signified content.”17
My hypothesis is that the aim of Blanchot’s early essays on 
language is to challenge the representative idea of writing, which 
Derrida defines as “a theory of the sign as a representation of the idea, 
which itself represents the perceived thing”.18 As Derrida explains, 
13
 BT 187. 
14
 GA 34, 12. Heidegger writes: “Seeing, or having or keeping something in view, is 
indeed the predominant, most obvious, most direct and indeed the most impressive 
and extensive way of having something present. On account of its exceptional way 
of making-present, sensible vision attains the role of the exemplary model for 
knowing, knowing taken as an apprehending of entities” (GA 34, 159-60). 
15
 In Heidegger’s analysis, the privilege given to the notion of form follows from the 
notion of representation, grounded on determination of Being as presence. As he 
summarizes in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, “Form and content are the most 
hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed. And if 
form is correlated with the rational and matter with the irrational; if the rational is 
taken to be the logical and the irrational the alogical; if in addition the subject-
object-relation is coupled with the conceptual pair form-matter; then representation 
has at its command a conceptual machinery that nothing is capable of withstanding” 
(Heidegger 1977, 158).  
16
 Heidegger underlines the etymology of knowing as “seeing”: “Even at an early 
date cognition was conceived in terms of the ‘desire to see’ ” (BT 214-5). In section 
36 of Being and Time, entitled “Curiosity” (“Neugier”), he refers to Aristotle’s 
treatise on ontology in Metaphysics, which begins with the sentence “All human 
beings by nature desire to know” (“Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge 
des Sehens,” SZ 171), which John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson render as “The 
care for seeing is essential to man’s being.” As these translators note, “Heidegger 
takes eidenai in its root meaning, ‘to see’” (BT 215 n.2) and thus connects it with 
eidos. In Heidegger’s interpretation, Being is for Aristotle “that which shows itself 
in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does 
Being get discovered” (BT 215). From the equivalence put between seeing and 
knowing follows the thesis that has “remained the foundation of western philosophy 
ever since: “Primordial and genuine truth lies in the pure beholding” (BT 215). 
17
 MP 312. According to Derrida’s analysis, “The same content, previously 
communicated by gestures and sounds, henceforth will be transmitted by writing, 
and successively by different modes of notation, from pictographic writing up to 
alphabetic writing, passing through the hieroglyphic writing of the Egyptians and the 
ideographic writing of the Chinese” (ibid.). 
18
 MP 314.
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conventionally a sign is defined as a substitute for something absent, 
i.e., something which cannot be seen: “The sign is born at the same 
time as imagination and memory, at the moment when it is demanded 
by the absence of the object for present perceptions.”19 The theory of 
language has to do with the idea of the relation between seeing and 
thinking, since, as Derrida writes, the emphasis put on language as 
representation follows from “the self-evidence of the idea (eidos,
idea)” and from “a theory of the sign as a representation of the idea, 
which itself represents the perceived thing.”20
One of the questions that permeate this study is the following: 
Why does Blanchot define literary language a medium that aims to 
“reveal nothing”?21 Why is “literature’s ideal” “to say nothing, to 
speak in order to say nothing”?22 My hypothesis is that we can read 
Blanchot’s definition of literary language as “the refusal to reveal 
anything” as a reference pointing in two directions: first, to Hegel’s 
idea of naming as negativity which reveals Being incrementally to 
man, and second, to Heidegger’s idea of poetry as the simultaneity of 
revealing and withdrawal; I will argue that with his analysis of 
language Blanchot challenges both Hegel’s idea of naming as a 
19
 MP 314.
20
 MP 314. This is, in Derrida’s analysis, also Husserl’s conception of language, 
even if in analysing language in Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen)
Husserl acknowledges the ability of any mark to signify without the presence of its 
referent or signified content. In Logical Investigations Husserl realizes that 
“intuition of an object is not needed for signification: Gegestandlosigkeit is, 
presicely, what is structurally original about meaning” (Pasanen 1992, 102). In 
Derrida’s interpretation, Husserl has to admit the possibility of any statement being 
cut off from its referent, since “Without this possibility, which is also general, 
generalizable, and generalizing iteration of every mark, there would be no 
statements” (MP 319). As Derrida summarizes: “The absence of the referent  […]  
constructs the mark; and the eventual presence of the referent at the moment when it 
is designated changes nothing about the structure of the mark which implies that it 
can do without the referent” (MP 318). Husserl admits even the absence of the 
signified, even if he considers this absence to be dangerous to philosophy in opening 
a “crisis” of meaning. For Husserl, says Derrida, the cause of this crisis is the 
“nonpresence in general, absence as the absence of the referent, of perception – or of 
meaning – of the actual intention to signify” (MP 314). For Derrida, Husserl’s 
interpretation of writing as a danger to phenomenological science represents the 
metaphysics of presence, which Derrida’s own deconstruction – along with 
Heidegger’s destruction of the history of Western philosophy – seeks to undermine.  
21
 WF 326, PF 316, IC 25.  
22
 WF 324.  
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gradual revelation of the totality of being and Heidegger’s conception 
of poetry as a way of revealing the truth of Being.  
The critique of vision, as well as the theme of exteriority, is 
present in Blanchot’s entire work from the early 1940s to his last 
publications in the 1980s. His theory of literature is sketched out in 
the essays of The Work of Fire (La Part du feu, 1949), of which the 
essay entitled “Literature and the Right to Death” (“Literature et le 
droit à la mort, 1949) is the most seminal.23 Since Blanchot never 
gave up the central arguments of this early essay, I have taken them as 
my starting point in analysing Blanchot’s view on language.24 In order 
to put a framework around otherwise unlimited material, I will limit 
my discussion within two landmarks: in addition to “Literature and the 
Right to Death” the other landmark is The Infinite Conversation
(L’Entretien infini, 1969), the collection of philosophical essays which 
contain devices of writing that became dominant in Blanchot’s later 
unclassifiable fragmentary texts. In this work, Blanchot’s critical tone 
in relation to Heidegger’s ontology finds its point of culmination and 
becomes explicitly expressed. Between these texts is situated The 
Space of Literature (L’Éspace Littéraire), published in 1955, where 
Blanchot’s relation to Heidegger’s thinking is most intimate.  
In the following thesis, my intention is to trace those points in 
Blanchot’s writings between the 1940s and the 1960s where he 
departs from Heidegger’s thinking on art and language. The focus of 
this study will be on the philosophical conversation between Blanchot 
and his contemporary philosophers. Although I will situate Blanchot’s 
early work in the field of phenomenological philosophy, my intention 
23
 “Literature and the Right to Death” was originally published in two parts over 
1947 and 1948 and was joined together under the same title in The Work of Fire.
The original title of the first part, “Le Règne animal de l’ésprit” (“The Spiritual 
Animal Kindom”) refers to the fifth chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,
“The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, and the ‘Matter in Hand Itself’ (Hegel 
1977, 237-251). The title of the second part of Blanchot’s essay, “La Littérature et 
le droit à la mort”, refers to Friedrich Hölderlin’s play Empedocles, where the hero 
affirms: “For death is what I seek. It is my right.” (“Dann sterben will ja ich. Mein 
Rech ist dies.”) See Hölderlin, Werke und Briefe, II, 551; Poems and Fragments,
327.
24
 I agree with Leslie Hill, who in his study Maurice Blanchot. Extreme 
Contemporary (1997) defines “Literature and the Right to Death” as Blanchot’s 
“most programmatic account of literature in general” (Hill 1997, 103).  
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is not to reduce it in the network of philosophical references. I hope, 
on the contrary, that I will clarify Blanchot’s originality in the field of 
philosophical conversation on the nature of literary language.  
My principal intention is to trace how Blanchot during these 
decades develops his notion of writing as the realm between Being 
and non-Being, light and darkness. I will restrict my perspective in 
following Blanchot’s effort to formulate his own non-metaphysical 
account of language. Although I am aware, for instance, that doing 
justice to the later Heidegger’s philosophy of language would demand 
taking into account those of his writings which Blanchot neglects in 
his essays written in the1960s, I will leave the affiliation between 
Blanchot and the later Heidegger for another study. The same applies 
to the development of Levinas’s philosophy and to Blanchot’s 
reception of it: I will also exclude Blanchot’s interpretation of 
Levinas’s later writings on language.25
The Violence of Light and Vision 
In The Infinite Conversation, in an essay written in the form of a 
dialogue and entitled “Speaking Is Not Seeing”, an anonymous 
speaker says, as if quoting Heidegger, that all through the history of 
Western philosophy, “the optical imperative […] has subjugated our 
approach to things, and induced us to think under the guaranty of light 
or under the threat of its absence.”26 The speaker notes also that in this 
tradition the “perversion of language” has always been to act “as 
thought we were able to see the thing from all sides”: “Speech no 
longer presents itself as speech, but sight freed from the limitations of 
sight. Not a way of saying, but a transcendent way of seeing. The 
‘idea’, at first a privileged aspect, becomes the privilege of what 
remains under a perspective to which it is tributary. The novelist lifts 
25
 On this subject, see Paul Davies, “A fine Risk. Reading Blanchot Reading 
Levinas”. In Re-Reading Levinas. Ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley. 
Indiana University Press 1991, pp. 201-226.  
26
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up the rooftops and gives his characters over to a penetrating gaze. His 
error is to take language as not just another vision, but as an absolute 
one.”27
Despite the fact that the critique of sight is prominent in 
Blanchot, denigration of vision is not and has never been his problem 
alone: the question concerning the role of vision in philosophical 
thought had been central in the French post-war philosophical 
discussion from the 1940s onwards. Blanchot follows Heidegger in 
stating that we can trace already from the philosophers of antiquity the 
moment at which “light becomes idea and makes of the idea the 
supremacy of the ideal.”28 From the privilege given to vision follows 
the logic which dominates the tradition of all Western philosophy. 
From now on,   
To think is henceforth to see clearly, to stand in the light of 
evidence, to submit to the day that makes all things appear in the 
unity of form; it is to make the world arise under the sky of light as 
the form of forms, always illuminated and judged by this sun that 
does not set. The sun is the overabundance of clear light that gives 
life, the fashioner that holds life only in the particularity of form. 
The sun is the sovereign unity of light – it is good, the Good, the 
superior One, that makes us respect as the sole true site of being all 
that is ‘above’.29
Common to Blanchot and his contemporaries writing under the 
influence of Husserl’s phenomenology was the profoundly critical 
attitude toward the way vision had been constructed inside and outside 
the field of philosophical discourse: as the guarantee of meaning as 
presence. Although there are in Husserl’s phenomenology 
characteristics which justify calling him both a critic of 
“ocularcentrism” and its exponent, the Husserl discovered in France in 
the 1930s was for Blanchot and most of his contemporaries an 
27
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28
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ocularcentric thinker.30 As Blanchot writes in The Infinite 
Conversation,
Phenomenology maintains – it is true – the primacy of the subject: 
there is an origin. The origin is light, a light that is always more 
original from the basis of a luminous primacy that makes shine in 
all meaning the summons of a first light of meaning (as Emmanuel 
Lévinas says it so magnificently). Phenomenology thus 
accomplishes the singular destiny of all Western thought, by whose 
account it is in terms of light that being, knowledge (gaze or 
intuition), and the logos must be considered. The visible, the 
evident, elucidation, ideality, the superior light of logic – or, 
through a simple reversal, the invisible, the indistinct, the illogical 
or silent sedimentation: these are the variations of the Appearance, 
of primacy Phenomena.31
Blanchot finds in Husserl’s phenomenology the same problematic 
assumptions as Heidegger: the primacy of the subject, the privilege 
given to visibility over invisibility, as well as the Platonic idea of light 
as the origin of meaning and truth. Blanchot’s interpretation of 
phenomenology was influenced by Levinas’s doctoral dissertation on 
Husserl, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (Théorie 
de l’Intuition dans la Phénomenologie de Husserl), appearing as early 
as 1930. Levinas’s book was in France, as Jacques Derrida writes, 
“the first major work devoted to the entirety of Husserl’s thought.”32
There is no doubt that Levinas’s study, especially with its critique 
levelled against the ethical problems of phenomenology, strongly
affected Blanchot’s insights on both Husserl and Heidegger.33
As has often been pointed out, what is common to Blanchot 
and Levinas is their critique of Western philosophy as a discourse 
based on the suppression of the “other” in favour of the mastery of the 
“self”. Blanchot accepts Levinas’s claim according to which 
philosophy from Plato onwards has based itself on the priority of the 
30
 Following Levin, “ocularcentrism” can be understood as “the hegemony of vision 
in our cultural paradigm of knowledge, truth, and reality” (Levin 1997a, 44).   
31
 IC 251. 
32
 WAD 84. 
33
 Blanchot acknowledges the influence of Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl in his 
letter to Salomon Malka from 1988, writing that “it is to him [Levinas] I owe my 
first encounter with Husserl, and even with Heidegger” (BR 244).  
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same. Their dialogue from the 40s to the 60s focused particularly on 
the problem of how to approach the other or how to speak of the 
encounter with the other. In his essay “The Gaze of the Poet” (“Le 
Regard du Poète”, 1956) Levinas formulates this question with the 
following words: “How can the Other (which Jankélévitch calls the 
absolutely other and Blanchot ‘eternal streaming of the outside’) 
appear, that is, be for someone, without already losing its alterity and 
exteriority by way of offering itself to view? How can there be 
appearance without power?”34
With regard to the themes of vision and otherness in the work 
of Blanchot, his indebtedness to Levinas is evident. Following 
Levinas, Blanchot does not only emphasize the question of the 
“otherness of the other” as the most important question of his 
thinking, but he also pays attention to the dominance of vision, not 
only in Husserl’s phenomenology but also in Heidegger, who from
Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927) onwards, while criticizing 
Husserl’s philosophy for understanding vision as a way of making-
present, was looking for new, more primordial ways of seeing, i.e., 
ways to open us to “the light of Being”.
According to both Levinas and Blanchot, verbs such as voir,
pouvoir and savoir – to see, to be able to, and to know – always
remain close to each other in philosophical discourse. Heidegger 
enters this dialogue, as Levinas introduces German phenomenology to 
Blanchot. In his lecture The Age of the World Picture (Die Zeit des 
Weltbildes) from 1938, Heidegger claims that representative thinking 
governs the age of modernity and “the conquest of the world as a 
picture.”35 He relates the representation of beings to the metaphysical 
tradition, emphasizing that ‘to represent’, ‘vorstellen’, means to set 
out, ‘stellen’, before oneself and to set forth in relation to oneself.36
34
 Levinas 1996, 130. ”Comment l’Autre […] peut-il apparaître – c’est-à-dire être 
pour quelqu’un – sans déjà perdre son altérité, de par cette façon de s’offrir au 
regard? Comment peut-il avoir apparition sans pouvoir?” (Levinas 1975, 14)  
35
 Heidegger 1977, 134. 
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 Heidegger 1977, 132. Heidegger accentuates the point that in the metaphysical 
tradition to represent (vorstellen) means to set out (stellen) before oneself and to set 
forth in relation to oneself. Vorstellung means “to bring what is present at hand (das 
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The age of modernity regards the world as an image or a picture, and 
frames it like a window or like a photograph. To have a clear picture 
of something demands grasping it, to put it in front of oneself to see it 
from a distance, in order to present or to re-present it to oneself. When 
a being is brought before man as an object, it loses its existence 
outside the controlling gaze. 
Blanchot’s work, like Heidegger’s, expresses a will to get 
beyond the dominance of vision understood as a subject’s ability to 
control its object from a neutral distance with a motionless, 
disinterested a-historical gaze. Blanchot affirms Heidegger’s analysis, 
according to which representative thinking follows from our tendency 
to think of the world from the outer position – that of a God or a 
subject – in order to give thinking a firm basis. For Heidegger, 
representative thinking is based on immediacy and to the violence of 
seeing.37 Instead of being a gaze that would withdraw “in the face of 
beings in order that they might reveal themselves”, the gaze that 
frames its object is violence of perception. 38 It is a “mere looking-at”, 
“a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand.”39
For this study, an important aspect in Heidegger’s analysis of 
representative thinking is the connection Heidegger makes between 
Vorhandene) before oneself as something standing over against 
(Entgegenstehendes), to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it (den
Vorstellenden), and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative 
realm” (Heidegger 1977, 131-2). From this it follows, that “That which is, is no 
longer that which presences; it is rather that which, in representing, is first set over 
against […] which has the character of object” (Heidegger 1977, 150). 
37
 In his 1942-43 lectures on Parmenides, Heidegger describes modern man as “the 
living being that, by way of representation, fastens upon objects and thus looks upon 
what is objective, and, in looking, orders objects, and in this ordering posits back 
upon himself the ordered as something mastered, as his possession.” Heidegger 
speaks of the “figure-ground”structure, i.e., the difference between the focus of our 
objectifying gaze and the ground, which in this gaze is framed outside our attention 
(Heidegger 1992, 156).  
38
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 BT 88. In section 15 of Being and Time Heidegger makes a distinction between 
Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, between “presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-
hand.” Whereas the first posits something in front of us, so that it can be seen, the 
latter means a practical using of something rather than visualizing it. Heidegger 
adopts from Aristotle the distinction between poiesis and phronesis. Theoretical 
knowledge concerns the universal, whereas phronesis as practical wisdom is the 
ability to act correctly in a specific situation. Especially ethics and politics are 
realms of phronesis. Poiesis is the realm of everyday practices that get their meaning 
from being “wozu”. In this realm things are equipment (Zeug) or tools.  
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everyday looking and seeing and the problem of violence. As we 
name the thing that comes to us, we lose it as something that merely 
presences. For Heidegger, the problem with naming is that “As soon 
as presencing is named, it is represented as some present being. The 
essence of presencing, and with it the distinction between presencing 
and what is present, remains forgotten. The oblivion of being is the 
oblivion of the distinction between Being and beings.”40 In giving a 
name to Being we negate Being and forget the distinction (i.e., the 
“ontological difference”) that actually lies between beings and 
Being.41 This is what in Heidegger’s view happens among others in 
Hegel’s dialectics.42
The purpose of Heidegger’s critique of representation is to 
make manifest the narrowness of metaphysics: as he argues, in 
40
 EGT 50-51. 
41The main premise of Being and Time is that Being (Sein) is not “beings” 
(Seiendes), although philosophy has a tendency to think so, thus narrowing itself, 
under the rubric of “metaphysics”, into a mere theory of “objects”. From this it 
follows that before the discoverability of a concrete being (a flower, for instance) we 
need to have an understanding of Being at a more abstract level. Heidegger proposes 
that in order to become free from the representative way of thinking, we must ask 
what is meant by the term Being (Sein): is Being object and entities, or would it be 
possible to maintain the difference between Being and beings, and thus avoid 
objectifying Being? As he explains in Introduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in 
die Metaphysik, 1953), a series of lectures given in 1935, the purpose of the ontico-
ontological difference is to teach us to look at things in a way that remains open to 
the possibilities that lie in each being: “The main thing is to not let ourselves be led 
astray by overhasty theories, but to experience things as they are on the basis of the 
first thing that comes to hand” (IM 30). For Heidegger, to ask about the difference 
between Being and beings is to ask: what is the condition of the possibility of 
appearing and having something at our disposal? In his Introduction to Metaphysics
Heidegger stresses that Being is only by being in relation to that which is not – to 
that which we cannot see or grasp – that opens up the possibility of having a relation 
to that which is. Being, in other words, is the condition of possibility for beings, and 
the possibility for us having anything accessible. Although Being in itself is no-
thing, and even if it cannot be seen as such, it makes it possible for any entity to 
appear and be present at all. By acknowledging the difference between beings and 
Being – and what follows from this difference, namely that “everything that appears 
withdraws” – we can finally pose the question of Being anew in order to get beyond 
the dominant notion of presence. Only if we stop thinking of Being as presence can 
we get rid of our tendency to assume the equivalence between beings and presence; 
we can eventually notice that “The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” (BT 26), 
although “Being is always the Being of an entity” (BT 29). To ask what the meaning 
is of Being of beings means to ask what is the difference between Being and beings 
and to become aware that the universality of Being (Sein) transcends the universality 
of every singular being (“beings” or “entities,” seiendes) at the same time as Being 
pertains to every entity (BT 3).  
42
 In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger gives to naming another meaning. 
In this essay he speaks of the power of poetry to create beings by naming them. I 
will return to Heidegger’s idea of poetical naming in Chapter Five.   
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determining Being as presence, metaphysics forgets, neglects, or 
denies the “open dimensionality” or the “clearing” of things.43 As the 
subject (re)presents the object to itself, the object is split off from its 
ground, from its surrounding contextual and referential field. 
Although Descartes was to give philosophy a “new and firm footing” 
with his “cogito ergo sum”, he left undetermined “the kind of Being 
that belongs to the res cogitans”: “the meaning of the Being of the 
‘sum’.”
44
 Kant, who adopted Descartes’s ontological position, also 
fails to provide an ontological analysis of the subject,45 and equally is 
with the tradition of theology: the essence of ‘man’ is understood as 
an entity created by an all-seeing God, and thus the question of his 
Being remains forgotten.46 From this oblivion, claims Heidegger, “the 
history of the Western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of 
metaphysics.”47
Heidegger’s succinct definition of perception as the “appetite, 
which seeks out the particular being and attacks it, in order to grasp it 
and wholly subsume it under a concept” crystallizes the ethical 
premises of his judgment on representative thinking. According to 
Heidegger, every relation to something – be it willing, sensing, or 
having – is already representative, in Latin cogitans, which is usually 
translated as ‘thinking.’ In Descartes, “the fundamental certainty, the 
me cogitare = me esse” elevates man as a measure and a centre of 
different contents of thinking.48 “Thinking is the representing relation 
43
 As Derrida interprets Heidegger to propose,” “The best liberation from violence is 
a certain putting into question, which makes the search for an archia tremble. Only 
the thought of Being can do so, and not traditional ‘philosophy’ or ‘metaphysics” 
(WAD 141). 
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 Heidegger 1977, 150. According to Heidegger, until the discoveries of Galileo, 
man stood at the centre of the universe, under the eyes of an interested God. With 
Descartes, the place of the all-seeing God as the anchor of meaning is given over to 
a Cartesian subjectivity. As Descartes presents cogito ergo sum as the only solid 
ground of knowledge, consciousness and subject come to mean the same thing: 
every object becomes an object to a subject as pure consciousness (BPP 123). For 
modern philosophy, all thinking is “I am thinking” (BPP 126). The most indubitable 
fact for the Cartesian thinker using the method of radical doubt was the fact that he
was thinking. From Descartes on, knowing is always the knowing of the subject, 
“every act of representing is an ‘I represent.’” (BPP 126).  
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to what is represented, idea as perception.” As Heidegger writes in 
Parmenides, “It is through and for perception that the object comes to 
be a ‘standing against.’ As Leibnitz clearly saw, percipere is like an 
appetite which seeks out the particular being and attacks it, in order to 
grasp it and wholly subsume it under a concept, relating this being’s 
presence [Präsenz] back to the percipere (repraesentare).
Reprasentatio, representation [Vorstellung], is defined as the 
perspective self-presentation (to the self as ego) of what appears.”49
Already Plato makes vision the measure of truth. “Is it not true”, 
Heidegger asks, “that the Being of whatever is, is grasped by Plato as 
that which is beheld, as idea?”50 “Doesn’t pure looking, the?ria, form 
our relation to Being as such?” 51
In my analysis, Heidegger’s critique of representation as well 
as the following critique of the privilege given to the subject over the 
object influenced Blanchot’s idea of language as non-representative.52
As he writes in The Infinite Conversation, writing “is a rupture with 
language understood as that which represents, and with language 
In Heidegger’s analysis, cogitare is not only “thinking” for Descartes, but also 
“perceiving” and “representing”: “In important passages, Descartes substitutes for 
cogitare the word percipere (per-capio) – to take possession of a thing, to seize 
something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself by way of presenting-before-
oneself, representing” (N IV 104-105). Cogito means “presenting to oneself what is 
presentable” (N IV 105), that is, cogito is representation. An ego-logical subject, 
constituting himself as a subject, focuses on what is present and turns it into an 
object, a being that is there and present for the subject in the form of representation. 
Representing is always and essentially a representing of a ‘myself’ (cogitare me 
cogitare), i.e., self-representing, because consciousness of an object demands self-
consciousness as its ground, as its subject (N IV 108). 
49
 EGT 82. In the background of Heidegger’s analysis one can find Kant’s 
distinction between Darstellung as ‘presentation’, ‘exhibition’ or ‘exposition’, and 
Vorstellung as the traditional idea of representation or ‘conception’. Darstellung 
refers to the Latin translation of ‘exhibition’ (subjectio sub adspectum), whereas 
Vorstellung means the way of making things present. With its prefix re- (re-
praesentio) it refers to repetition, where something is established before oneself and 
kept at one’s disposal. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner 
S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 961, 980. 
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understood as that which receives and gives meaning.”53 What relates 
Blanchot’s work to Heidegger is, as Françoise Collin writes, “le 
combat contre représentation”, the fight against representation.54
In Pathmarks (Wegmarken), published for the first time in 
1969, Heidegger formulates a question that is, as I will try to prove, 
also central to Blanchot: “Is objectifying thinking and speaking a 
particular kind of thinking, or does all thinking as thinking, all 
speaking as speaking, necessarily have to be objectifying?”55 Can 
thinking have a relation to its “exteriority” without interiorizing it, 
without forcing it to be present to the “eyes of the mind”? The 
question of the possibility to write without representing and 
objectifying is present all through Blanchot’s work. One can even 
speak of Blanchot’s “lifelong fascination with the complicity (if not 
identity) of speech and violence.”56
Blanchot affirms, although with some reservations which will 
be focused upon in this study, the answer Heidegger gives to his 
question, the answer, according to which “an example of an 
outstanding nonobjectifying thinking and speaking” is poetry.57 As I 
will argue, Blanchot also shares Heidegger’s idea of language as 
something other than a human instrument: for both of them, language 
is without subjectivity, which means that it says and signifies without 
the presence of any intentional subjectivity. Both of these insights, 
vital in Blanchot’s writings from the 40s to the 60s, are in my 
interpretation related to Heidegger’s critique of vision, which entered 
the French discussion already in the 30s.  
As I will show, however, for Blanchot, not only Husserl’s 
phenomenology but also Heidegger’s ontology is a representative of 
the metaphysics of presence. Although he accepts Heidegger’s 
analysis of vision as presence in the philosophical discourse from 
Plato to Husserl, as well as the following criticism of the metaphysics 
53
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of presence and the following criticism of representative thinking, he 
does not accept Heidegger’s analysis of art as the place of truth. In 
The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot comes to the conclusion that 
Heidegger’s ontology has not found a language in which it would 
express its intentions without metaphysical presuppositions; as he 
writes, Heidegger’s ontology is still “formulated in the language of 
metaphysics.”58
How to (Not) Think of the Other?  
“All the founding concepts of philosophy are primarily Greek”, 
remarks Derrida, and thus “the entirety of philosophy is conceived on 
the basis of its Greek source.”59 Along with Levinas, Blanchot, and 
Heidegger, Derrida also argues that the entire history of philosophy 
follows the “violence of light”, from which it follows that our 
vocabulary also is based on the dominance of light and vision. Derrida 
summarizes the discussion concerning the relation between vision and 
language in his famous essay on Levinas, entitled “Violence and 
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” 
(“Violence et métaphysique”. Essai sur la pensée d´Emmanuel 
Levinas”), originally published in 1964. What Derrida is concerned 
with in the essay is Levinas’s relation to Husserl and to Heidegger. 
Blanchot is not discussed, except for two passing references to his 
essays on Levinas. In my opinion, however, Blanchot’s name could 
have been present much more explicitly: at the time when Derrida 
wrote the essay, Blanchot had already published three excellent essays 
on Levinas, not to mention his numerous references to Levinas in 
various essays and reviews.60
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 In “Literature and the Right to Death” Blanchot refers to Levinas’s il y a in order 
to clarify it with his own account of language as infinite, non-human consciousness 
without subjectivity. In his later collection of essays, The Infinite Conversation from 
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Derrida’s essay is not only a careful close reading of Levinas’s 
work,61 but it gathers together questions and problems concerning the 
notion of “non-violent” language, and as such includes those questions 
to which both Levinas and Blanchot had been trying to find a solution 
since the 1940s.62 As is well known, Levinas scholars consider 
Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics” to be “the first serious and 
extensive philosophical study of Levinas’s work”,63 after which 
Levinas’s works went largely unnoticed until the 1980s. While the 
importance of Derrida’s excellent close reading of Levinas’s work has 
been widely acknowledged, what has been left without adequate 
attention is, as I claim, Blanchot’s early critical reception of Levinas’s 
thinking.64
Despite the fact that Derrida overlooks Blanchot, he poses a 
question that had been central to the dialogue between Levinas and 
Blanchot, a question which concerns my topic here, the relation 
between writing, seeing, and the other. At the end of the first section 
of his essay entitled “The Violence of Light” (Violence de la lumière),
Derrida poses the question, how is it possible to speak of our 
encounter with the other without the metaphors of light, if “To see and 
to know, to have and to will, unfold only within the oppressive and 
luminous identity of the same”, and if “Everything given to me within 
light appears as given to myself by myself”, and “if there is no 
history, except through language”. Who will we ever “dominate” 
light, Derrida asks. “What language will ever escape it?” Derrida 
totalizing relation to the other, discusses the possibilities of this relation and 
develops it further.  
61
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de l’intuition dans la phenomenology de Husserl (1st ed., Paris): Alcan, 1930; 2d ed., 
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concludes by stating that “Light is only one example of several 
fundamental metaphors, but what an example! […] Light perhaps has 
no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night.”65
The question that therefore according to Derrida remains, is the 
following: If language as light is violence of the day and of the 
significant, and if non-language as silence is the realm of the night and 
of the insignificant, would it be possible to imagine language that 
would remain outside this metaphysical opposition? If light is 
violence, is it possible to imagine its non-violent opposite?  
Although Derrida does not discuss Blanchot, in my view this is 
the question to which he could have looked for an answer in 
Blanchot’s effort to define language beyond the opposition between 
light and darkness, day and night. As I will try to show in this thesis, 
Blanchot seeks to define literary language in a way that would leave it 
beyond traditional oppositions used in describing the function of 
language, such as conceal-unconceal, day-night, light-darkness, truth-
untruth. For Blanchot, the opposite of light is not night, but what he 
calls “the second night” (The Space of Literature) or “the neutral” 
(The Infinite Conversation, see Chapter Five of this thesis).  
According to Derrida, Levinas’s problem concerning the other 
is the following: how to translate the other in language, if the other 
must be conceived without relation to the same. Is it not impossible to 
encounter the other within language, which is always and already 
based on the repetition of the same and, thus, on violence? Or as 
Derrida formulates: “How to think the other, if the other can be 
spoken of only as exteriority and through exteriority, that is, 
nonalterity?”66 If giving a name to the other annihilates the exteriority 
of the other, there arises the question of, how is it possible to approach 
the other in thinking and in language at all. Derrida’s conclusion is 
clear: “Since finite silence is also the medium of violence, language 
65
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can only indefinitely tend toward justice by acknowledging and 
practicing the violence within it.”67
As I will show in Chapter Two in my analysis of Blanchot’s 
notion of language, Blanchot affirms, in a similar way as Derrida, the 
violent nature of language, with which he understands its dependence 
on the concepts of the “same” and the “I”. What both Blanchot and 
Derrida underline is the complexity of arguing against the tradition in 
which our language and thinking nevertheless is bound. The problem 
to which Blanchot’s work seeks an answer is the following: how to 
speak without the violence of light, if our language is tied to it?68 As 
Derrida writes, “Borges is right: light is the most powerful of all 
metaphors”.69
My intention in what follows is to show how Blanchot affirms, 
as does Derrida after him, the violent essence of language, but 
considers it (at the same time) as our only way to approach the other. 
Common to Blanchot and Derrida in their challenging of the 
metaphysical vision is that in their writings the criticism of 
metaphysics is not made from a standpoint beyond vision but from its 
limits, from which it follows that their main question concerns the 
conditions and possibilities of this vision. At the core of Blanchot’s 
thinking is the idea of language as violence and non-violence, both at 
the same time. Language is a violent opening of communication, an 
opening which alone makes it possible to approach the other. Without 
the violence of language there wouldn’t be appearance, 
communication, or signification to communicate. There would be only 
another violence which perhaps, as Derrida writes in “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, is “the worst violence.”70 From this it follows, as 
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 In Writing and difference Derrida writes that light and darkness is “the founding 
metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics”, “not only because it is a 
photological one – and in this respect the entire history of our philosophy is a 
photology, the name given to a history of, or treatise on, light – but because it is a 
metaphor. Metaphor in general, the passage from one existent to the other, 
authorized by the initial submission of Being to the existent, the analogical
displacement of Being, is the essential weight which anchors discourse in 
metaphysics” (WAD 27).  
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Derrida says, that all questions concerning the other are “questions of 
language”.71
As I will try to prove in the following chapters, the conclusions 
of “Violence and Metaphysics” – that language always depends on the 
“same” and thus follows the “violence of light” – are views that are 
central to Blanchot and can be already found in his early essay 
“Literature and the Right to Death”, known as his key essay on 
language, where he shows how all language has its origin in violence 
which, even thought it is the violence of the same, is nevertheless “our 
only hope of being man”. Since all language (both “poetical” and 
“philosophical”) is essentially violent, it is not possible to think of 
literary language as “the realm of the unrevealed”. Blanchot’s 
conviction is that eventually all language is tied to light and darkness, 
conceptuality and exteriority.  
However, in the following chapters I will propose that 
Blanchot’s idea of language as infinity and exteriority challenges both 
the Hegelian idea of naming as conceptualizing things and 
Heidegger’s concept of language as a way to truth (as aletheia). To 
use J. L. Austin’s classic distinction between the constative and the 
performative function of language as a heuristic tool in analysing 
Blanchot's idea of language, I will also make the following 
proposition: Whereas naming in Hegel works in constating, and 
whereas in Heidegger the performative function of naming is to 
create, in Blanchot language is neither naming in its constative nor in 
its performative function.72 In criticizing the idea of language as 
naming both in Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot generates a third 
account of language which neither negates nor creates being. 
71
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 I am ready to admit that interpreting Hegel's notion of language as "constative" 
and Heidegger's notion of language as "performative" does not do justice to the 
complexity of their work. The notion of language in both Hegel and Heidegger is 
much more complicated than it is in Austin's thinking. Austin's distinction is thus for 
me only a heuristic instrument in analysing Blanchot's thinking, and I will not go 
closer to Austin's theory of language. Blanchot himself does not analyse Austin, nor 
does he use Austin's distinction. As I will argue, Blanchot's notion of language goes 
beyond Austin's distinction.   
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Blanchot’s aim is, as I will claim, to say nothing with words.73 In my 
interpretation, Blanchot seeks to formulate the idea of language that 
remains beyond the distinction between naming as negativity and 
naming as creativity.74
Exteriority and Language
One of the central hypotheses of the following chapters will be that 
the most significant affinity between Heidegger and Blanchot is their 
demand to take up seriously the question of language, and use it 
against the dominance of vision understood as presence, and further, 
to place the question of language explicitly against the ideology of 
transparency, which comes down to us from a tradition that already 
begins with Plato. In Blanchot it is language as material writing which 
most apparently challenges the indefinable line between visible and 
invisible, exteriority and interiority. In opposition both to the Hegelian 
idea of language as the tool of the Spirit and the Husserlian idea of the 
consciousness of subjectivity as the origin of meaning, for Blanchot 
the condition for a word to continue its signifying beyond the 
existence of the writing or reading subjectivity is the materiality and 
the repeatability of the written mark. The otherness of language, its 
exteriority and obscurity, is due to the possibility of repeating marks 
and extracting them from their original contexts. As repeatable, words 
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 As Blanchot writes in “Literature and the Right to Death”, the ideal of literature 
has been “to speak in order to say nothing (WF 324); “L’idéal de la littérature a pu 
être celui-ci: ne rien dire, parler pour ne rien dire” (PF314). 
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 Blanchot challenges Hegel’s idea of language as negativity and conceptuality with 
the obscurity and ambiguity of the literary language. But whereas Heidegger finds 
poetic language as an affirmative, non-violent, and “aletheic” way of approaching 
Being, by following Kojève’s idea of negativity as the ground of meaning Blanchot 
finds violence even in poetry, and in the core of language itself. In my analysis, 
Blanchot’s third way of determining language – which is not based on the dialectical 
movement central in Hegelian philosophy, nor on the dialectical opposition between 
the assertative and the performative function of language – defines language as both 
negativity and affirmation, visibility and invisibility, conceptuality and non-
conceptuality. As I suggest, Blanchot’s goal is in this way to affirm the violence of 
language in an ethical way. 
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have the ability to continue their existence independently, beyond the 
intentionality of a single subjectivity. 
In Blanchot’s essay “Speaking is Not Seeing” an anonymous 
speaker asks, why is it that we should choose between speech and 
sight: “why should the thing be separated into the thing seen and the 
thing said (written)?”75 His friend answers in a way that can be taken 
as the hypothesis of Blanchot’s investigation of the relation between 
seeing and writing: “To see, perhaps, is to forget to speak; and to 
speak is to draw from the depths of speech an inexhaustible 
forgetfulness.”76
The question of that which remains unthought in the history of 
philosophy is common to Blanchot and his nearest philosophers, 
Heidegger and Levinas. As we will see, the question of exteriority 
both connects and separates these thinkers. For Levinas, as he argues 
in Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority (Totalité et infini: 
essai sur l'extériorité, 1969), metaphysics should be defined in a new 
way that understands “the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority 
of the other.”77 In order to be ethical, vision should not incorporate the 
other but admit that there is always something other, which remains 
left in our effort to understand the other. Blanchot in his turn, as I 
claim, defends literature as the place for radical exteriority: only as 
pure exteriority does literary language remain beyond the 
metaphysical opposition between the visible and the invisible, as well 
as the opposition between the truth and non-truth which, however, is 
still crucial for Heidegger. The basic question of Blanchot’s thinking 
is, would it be possible to think of the other or the exterior without 
negating the otherness of the other in language, and would there be 
something exterior which philosophical systematic thinking would not 
be able to internalize?  
In Blanchot, the experience of exteriority can be defined as the 
experience of something that remains beyond the concepts of 
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philosophical thinking. The difficulty with analysing Blanchot is that 
– in addition to leaving his references obscure – he in most cases 
leaves concepts without definition. This is the case also with 
exteriority. Despite this, one might propose that in Blanchot 
exteriority is always the exteriority encountered in and through 
literary language. The space of literature is the place of exteriority; 
literary language is the medium that brings exteriority forth without 
defining it.78 My hypothesis is that for Blanchot, the critique of vision 
also is a defence of exteriority and that his criticism of the privilege of 
vision is always related to the problematic of exteriority.  
My hypothesis is that the starting place of Blanchot’s analysis 
of language is the same as Heidegger’s Destruktion:79 to challenge the 
tradition of Western metaphysics which “attempts to comprehend 
everything by returning all things to their origin”.80 Blanchot seeks to 
think of language in a way that would not return a linguistic meaning 
to an origin or anchor of meaning either in the mind of the writer or 
the reader. As I will show in the second chapter, Blanchot’s notion of 
language already in his early writings from the 1940s confronts the 
idea of meaning as either delayed or deferred presence. His idea of 
language as absence, as it is presented in his essays in The Work of 
Fire, contradicts the conventional view of language, where writing is 
understood as a neutral way of communicating pre-existing meanings 
and which thus remains bound to the structure of representation.81
Already in this early work, published in 1949, the goal of Blanchot’s 
analysis of language is to challenge the idea of the self-identical 
78
 Levinas writes in “The Poet’s Vision” (“Le Regard du Poète”, 1956) that 
“Blanchot determines writing as a quasi-mad structure in the general economy of 
being, by which being is no longer an economy, as it no longer possesses, when 
approached through writing, any abode – no longer has any interiority. It is literary 
space, that is, absolute exteriority: the exteriority of absolute exile. This is what 
Blanchot also calls the ‘second night’” (Levinas 1996, 133). 
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Heidegger’s Destruktion hopes to make the prevailing philosophical discourse aware 
of its blindness to the neglected dimensionality of Being (BT 44). 
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subjectivity and to find a way of writing, both in theory and in 
practice, beyond the metaphysical dominance of perceptual presence.
As I will show in Chapter Three, the defence of exteriority also 
goes hand in hand with the criticism of the idea of subjectivity as the 
origin and the anchor of meaning. In Blanchot, as in Heidegger, the 
definition of a subject is related to our concept of a subject’s relation 
to its outside, to its other, to exteriority. Common to Blanchot and 
Heidegger is that both relate the experience of exteriority to our 
encounter with art. Blanchot’s defence of Mallarmé’s material poems 
already in “Literature and the Right to Death” can be interpreted to 
refer to Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes, 1933-1935), where Heidegger speaks of the 
materiality of the work of art, by virtue of which there is always 
something excessive in art.82 In Blanchot, as in Heidegger, the 
exteriority of art is linked to its obscure materiality, which is visible 
and invisible, both at the same time. 
The question of exteriority links Blanchot’s work also to 
Levinas. As we well see, Blanchot refers to Levinas either explicitly 
or implicitly in all his central writings on language from the 1940s to 
the 1960s. For both of them, at least in some broad sense, philosophy 
is a thinking and questioning of our experience in relation to the other, 
to exteriority.83 In Totality and Infinity Levinas defines the relationship 
between the self and the other as a relation between interiority and 
exteriority: in the experience of exteriority I encounter something 
which overflows my abilities to make an idea of it. For Levinas, 
82 The Origin of the Work of Art is based on three lectures given in November and 
December 1936. 
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 Perhaps the most significant of Levinas’s books as regards Blanchot’s early 
writings on language was Existence and Existents (De l’existence à l’existant, 1947), 
whose impact, with its analysis on the alterity of existence, is already evident in 
“Literature and the Right to Death” (“La literature et le droit à la mort”, 1949) and 
in the essays from the 1950-60s collected in The Infinite Conversation (L’entretien 
infini, 1969). But in relation to Blanchot’s critique of vision – which becomes the 
key issue in The Infinite Conversation – the most important of Levinas’s books is 
Totality and Infinity (Totalité et infini, 1961), with its question of ethics as “first 
philosophy”. Especially relating to Blanchot’s later writings (1970s-80s), which 
however remain beyond the scope of this study concentrating on Blanchot work 
from the 1940s to the 1960s, the impact of Levinas’s later writings (for instance 
Autrement qu’être from 1974), with its question of the importance of language, is 
significant.  
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exteriority is a state where it is not possible for the self to be united 
into a totality.  
However, whereas the early Levinas sees as problematic the 
way Husserl’s “disinterested spectator” objectifies the other human 
being, in Blanchot the problematic concerns from the beginning the 
essence of language. For him, language is violent in its essence, from 
which it follows that violence is a necessary condition of meaning and 
signification in general. Whereas in Blanchot the most central 
question is the question of literary language as something 
fundamentally other, for Levinas the most central problem is the 
ethical relation to the other, to which all other matters are 
subordinated. Concerning the question of exteriority, this is the 
primary difference between Blanchot and Levinas. Already in 
Blanchot’s first essays, exteriority is the exteriority of language.84
However, there is certain symmetry between the ethical question and 
the question of language: they both concern our relation to exteriority, 
or the relation between interiority and exteriority, or between the same 
and the other. The exposure to the alterity of the other person (in 
Levinas) and the exposure to the exteriority of language (in Blanchot) 
expose us to the regions which challenge the idea of the mastering 
subjectivity, i.e., its ability to control its being or the being of the 
other.
In Chapter Two, I will outline the contemporary philosophical 
reception of Blanchot’s first and most renowned short story Thomas 
the Obscure. In his review of this story Sartre claims that in 
opposition to his intentions, Blanchot ends by “revealing nothingness” 
in his story, i.e., by making it an object of his philosophical reflection.
Against Sartre’s interpretation I claim that language does not “reveal 
nothingness” in Blanchot, since there is nothing behind the surface of 
the text to be revealed. Writing itself is this nothingness which, 
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 According to Levinas, it is necessary to define the other as a personal other, 
Autrui, in order to create a space, an ethical space, in which the other as absolutely 
exterior could present itself as such without being represented by us: “The 
metaphysical relation cannot be properly speaking a representation, for the other 
would therein dissolve into the same: every representation is essentially interpretable 
as a transcendental constitution” (Levinas 1969, 38).
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however, is too obscure or ambiguous to expose itself to the reading 
gaze. In opposition to Sartre, I will argue that in Blanchot language 
does not express or name exteriority after the fact, i.e., after the 
experience of exteriority is over, but it is this exteriority. In my view, 
the aim of Blanchot’s stories is to bring exteriority forth, without 
conceptualizing and naming it and without forcing it into the form of 
an object. For Blanchot, (literary) language is not just a medium that 
uses mechanisms to express alterity in an alternative way but it is 
itself this alterity. For Blanchot, literary narrative cannot be 
understood as a later composition of pre-narrative experiences or ideas 
to which a narrative would be faithful, but rather narrative constitutes 
this experience itself.85
In Blanchot, the exteriority encountered in reading challenges 
not only the key concepts of Husserlian phenomenology, but also the 
idea of the phenomenological theory of reading. In my analysis 
Blanchot poses the question of what is the theory of reading like, that 
is not based on the idea of the presence of vision and meaning as its 
object, central to the phenomenological model of reading, but 
understands reading rather as a textual encounter with something that 
dislocates time. In interpreting Blanchot’s narrative of reading 
experience in Thomas the Obscure, I will argue in Chapter Four that 
the story questions the idea of reading as a process of becoming 
conscious of the present meaning of the text. In Blanchot’s story, the 
experience of the infinity of time in reading is the experience of 
something invisible that nevertheless grounds the object of vision.  
Blanchot speaks of the literary experience as the experience of 
fascination (la fascination), which challenges seeing as intentionality 
and making present. In analysing reading in Blanchot, I will claim that 
the experience of fascination opposes the classical phenomenological 
theories of reading where reading is understood as an act of the 
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 As Blanchot writes in “Literature and the Right to Death”, before the work is 
born, there is nothing. Only as the work is written, is the writer born, even if it is 
true that the work is not born without its author. There is no writer without a work, 
and no work without a writer. Both are born at the same instant, but neither is before 
the other.  
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reading consciousness. For Blanchot, reading is not an act of 
subjectivity but turns from consciousness to affection and from 
perception to fascination. I will propose that Blanchot replaces 
Heidegger’s notion of seeing as Umsicht with his own notion of 
fascination, which eventually is an experience that remains beyond the 
opposition seeing/non-seeing. For Blanchot, the literary experience 
prevents any seeing, revealing, illuminating or appearance of truth 
from happening. With his concepts of fascination, resemblance and 
image, Blanchot both affirms and challenges the central points of 
Heidegger’s thinking on art.  
In the closing chapter of the study I argue that Blanchot’s 
fragmentary writings, already in The Infinite Conversation but 
especially in The Writing of the Disaster (L’écriture du désastre,
1980), can be read as radical repudiations of phenomenological 
perception as such: by challenging the idea of language as seeing, 
revealing, representing and thinking, Blanchot’s fragmentary writing 
questions the power of vision and perception, and aims to fill the 
needs of “less violent language”, to which Heidegger already aimed 
with his idea of art as a way of aletheic seeing, and to which Derrida 
refers in his analysis of Levinas’s thinking in his essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics” (“Violence et Métaphysique”, 1964).
For Blanchot, the question is not only how to approach the 
otherness of the other in language, but how to approach anything with 
something that is already otherness – something internal and external 
at the same time. He asks, is it possible to understand something that 
has no essence, and is it possible to think of anything without 
essentializing and thematizing it? How should one respond to the 
primordial violence of language? Is there language that would be 
beyond all objectifying and essentializing tendencies of the 
metaphysical thinking, and if not, what is our hope of ever 
encountering exteriority and otherness in language? In my view, 
Blanchot’s originality in, and contribution to, the discussion about the 
violence of vision and language is found in his answer to the question 
of how to approach the other by avoiding the “worst violence”. This is 
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the question to which Blanchot, as well as Derrida, continuously 
returns.
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II How to Avoid Doing Things with Words?   
The Question of Literature 
“Let us suppose that literature begins at the moment when literature 
becomes a question.”86 This opening sentence of Blanchot’s early, 
philosophical essay “Literature and the Right to Death” (“La
litterature et le droit á la mort”, 1949) crystallizes his starting point in 
approaching literature. The performative “Let us suppose…” asks us 
to think of literature as its own origin. There is no essence of 
literature, which is why there is no answer to Sartre’s essentializing 
question, “What is literature” (Qu’est-ce que la literature, 1948). The 
“what is” of the question “what is literature” assumes an essence for 
its object, which is why the question, accompanied by the reflective 
attitude of a philosopher, becomes bogus when applied to literature.87
Since the essentializing attitude and an objectifying question 
such as “What is a novel” or “What is poetry” prove powerless in the 
face of literature, it must be put on hold in order that literature itself 
can re-emerge as the question of its own being.88  For Blanchot, to 
86
 WF 300. A little bit later Blanchot formulates another performative: “Let us 
suppose the work to be written: with it the writer is born” (WF 305, PF 297). These 
performatives can be read to refer not only to Hegel whose name Blanchot mentions 
explicitly at the beginning of his essay but also to Heidegger’s questions concerning 
the origin of the work of art.  
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 We could propose Blanchot to say that it is not possible to define literature with a 
“constative” (to use Austin’s vocabulary) or with an “assertion” (which according to 
Heidegger follows the idea of thinking as representation). 
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 According to Blanchot, the origin of literature is a “miracle” which philosophical 
reflection has in vain tried to solve. Blanchot thus rejects Kojève’s idea that the task 
of philosophy could be to solve the “miracle” of discourse. In the opening pages of 
“Literature and the Right to Death” he refers ironically to Kojève, writing that “if 
literature coincides with nothing for just an instant, it is immediately everything, and 
this everything begins to exist: what a miracle!” (WF 302) For Blanchot, 
contradictions and impasses, which every writer confronts in the act of writing, are 
not anything solvable. The origin of writing is in the experience of impossibility, 
which cannot be transgressed by any higher term or aspect, as happens in Hegel’s 
dialectic. In Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, the miracle which philosophy seeks to 
explain, concerns the birth and condition of language. Kojève writes: “Now if the 
traditional conception of [the conjunction] Being-Thought takes account of the 
possibility of a discourse revealing the meaning of what is, by explaining how and 
why Being has meaning, it does not say how and why discourse becomes real, that 
is how and why we manage in fact to ‘disengage the meaning from the being’ and to 
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encounter the exteriority of literature presupposes a non-objectifying 
attitude. Only if the reflective attitude withdraws and retreats, it 
follows that literature “once again becomes something important, 
essential, more important than philosophy, religion or the life of the 
world which it embraces.”89  Or as Blanchot writes in his later work, 
The Space of Literature (1955), as if quoting Heidegger: 
“Investigations on the subject of art such as those the aesthetician 
pursues bear no relation to the concern for the work of which we 
speak. Aesthetics talks about art, makes of it an object of reflection 
and of knowledge. Aesthetics explains art by reducing it or then again 
exalts it by elucidating it, but in all events art for the aesthetician is a 
present reality around which he constructs plausible thoughts at no 
risk.”90
Blanchot’s way of opening his essay “Literature and the Right 
to Death” reminds one of the opening of Heidegger’s Being and Time,
where Heidegger states that philosophy forgets, in turning away from 
its original interrogative nature, to ask the “meaning of Being”. In 
order to regain the name of philosophy as fundamental ontology, 
philosophy should look at itself as the source of questioning. 
Philosophy itself – and not the consciousness of the one who asks – 
should be seen as the ground from which the inaugurating question is 
born.
The central point of Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to 
Death” is, as I read it, that the inaugurating question concerning the 
essence, the being and the condition of literature’s possibility, has to 
be derived from its existence and its signification, and not from the 
consciousness and pre-existing ideas of the one who asks, be the 
questioner a critic or a philosopher.91 This question “awaiting us” at 
the heart of literature does not concern the task of literature in 
incarnate it in a collection of words that have nothing in common with that meaning 
and that have been created out of a whole discourse that is the miracle that 
philosophy must explain” (Kojève 1993, 327).  
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contemporary political reality or literary genres.92 Literature is 
concerned with itself, and literary writing is, in its turn, writing in the 
form of a question. 
The question that organizes “Literature and the Right to 
Death”, Blanchot’s central essay on the essence of language and 
literature, concerns the condition of the possibility of language to turn 
towards its own origin in order to ask what makes language possible. 
Blanchot formulates this ultimately Orphic question in the following 
way: “Something has disappeared. How can I recover it, how can I 
turn around and look at what exists before, if all my power consists of 
making it into what exists after?”93
In a similar way as philosophy in Heidegger begins with a 
question that concerns its own being, in Blanchot the task of both 
writer and reader is to concentrate on the being of language. In Being
and Time the inaugurating question concerns the beginning of 
philosophy, whereas in “Literature and the Right to Death” the 
question concerns the beginning of literature. As Heidegger claims, 
philosophy has turned away from its original interrogative nature, and 
in order to regain the name of philosophy as fundamental ontology, 
philosophy should look at itself as the source of questioning. 
Blanchot, in turn, claims that literature “begins” only when literature 
is understood as “language, which has become literature.”94 The 
question that awaits us at the heart of literature is one that concerns 
the being of literature itself. As Blanchot writes, “one thing is true: as 
soon as the page has been written, the question which kept 
interrogating the writer while he was writing – though he may not 
have been aware of it – is now present on the page; and now the same 
question lies silent within the work, waiting for a reader to approach – 
any kind of reader, shallow or profound; this question is addressed to 
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language, behind the person who is writing and the person who is 
reading, by language that has become literature.”95
Blanchot’s key essay on language, “Literature and the Right to 
Death” and his first essay on Heidegger, “The Sacred Speech of 
Hölderlin” (“La Parole Sacrée de Hölderlin)” were both published in 
The Work of Fire, the collection of essays published in 1949. In this 
work, the impact of Heidegger’s thinking on Blanchot becomes 
apparent not only in his questioning of the essence of language and in 
his criticism of the essentializing ways of approaching literary 
language, but also in his demand for a non-reflective attitude towards 
literature. In my analysis, for Blanchot, as for Heidegger, the question 
concerns our ability to think of something that does not take place in 
the form of any object or that does not exist in the manner of a thing.  
For Heidegger, however, it is the question of the “meaning of 
Being” to which all the other questions, including the question of 
language, are subordinated.96 In Blanchot, instead, the privilege is 
from the beginning given to language as literary writing, from which 
follow all the major differences between him and the early 
Heidegger.97 Whereas in Heidegger Being comes to us with language, 
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 As Timothy Clark puts it, in Heidegger poetry as “Dichtung concerned a sending 
of [B]eing that even though most fully realized in certain poets, is not to be entirely 
identified with language in any received sense but which must be associated, 
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Blanchot seeks to speak of language as an element that is neither 
Being, nor not-Being, but beyond this opposition.  
The most significant common characteristic of Blanchot and 
Heidegger is their intention to challenge those metaphysical prejudices 
which determine our thinking about art, language and the other. In 
Heidegger’s analysis, these prejudices are our tendency to conceive of 
Being always as an entity of some kind, as a substantial being, as well 
as our tendency to understand Being as presence.98 As Heidegger says, 
every time as we think, speak or write of any entity, our first 
supposition is that something is there, rather than nothing at all.99
Common to Heidegger and Blanchot is their will to turn away 
from metaphysical thinking, which posits the world as an object of 
representation.100 If to think metaphysically means to posit the world 
as an object of representation, in the case of literature a metaphysical 
attitude means having literary work as an object of analysis. In 
Blanchot’s view this is not a correct way to approach something 
which refuses to be analysed and defined: rather than “investigating” 
literature, our reading should take into account the “concern that 
literature has with itself”.101 For Heidegger, the violence of perception 
is the problem of all thinking and theory, and therefore it is the 
broadly speaking, with anything of significance for Dasein. Blanchot, however, also 
shows minute concern with literature in the narrower sense” (Clark 2002, 67-8).  
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problem also in aesthetics, where the artwork is posited as the object 
for a subject. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” he questions the idea 
of a work of art as an object we can possess and subdue to our 
experience: a work of art is not an object of any kind, but an event 
where something unusual manifests itself. In The Space of Literature,
Blanchot in his turn writes, as if with Heidegger’s words: “It cannot 
be said that the work belongs to being, that it exists. On the contrary, 
what must be said is that it never exists in the manner of a thing or a 
being in general. What must be said, in answer to our question, is that 
literature does not exist or again that if it takes place, it does so as 
something ‘not taking place in the form of any object that exists.’ ”102
In my analysis, the questions shared by Blanchot and 
Heidegger are the following: Is it possible for man as a being who 
“has language” to approach nothingness without objectifying it?103
Can we reach for anything without determining it somehow? Why is 
our first supposition that something is there rather than nothing at 
all?104 Does thinking always require thematization? Doesn’t language 
always, as soon as something is said, pose a relation to being? Isn’t it 
impossible to negate something without positing it beforehand?105 In 
what follows I will analyse Blanchot’s answer to these fundamental 
questions concerning the possibility of non-representative language.  
The Debate over “Nothingness” and Blanchot’s Thomas l’Obscur
The question of whether language always, as soon as something is 
said, poses a relation to being, was also a question shared by Jean-Paul 
102
 SL 43.  
103
 BT 208-209.  
104
 IM 1. Heidegger asks at the beginning of his Introduction to Metaphysics, “why 
are there beings at all instead of nothing?” Heidegger defines Being as Nothingness, 
since Being is nothing that “is”. Thus the question is, how can we have a relation to 
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 As Blanchot writes in The Infinite Conversation, “It has often been remarked – 
by philosophers, linguists, and political analysts – that nothing can be negated that 
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Sartre, Georges Bataille, and Emmanuel Levinas, the contemporary 
thinkers and renowned readers of Blanchot. The fictional text that 
provoked the debate on the capacity of the literary language to 
thematization was Blanchot’s first and most renowned short story
Thomas the Obscure (1941/1950)106, in particularly the second chapter 
of the story, which describes how the protagonist, Thomas, gets lost in 
a dark, cave-like space, possibly a cellar. Blanchot’s text, 
demonstrating in different ways the impossibility of its protagonist to 
gaze into the abyss of nothingness, participated in its own way in the 
philosophical discussion of the interrelatedness of truth and sight, of 
knowing and seeing, in French philosophy at the time the story was 
published.
The dispute among Blanchot’s readers concerned the meaning 
and the position of nothingness in Blanchot’s story; the main question 
was whether Blanchot’s story succeeds in presenting nothingness 
without objectifying it. One could, using J.L. Austin’s classical 
distinction in How to do Things with Words (1962), claim that the 
focus of this debate was the difference between the “constative” and 
“performative” functions of language: according to Austin, constative 
signs refer to a thing or a state of affairs independent and external of 
the process of signification, whereas a performative’s referent is 
internal to the linguistic event itself. Austin suggests that instead of 
“constating” or “describing” what is the case, language in its 
performative dimension is rather doing than reporting something,107
and that the performative function of language is to create something 
new, independent of any referent outside this linguistic event.108 Or as 
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 Blanchot published the first version of Thomas l’Obscur in 1941 and a new, 
shorter version in 1950. The story was translated into English by Robert Lamberton 
in 1973. The first version describes itself as a “roman”, whereas from the second 
version this subtitle is missing.  
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 Jacques Derrida gives, while commenting on Austin’s distinction in his article 
“Signature Event Context” (“Signature événement contexte”, 1972), the following 
explanation of performative: “Differing from the classical assertion, from the 
constative utterance, the performative’s referent (although the word is inappropriate 
here, no doubt, such is the interest of Austin’s finding) is not outside it, or in any 
case preceding it or before it. It does not describe something that exists outside or 
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Derrida puts it, the “performative does not describe something that 
exists outside or before language.”109
Jill Robbins, in her study on the place of literature in Levinas’s 
thinking (Altered Reading. Levinas and literature, 1999), uses 
Austin’s distinction to draw a contrast between Levinas and Blanchot: 
according to Robbins’s interpretation, Levinas “uses” Blanchot’s story 
in a way that we could name “constative”, i.e., he only utilizes 
Blanchot’s fiction as material for his own philosophical arguments. 
What we should instead do, says Robbins, is to give to Blanchot’s text 
a possibility to “perform” what a philosophical argument can only 
“constate”.110
Although I admit the usefulness of Austin’s distinction in 
clarifying the difference between the place of literature in Levinas (the 
philosopher) and in Blanchot (the writer), I would also argue that both 
Austin’s distinction and his question “How to do Things with 
Words?” prove to be inaccurate in the case of Thomas the Obscure. I 
will argue – following here Mark C. Taylor’s absorbing article “How 
to do Nothing with Words?” (1992) – that in addition to the distinction 
between “constative” and “performative” use of language we should 
distinguish a third function or dimension of language, that which in 
contrast to the constative, which always refers to something, and in 
contrast to performative, which always “does” something, “struggles 
to do nothing with words.”111 As Taylor writes, the question that 
remains is “whether words sometimes are neither constative nor 
before language. It produces or transforms a situation, it operates; and if it can be 
said that a constative utterance also effectuates something and always transforms a 
situation, it cannot be said that this constitutes its internal structure, its manifest 
function or destination, as in the case of the performative” (MP 321). In Derrida’s 
interpretation, Austin frees the performative from the opposition truth/false, but 
replaces it with the value of “force”, which means that it “does not essentially limit 
itself to transporting an already constituted semantic content guarded by its own 
aiming at truth (truth as unveiling of that which is in its Being, or as an adequation
between a judicative statement and the thing itself)” (MP 322).  
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performative but function as an unthought third that allows words to 
do nothing”.112
Before entering the dispute between Levinas, Bataille, and 
Sartre on the relations between thinking and nothingness in Blanchot, 
I would like to give space to the story itself, the obscure centre of this 
discussion. Now, since Levinas restricts himself only to describing the 
story, without actually quoting it,113 and since Bataille, who 
nonetheless appreciates the same story as a fictional text, makes (in 
my opinion) only a short citation of it, I will restart the discussion by 
making what Robbins insists we should do: instead of allowing the 
philosophical arguments alone to introduce Blanchot’s text, I will let 
the text speak for itself. The below-quoted paragraph from Blanchot’s 
story encompasses the second half of chapter two.114
The night was more somber and more painful than he [Thomas] 
could have expected. The darkness immersed everything; there was 
no hope of passing through its shadows, but one penetrated its 
reality in a relationship of overwhelming intimacy. His first 
observation was that he could use his body, and particularly his 
eyes; it was not that he saw anything, but what he looked at 
eventually placed him in contact with a nocturnal mass which he 
vaguely perceived to be himself and in which he bathed. Naturally, 
he formulated this remark only as a hypotheses, as a convenient 
point of view, but a one to which he was obliged to have recourse 
only by necessity of unravelling circumstances. As he had no 
means of measuring time, he probably took some hours before 
accepting this way of looking at things, but, for him, it was as if 
fear had immediately conquered him, and it was with a sense of 
shame that he raised his head to accept the idea he had entertained: 
outside himself there was something identical to his own thought 
which his glance or his hand could touch. Repulsive fantasy. Soon 
the night seemed to him gloomier and more terrible than any other 
night, as if it had in fact issued from a wound of thought which had 
ceased to think, of thought taken ironically as object by something 
other than thought. It was night itself. Images which constituted its 
darkness inundated him. He saw nothing, and, far from being 
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addressed to the English-speaking academic audience, is English. Of course, this 
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distressed, he made this absence of vision the culmination of his 
sight. Useless for seeing, his eye took on extraordinary proportions, 
developed beyond measure, and, starching out on the horizon, let 
the night penetrate its center in order to receive the day from it. 
And so, through this void, it was sight and the object of sight which 
mingled together. Not only did his eye which saw nothing 
apprehend something, it apprehended the cause of its vision. It saw 
as object that which prevented it from seeing. Its own glance 
entered into it as an image, just when this glance seemed the death 
of all image. New preoccupations came out of this for Thomas. His 
solitude no longer seemed so complete, and he even had the feeling 
that something real had knocked against him and was trying to slip 
inside. Perhaps he might even be able to interpret this feeling in 
some other way, but he always had to assume the worst. What 
excuses him is the fact that the impression was so clear and so 
painful that it was almost impossible not to give way to it. Even if 
had questioned its truth, he would have had the greatest difficulty 
in not believing that something extreme and violent was happening, 
for from all evidence a foreign body had lodged itself in his pupil 
and was attempting to go further. It was strange, absolutely 
disturbing, all the more disturbing because it was not a small 
object, but whole trees, the whole woods still quivering and full of 
life. He felt this as a weakness which did him no credit. He no 
longer even paid attention to the details of events. Perhaps a man 
slipped in by the same opening, he could neither have affirmed nor 
denied it. It seemed to him that the waves were invading the sort of 
abyss which was himself. All this preoccupied him only slightly. 
He had no attention for anything but his hands, busy recognizing 
the beings mingled with himself, whose character they discerned by 
parts, a dog represented by an ear, a bird replacing the tree on 
which it sang. Thanks to these beings which indulged in acts which 
escaped all interpretation, edifices, whole cities were built, real 
cities made of emptiness and thousands of stones piled one on 
another, creatures rolling in blood and tearing arteries, playing the 
role of what Thomas had once called ideas and passions. And so 
fear took hold of him, and was in no way distinguishable from his 
corpse. Desire was this same corpse which opened its eyes and 
knowing itself to be dead climbed awkwardly back up into his 
mouth like an animal swallowed alive. Feelings occupied him, then 
devoured him. He was pressed in every part of his flesh by a 
thousand of hands which were only his own hand. A mortal 
anguish beat against his heart. Around his body, he knew that his 
thought, mingled with the night, kept watch. He knew with terrible 
certainty that it, too, was looking for a way to enter into him. 
Against his lips, in his mouth, it was forcing its way toward the 
monstrous union. Beneath his eyelids, it created a necessary sight. 
At the same time it was furiously destroying the face it kissed. 
Prodigious cities, ruined fortresses disappeared. The stones were 
tossed outside. The trees were transplanted. Hands and corpses 
were taken away. Alone, the body of Thomas remained, deprived 
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of its senses. And thought, having entered him again, exchanged 
contact with void.115
Thomas the Obscure is a paradoxical story about an experience that, 
even if it is not grounded on vision, nevertheless seems to remain – in 
a way that urges on interpretation – an optical experience; although 
everything that happens to Thomas seems to happen to his eyes, there 
is not much to visualize. As the text tells us, it was not that Thomas 
“saw anything, but what he looked at eventually placed him in contact 
with a nocturnal mass which he vaguely perceived to be himself and 
in which he bathed.” As the narrator tells, Thomas has to accept the 
new “way of looking at things”, the way that hurts his eyes as much it 
frightens him. Without the ability to see and to objectify with his 
intentional gaze, Thomas is unable to keep his identity, and it is as if 
“outside himself there was something identical to his own thought 
which his glance or his hand could touch […] And so, through this 
void, it was sight and the object of sight which mingled together.” 
However, precisely when much is not seen, the question of our 
capacity for vision comes to the forefront. As the text describes 
Thomas’s feelings, “He saw nothing, and, far from being distressed, 
he made this absence of vision the culmination of his sight.” One 
could also say that because Blanchot’s story does not try to be 
representative, it brings up the question of representation; in being 
suspicious of the idea of representation, it asks the limits of 
representation. Thomas’s experience hurts not only his physical eyes, 
but it challenges also his capacity (as an “intentional consciousness” 
perceiving with the “eyes of the mind”, as Husserl would say) to 
internalize what remains exterior to him.116 The story underlines the 
impossibility of Thomas encountering the night or the nothingness as 
such, as well as the impossibility of him escaping the intentionality of 
115
 TTO 14-16. 
116
 The goal of Husserl’s phenomenology was to formulate a new phenomenological 
method and a phenomenological programme committed to the restricted exercise of 
the “mental eye” in order to analyse how the world was represented to the mind as 
images in its metaphorical eye. See e.g. Husserl 1969, 94, 107, 109, 173, sect.57, p. 
156, sect. 84, 223, sect. 137, pp. 353-354. 
52
his mind.117 “And so, through this void, it was sight and the object of 
sight which mingled together.” As Adams Sitney proposes, Blanchot’s 
writings are oppositional to Horace’s famous slogan Ur picture poesis,
i.e., the idea that visibility would be a self-evident literary value.118
The question which Blanchot’s story poses to us is, as I interpret it, 
what is the relation between seeing and writing: what is the difference 
between having something in view and reading something? What is 
the relation between an image and a word? 
Vision in Blanchot 
Blanchot’s story, with its network of philosophical allusions, seems to 
suggest itself generously to philosophical interpretation. “A wound of 
thought” (“une blessure de la pénsee”) could be read as a reference to 
Bataille and his notion of the “inner experience”.119 Toward the end of 
the story Thomas’s existence is compared to an enormous “lens”, and 
thus also Spinoza is involved.120 To Descartes’s philosophy refer 
Thomas’s constant doubts of his perceptions, as well as his inability to 
find any secure basis for his own existence (his existence is “obscure”, 
as the title already informs), and the impossibility of getting 
confirmation for different uncertain perceptions; to the Cartesian 
revolution in philosophy refer ironically also the recurrence of the 
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verb “to think” and the increasing ambiguousness of its meaning 
towards the end of the story, until Thomas pronounces explicitly: “I 
think, therefore I am not.”121 Ironical enough, this is the only instance 
in the story, told in the third person, when Thomas says anything. He 
thus says “I” only in order to deny the analogy between thinking and 
existing, or at least to deny this analogy in his own existence – which, 
paradoxically, the linguistic performative (“I am not”) despite its 
negative form succeeds only to affirm: “It was then that, deep within a 
cave, the madness of the taciturn thinker appeared before me and 
unintelligible words rung in my ears while I wrote on the wall these 
sweet words: ‘I think, therefore I am not.’ These words brought me a 
delicious vision.”122
The story also brings to mind Plato’s famous cave story in the 
Republic. But whereas Plato in his cave story lectures his interlocutor, 
that we have to learn to see properly in order to have access to truths, 
Thomas’s effort is to do just the opposite: to learn how not to see.  
One can also think of the cave of Zarathustra – although Thomas’s 
cave in the woods is not up on a mountaintop as Zarathustra’s. The 
cave is not only a metaphor for a womb; it is also Hades, where 
Thomas accompanies his beloved Anne soon after the cave scene. 
Thomas the Obscure is also a love story, and as such it is one of the 
recurrent variations of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice in 
Blanchot’s work. The myth of Orpheus, which Blanchot rewrites 
through his work, defines the gaze of Orpheus as a gaze that kills. In 
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the Western tradition, Orpheus, whose forbidden gaze sends Eurydice 
to death, has been interpreted as a mediating figure between opposite 
realms: between life and death, men and gods, as well as between two 
kinds of languages, literary and philosophical.  
The “nocturnal mass” Thomas encounters in the woods could 
in turn be seen as an “element” (élément) in the sense of Levinas: an 
“element” does not give itself as an object of our vision; rather, it 
surrounds and functions like an environment for the experience, that 
no longer represents and objectifies (Levinas’s “element” could also 
be found in the first chapter of the story where Thomas is swimming 
in the sea). For me, Blanchot’s story also brings to mind Bataille’s 
short text “Man, that Night” (1947), where Bataille writes:  
As Louis Althusserl writes in his short text “Man, That Night” (in 
“The Spectre of Hegel - Early Writings”) from 1947, night is one 
of “the profoundest themes of the Romantic nocturne” that “haunt 
Hegel’s thinking”. “Yet Night is not,” in Hegel, Althusserl 
continues, “the blind peace of the darkness through which discrete 
entities make their solitary way, separated from one another for all 
eternity. It is, by the grace of man, the birth of Light. […]. At the 
level of nature, man is an absurdity, a gap in being, an ‘empty 
nothing’, a ‘Night’. ‘We see this Night,’ as Hegel profoundly says, 
‘when we look a human being in the eye: a Night which turns 
terrifying, the Night of the World that rises up before us....’ This 
passage, which one would like to have seen Sartre choose as the 
epigraph for his chapter on the gaze, dominates, from a 
commanding height, the whole of contemporary anthropology. The 
birth of man is, in Hegel, the death of nature. Animal desire 
whether hunger, thirst, or sex sates itself on natural creatures.”123
The title of Bataille’s text “Man, that Night” is a phrase drawn from a 
lecture Hegel delivered in 1805-06, and which Alexandre Kojève in 
turn cited in his study on Hegel, Introduction a la lecture de Hegel –
which is for the early Blanchot the most relevant philosophical text on 
the nature of language. One could propose that what Blanchot’s story 
tries to do is to “look a human being in the eye” and to ask how 
meaning is born. In Blanchot, in opposition to Hegel, it is not by the 
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grace of man that the light of meaning is born. In Blanchot the 
opposite happens: as is narrated in Thomas the Obscure, meaning 
comes to Thomas in the form of objects and entities from which he is 
not able to close his eyes: “a foreign body had lodged itself in his 
pupil and was attempting to go further. It was strange, absolutely 
disturbing, all the more disturbing because it was not a small object, 
but whole trees, the whole woods still quivering and full of life. He 
felt this as a weakness which did him no credit. He no longer even 
paid attention to the details of events. Perhaps a man slipped in by the 
same opening, he could neither have affirmed nor denied it. It seemed 
to him that the waves were invading the sort of abyss which was 
himself.” 124
However, despite the fact that Thomas the Obscure includes 
numerous references to the philosophical discussion on the relation 
between thinking and vision, for Blanchot the question of vision is not 
only a philosophical problem, but a problem that has to do with the 
praxis of writing. In Thomas the Obscure vision is not only a theme 
seducing us to different philosophical readings on the difference 
between thinking and seeing; Blanchot does not claim that he would 
represent how a man called Thomas sees his environment. Rather, in 
the story it is foremost a question of vision that is created in language. 
We could call it a performative of vision, a textual encounter with 
vision, where also vision is made textual.  
In Blanchot, the alternative to the violence of vision is not an 
absolute darkness, blindness, or an inability to see, but vision that is 
blindness and inability to stop seeing, both at the same time. Despite 
the weakness of the eye, it is not possible to gaze into nothingness, 
either. As the narrator tells in Madness of the Day (La Folie du Jour,
1973): “I nearly lost my sight, because someone crushed glass in my 
eyes. That blow unnerved me, I must admit. I had the feeling I was 
going back into the wall, or straying into a thicket of flint. The worst 
thing was the sudden, shocking cruelty of the day; I could not look, 
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but I could not help looking. To see was terrifying, and to stop seeing 
tore me apart from my forehead to my throat.”125 In Madness of the 
Day, light is not only what enables the narrator to see, but first of all 
what prevents him from seeing.126 As the narrator tells ”But this was 
what was strange: although I had not forgotten the agonizing contact 
with the day, I was wasting away from living behind curtains in dark 
glasses. I wanted to see something in full daylight; I was sated with 
the pleasure and comfort of the half light; I had the same desire for the 
daylight as for water and air. And if seeing was fire, I required the 
plenitude of fire, and if seeing would infect me with madness, I madly 
wanted that madness.”127
If idealization means bringing being to light, into the realm of 
consciousness, from this it follows that to think clearly is to see 
clearly, and not to think is not to see; what can be seen can also be 
idealized, and what cannot be idealized cannot be the object of 
thinking, or to quote Samuel Beckett’s famous story, Ill seen is ill said
(Mal vu mal dit, 1981) In Blanchot’s stories, characters often try not to 
see, only to notice that it is impossible: it is not possible to avoid the 
violence of light and vision. Thomas the Obscure even tries to bury 
himself in the ground (which can be interpreted as an ironical allusion 
to Heidegger’s notion of death in Being and Time as Dasein’s 
“possibility of the impossibility”).  
In the above-quoted passage of Blanchot’s Thomas the 
Obscure visions and glances are born, tied and inscribed within the 
temporal movement of writing. An image created by language is not 
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eidos or Gestalt, but rather an evasive happening, obscure from its 
limits and centre. Images created by the story are dependent on the 
movement of writing which, as temporal, does not have a stable 
ground, focus, or figure. As a textual construction vision is necessarily 
tied to the temporality of language, and also, as Derrida would add, to 
writing as “spacing”.128 Blanchot’s story, encountered by its reader as 
a precipitate and transitory event, is something in which a reader’s 
gaze is not able to dwell, i.e., the story can’t be approached by making 
it present to a reader’s interpretative gaze. Writing as event is not a 
stabile structure, which could be objectified with the motionless 
vision. In language as temporality vision becomes motion. We cannot 
say that meaning “is” – it rather happens. Language makes things 
appear, disappear, and to continue (dis)appearing. Or as the narrator 
expresses the interrelatedness of the experience of vision and time in 
Thomas the Obscure: “His eyes tried to look not in space but in 
duration, and in a point in time which did not yet exist”.129
Michel Levin introduces the notion of the “textual vision” in 
Sites of Vision: The Discoursive Construction of Sight in the History 
of Philosophy (1997), while analysing the function of the materiality 
of vision in Derrida. According to Levin’s interpretation, “Derrida 
demonstrates a post-metaphysical vision by inscribing and encrypting 
his glances and gazes within the movement of écriture, subverting the 
metaphysical eye in the articulation of texts. In effect, he articulates a 
‘vision écriture’: in a style of vision that insists on being strictly 
optical, he inscribes a vision, a gaze that has no identity apart from the 
128
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operations and effects of the text.”130 In Blanchot, as in Derrida, vision 
is not only “hermeneutical” (as it is in Heidegger) but it is also textual, 
i.e., tied to the effects and movement of the text: l’écriture vision 
becomes a vehicle in questioning the absolute gaze of traditional 
metaphysics.  
In what follows I will propose that Blanchot’s fictional writing 
does not concern a “being” or an “entity”, of which we could say that 
“it is here”, “it was here” or “it is not here”: it is not possible to fix 
one’s eyes on the being (existence) of this being (entity), nor is it 
possible to get hold of it by reflecting on it. One cannot imagine it as 
an “object”, an entity “present-at-hand” (as Heidegger would say), 
which one could perceive from “different sides” (as Husserl puts it). 
In Blanchot, writing gives us nothing that “is”. As such, its being 
reminds of the elusive “flow of being” of which “Heraclitus the 
Obscure” discusses.
How to Read Thomas the Obscure
As is well-known, Blanchot’s contemporary thinker Emmanuel 
Levinas reads Blanchot’s fictional story Thomas the Obscure from the 
philosophical position: in Existence and Existants (De l’existence à 
l´existant, 1947) he mentions Blanchot’s text as the most fitting 
example of the il y a, “there is”: “Thomas l’Obscur, de Maurice 
Blanchot, s’ouvre sur la description de l’ Il y a (ch., en particulier 
chapitre II, pages 13–16).”131 With his notion of il y a, Levinas refers 
to existence without any existent, to being devoid also of nothingness. 
To illustrate the scope of the there is Levinas gives a list of themes 
that Blanchot expresses in Thomas the Obscure: “La presence de 
l’absence, la nuit, la dissolution du sujet dans la nuit, l’horreur d’être, 
la retour d’être au sein de tous le mouvements négatifs, la réalité de 
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l’irréalité.”132 As the familiar forms dissolve in the night, it is no 
longer possible to distinguish between inwardness and exteriority; 
darkness is neither an object nor the quality of an object, which 
questions the ability of consciousness to determinate its object by 
objectivizing it.  
As an event of which we cannot make the noema of the noesis,
il y a marks the end of objectivizing and thus violent consciousness, 
and the egoism of Husserl’s phenomenology. For Levinas, the 
problem with light and vision is that vision does not open anything 
that, beyond the “same”, would be absolutely other: “The light that 
permits encountering something other than the self makes it 
encountered as if this thing came from the ego. The light, brightness, 
is intelligibility itself; making everything come from me […].”133
Husserl’s phenomenology, with light and vision as its accomplices, 
follows the “logic of the same” and thus the logic of violence by 
reducing the other to the same.134 Since light is for Levinas the proper 
element of violence, the experience of the il y a as the total exclusion 
of light involves the possibility of an encounter that escapes the 
violence of an intentional consciousness. In art in general and in 
Blanchot’s fiction in particular Levinas finds a possibility to make a 
“voyage into the end of the night itself”135 without enlightening, 
rational consciousness. As he puts it in “The Poet’s Vision” (“Le 
Regard du Poète,” 1956), “literature casts us upon a shore where no 
thought can land – it lets out onto the unthinkable.”136 In this review 
on Blanchot’s The Space of Literature Levinas suggests that art should 
be understood as an impossibility to interiorize the exterior (or as 
Heidegger would say, impossibility to transpose the “sensible” into 
the “nonsensible”). As the place where seeing no longer guarantees 
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knowing, art is a place where “the idealist metaphysics of esse-percipi
comes to an end.”137
However, despite this conclusion one can ask, does not 
Levinas still read Thomas the Obscure from a philosophical position, 
i.e., as a material for his own philosophy and as a philosophical 
argument made against Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation of 
art? As Levinas proposes in “The Poet’s Vision”, “Blanchot’s research 
brings to the philosopher a ‘category’ and a new ‘way of knowing’ 
”.
138
 Levinas’s interpretation of Blanchot is therefore ambiguous. On 
the one hand he acknowledges that Blanchot’s literary writing “casts 
us upon a shore where no thought can land.”139 On the other hand he 
sees Blanchot’s literary writings as “an invitation to leave the 
Heideggerian world”, where every relation to another is subordinated 
to philosophy as ontology and to “the light of Being”.140 Even if he 
seems to acknowledge that Thomas the Obscure presents us 
something that withdraws both from the thought of Thomas and from 
our ability as readers to interpret it, he does not question the 
legitimacy of his own philosophical reading of the story as an example 
of the il y a.141
In his essay “From Existentialism to the Primacy of Economy” 
from 1947 (“De l’existentialisme au primat de l’économie”, 1999)142
Georges Bataille expressed his disapproval of Levinas’s way to use 
Blanchot’s fictional narrative as the example of the il y a. Both in this 
essay and in his book Inner Experience (L’Experience Interièure, 
1954), Bataille reads Thomas the Obscure as a kind of affirmation of 
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the “non-knowledge”,143 making a sharp distinction between what he 
calls “a description of life” and “a cry of life”: “Levinas says of some 
pages of Thomas the Obscure that they are the description of the there 
is. But this is not exact. Levinas describes and Blanchot cries – as it 
were – the there is.”144 As Bataille sees it, Levinas prefers thought 
over life and philosophy over literature; in Levinas “the accent is put 
on the intellectual operation, and not on a suppression – by ecstasy or 
poetry – of discursive knowledge.”145 In his own texts Bataille thus 
carefully avoids merely to “describe” Blanchot’s fictional story or to 
use it as a description of something else (of which Levinas is guilty), 
but instead cites a passage from Thomas the Obscure, in order to let 
the story speak for itself. What Bataille tries is to approach literature 
in its own right.146 According to Bataille, we should in general, and 
not only in Blanchot’s case, draw attention to the essential “difference 
between the modes of literary and philosophical writing”147 –  or, as 
we could also say, between the “constative” and “the performative” 
dimension of language.  
But does Bataille really succeed in not using Blanchot’s text? 
In Inner Experience he opens a chapter on “non-knowledge” with a 
citation of Thomas the Obscure, claiming that Blanchot’s story affirms 
non-knowledge rather than claims to say something about anything. In 
this respect, as Bataille himself notes, his interpretation of Thomas the 
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Obscure does not differ from Levinas’s:148 along with Levinas, 
Bataille reads the cave scene of Thomas the Obscure as a description 
of an experience where the act of objectification is put into question. 
In Blanchot’s story, writes Bataille, “the indifference to formal 
definition effectuates an inhibition of a will to insert in the sphere of 
objects of thinking that which has no place except outside.”149 The 
question that one could therefore ask is the following: does not 
Bataille himself use the story and its experience of the unknown to 
clarify his own (philosophically loaded) concept of the “inner 
experience”? This, in fact, was the question Jean-Paul Sartre in his 
turn addressed to Bataille. 
While commenting on Bataille’s interpretation of Blanchot’s 
story150 Sartre pointed out that “Thinking that thinks that it doesn’t 
know anymore is still thinking.” (“Une pensée qui pense qu’elle ne 
sait pas, c’est encore une pensée.”)151 In his critique, entitled “A New 
Mysticism” (“Un nouveau mystique”, 1947) and levelled against 
Bataille’s Inner Experience Sartre accused Bataille for not wanting “to 
see that non-knowledge is always immanent in thinking” (“que le non-
savoir est immanent à la pensée”).152
Sartre acknowledges that even if Bataille “substantifie le non-
savoir, c’est avec prudence: à la manière du’un movement, non d’une 
chose.”153 For Bataille, non-knowledge appears as the movement of 
consciousness, where consciousness loses control of itself. What 
Sartre disapproves of is that by this movement what previously “was 
nothing” becomes now “the unknown”, determined as that which is 
“beyond knowledge.” As Sartre argues, after this Bataille can no 
longer claim, that “nothing […] is revealed” (“Rien, ni dans la chute ni 
dans l’abîme, n’est révelé”), because what is revealed is precisely the 
“essential”: that there is a “non-sense of this non-sense” – “il y a un 
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no-sens de ce non-sens.”154 As I interpret Sartre’s criticism, even if he 
affirms that Bataille substantifies “le non-savoir” “with prudence”, he 
is not happy with the status nothingness (le rien) has in Bataille’s 
writing. By writing “le rien” in quotation marks and by naming it as 
“the unknown”, Sartre claims, Bataille detaches and isolates 
nothingness, and makes it almost like existing by itself.155 With this 
gesture, Bataille makes of “the unknown” something that escapes 
consciousness.156 Sartre thus concludes that “En s’y jetant, M. Bataille 
se trouve soudain du côté transcendant.”157 What Sartre wants to 
point out, as far as I understand him, is that Bataille still acknowledges 
communicating with “nothingness” or with “the unknown” somehow, 
even though he wouldn’t communicate with it by means of 
knowledge.158 For Sartre, Bataille as well as Blanchot are mystics, and 
their thinking “new mysticism”, as the title of Sartre’s review tells 
us.159
To illustrate the communication with the unknown or 
nothingness Sartre refers to a passage from Thomas the Obscure with 
which Bataille had clarified the experience of the unknown (or as 
Bataille says, the “inner experience”). Sartre recites the following 
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sentences from (the first version of) Blanchot’s story: “Par ce vide, 
c’était donc le regard et l’objet du regard qui se mêlaient. Non 
seulement cet œil qui ne voyait rien appréhendait quelque chose, mais 
il appréhendait la cause de sa vision. Il voyait comme un objet ce qui 
faisait qu’il ne voyait pas.”160 Sartre does not interpret these sentences 
in their context, i.e., the fictional story; neither does he question, like 
Bataille does, the use of fiction in the philosophical argumentation. 
Despite this, he is ready to avert his conclusion of the meaning of 
nothingness in Bataille: “C’est un pur néant hypostasié.”161 Bataille 
doesn’t recognize, Sartre teaches us, that he constructs a universal 
object, the night.162 Sartre refers again to Bataille’s direct citation 
from Thomas the Obscure, which – as Sartre promises –  will now 
“reveal us the cheating” (“va nous découvrir la supercherie.”)163 The 
cited sentence is from the second chapter of Thomas the Obscure: “La
nuit lui parut bientôt plus sombre, plus terrible que n’importe quelle 
autre nuit, comme si elle était réellement sortie d’une blessure de la 
pensée qui ne se pensait plus, de la pensée prise ironiquement comme 
objet par autre chose que la pensée.”164 Sartre claims that eventually 
both Bataille and Blanchot see the unknown as an object of some 
kind, which is why the unknown is not “nothingness” anymore – it is 
rather something that is thus taken as an object of philosophical 
reflection.
In the light of this conversation on the place and meaning of 
“nothingness” in Blanchot’s story, it is interesting to read what 
Blanchot tells his readers on the first page of the revised (and much 
shorter) version of Thomas the Obscure from 1950. Blanchot writes 
that “to the pages written starting 1932, turned into the editor in May 
1940, published in 1941, the present version adds nothing” (la
présente version n´ajoute rien). He does not tell us which sentences 
have been cut off, which words have been omitted and replaced but 
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announces that “nothing” has been added to the story. But what does it 
mean to “add nothing” in the story? Or rather, would it even be 
possible to “add nothing” to language? This ironical question, I argue, 
Blanchot wants to pose back to his contemporary philosophers.165
The Experience of Literature  
Formally Sartre’s argument is justified: to doubt is to have a cognitive 
attitude and, as I have proposed, Blanchot’s text is also teeming with 
allusions to Descartes’s philosophical thinking.166 Despite this, I see it 
as problematic to claim curtly that Blanchot would think of the 
“impossible”, the “outside”, the “unnameable”, or the “other”. I would 
like to ask Sartre, for instance, if it is not possible to think that the 
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without any principle, without any beginning, which one cannot account for” (WF 
311).
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experience of the impossible would be born in language itself – that 
the impossible would not exist before the story, as something which 
the story tries impossibly to represent or refer to, but rather that the 
story itself creates the very experience of the impossible (or of 
exteriority, the other, the unnameable, and so on). Would it be 
possible to imagine meaning as an event or a happening that does not 
exist before the story or after it, but which we encounter only in the 
event of our reading? Or as Derrida writes of the performative: its 
referent is not outside it, since “It does not describe something that 
exists outside or before language.”167
Sartre’s novel Nausea was published in 1938, two years before 
Blanchot’s Thomas the Obscure. In his short critique of the work, 
entitled “The Beginnings of a Novel” (“L’Ebauche d’un roman”),
Blanchot wrote that Sartre’s “novel is visibly inspired by a 
philosophical movement that is little known in France, but it is of the 
utmost importance: that of Edmund Husserl and especially Martin 
Heidegger.” As Blanchot tells his readers, some extracts from 
Heidegger’s work had just been translated into French for the first 
time. In Blanchot’s words these extracts “reveal the power and the 
creative will behind this thinking which, in the infinite debate between 
laws, intelligence and chance, offers art a new point of view from 
which to contemplate its necessity.”168
Blanchot continues by referring to the contemporary reception 
of Sartre’s novel. As he states, in Sartre’s novel “the representation of 
life” and “the attention to circumstances” counts for little. This, in 
turn, has aroused among critics “astonishment, curiosity and 
incomprehension.”169 In its indifference to the make-believe realism 
of the traditional novel Nausea is “a rare, important and necessary 
undertaking”, since it “accustoms the mind to thinking that there can 
be artistic creation outside any desire for a real event, outside those 
make-believe existences we call characters which are usually the 
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object of a novelist’s ambitions.” Blanchot describes Sartre’s novel 
with words which foretell his own enterprise with Thomas the 
Obscure: in his words, Nausea “takes the novel to a place where there 
are no longer any incidents, any plot, any particular person; to that site 
where the mind sustains itself only by beguiling itself with 
philosophical notions like existence and being, notions that appear 
indigestible to art and which are only refractory to it as a result of the 
arbitrary workings and thought”.170
Despite this promising beginning, Blanchot’s review 
eventually shows his disappointment with Sartre’s venture. With its 
“realistic adventures” and “conventional psychology”, Sartre’s novel 
“ends up with the story of a man struck dumb before the fact of 
existence and seeking to go beyond it to a deeper world.” As Blanchot 
interprets Sartre’s novel, in it, nausea is “the distressing experience” 
that reveals to its protagonist “what it is to exist without being, the 
pathetic illumination which puts him in contact, in the midst of things 
that exist, not with those things but with their existence.” Blanchot’s 
conclusion is discourteous: “This is an original and authentic 
sentiment which could, in a more rigorous work, have opened the 
way, from symbol to symbol, towards essences, and produced a sort of 
novel of being which would have been a masterpiece on a par with the 
greatest. But it is a sentiment which, in Mr Sartre’s book, simply 
proliferates, analyses itself and becomes enfeebled in a story which, 
while remaining very interesting, is almost always inferior to its 
substance.”171
Both versions of Thomas the Obscure can be read as 
Blanchot’s effort to avoid the conventional psychology of Sartre’s 
renowned novel.172 For Blanchot, what he calls récit does not strive to 
narrate “what is believable and familiar”. It does not re-stage or 
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describe an event or a sentiment but rather brings it out: “The tale 
[récit] is not the narration of an event, but that event itself, the 
approach to that event, the place where that event is made to happen – 
an event which is yet to come and through whose power of attraction 
the tale can hope to come into being, too.”173 Although Blanchot 
speaks of our experience with language, he is looking for, along with 
Heidegger, a way to trace this experience without a presupposition of 
subjectivity as the centre of this experience. As Timothy Clark notes 
in his book Martin Heidegger (2002), Blanchot follows Heidegger in 
rejecting a representationalist view of art as the representation of 
something that exists before or independent of a work of art. In 
Clark’s reading, Blanchot as well as Derrida are “Heideggerian” in 
that they would protest against the view that the work could be seen as 
a projection of the psychology of the writer.174
For Blanchot, the power of the story as an event is in its ability 
to happen every time singularly, beyond the intentions of the author or 
the reader. Literary language is not a thinking experience, but rather 
an experience which challenges the limit of thinking and of 
experience. Blanchot does not suggest that there could be an original 
experience to which literature would be faithful or to which literature 
would return or seek after. Rather, the textual event we call literature 
or our encounter with language – the encounter between the text and 
the reader – is the experience of language. In opposition to Sartre, I 
would argue that in Blanchot literary language does not express or 
name exteriority after the fact, i.e., after the experience of exteriority 
is over, but it is this exteriority. In Blanchot, language does not 
“objectify”, “constate” or “name” alterity; rather, language is alterity 
in that it gives this alterity. Blanchot’s stories bring exteriority forth, 
without conceptualizing and naming it and – what is essential – 
without forcing it into the form of an object.  
Even though I just made a distinction between literary and 
philosophical language, it is important to notice that Blanchot himself 
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does not believe that we could maintain this distinction. As I will 
show in the next chapter, for Blanchot all language is by its essence 
both representative and non-representative, both at the same time. 
Although I find it important to point out (for Sartre) that in Blanchot, 
literature does not represent something that is before the act of reading 
as the eidos or model of what the text would mirror, but rather the 
literary experience exists only in the act of reading and writing, 
eventually this claim goes to all language: in Blanchot’s view, 
language by its “essence” questions the idea of writing as 
representation. In my analysis, Blanchot’s aim is to help us speak of 
our encounter with different texts in non-idealist vocabulary. For 
Blanchot, the question which the experience of exteriority in language 
demands us to answer does not concern the conditions of mystical 
experience – as Sartre claimed in reading Thomas the Obscure – or the 
conditions of empirical experience, but the manifestation of the 
essence of language in writing.175
Blanchot’s poetically written essays and philosophical novels 
are encounters with language as exteriority. Blanchot does not define 
language as an object of experience but something in which a reader 
participates. In asking what is it to experience something with 
language, and how literary experience should be understood, 
Blanchot’s writings challenge the idea of subjectivity as the origin of 
experience or meaning. The experience of writing is not the 
experience of the subject, but the experience that happens in the 
“space of literature”, as if it were an experience that is born in the 
encounter between the reader and the text, or in the disappearance of 
the limits between the subject and the object. Against Sartre’s 
interpretation of Thomas the Obscure I would thus claim that language 
does not “reveal nothingness” in Blanchot. Writing itself is this 
nothingness which, however, is too obscure or ambiguous to expose 
itself to the reading gaze. Or as Thomas Wall writes, “Art, quite 
simply, has no self, no ipse, to be revealed.”176
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According to my experience, Blanchot’s writings are almost 
never figurative language. They are more discourse, words and 
writing than visual images (one can ask, of course, what else could 
writing be?). It is not that Blanchot’s sentences would not be clear, 
since they are – every sentence is understandable as such. However, 
although every sentence would have been lucid and understandable, it 
is only impossible to imagine the scenes produced by these sentences. 
It even “hurts the eyes” (as Levinas says of modern art) to imagine 
what is happening in these texts. Although Thomas the Obscure
narrates to us a series of scenes where something is evidently 
happening to somebody, and although the narrator seems to be aware 
of everything Thomas sees, and although he seems to tell us 
everything he knows, the scenes of the story do not translate 
themselves into visual images or into knowledge. In his study 
Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary (1997) Leslie Hill pays attention 
also to the violence with which Blanchot’s narratives constantly 
interrupt the reader: there is no logic which would explain the relation 
between the scenes that follow each other.177 From all this it follows 
that Blanchot’s stories are also difficult to bring to mind afterwards.  
As I proposed, Blanchot’s story Thomas the Obscure can be 
interpreted to ask the following question, concerning the tension 
between a “constative” and a “performative” use of language: does 
literary language have a capacity to “posit” something, in the sense of 
laying down something, which did not exist previously, and if it does, 
what does this “to posit” mean? Does literary language posit or 
postulate “entities” or “beings”, or does it rather, as Heidegger 
claimed in his later writings, create happenings, equivocal events 
(Ereignis)? And finally, if a literary text is encountered rather as an 
event than a being, what is born from this event? Does literary text 
have a capacity to create something?   
What has to be asked, however, is the following: Don’t we 
always, every time we encounter in literature the experience with 
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obscuritas, with exteriority, face the problem between the “constative” 
and “performative” use of language? Isn’t it impossible for language 
to ever be free of all “contamination by the constative”,178 or to cite 
Levinas’s Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Autrement 
qu’être ou au-dela de l’essence, 1978), to be free of the “language of 
ontology”? In order to do justice to the otherness of the other we 
should repeat the other in its original otherness, but do we have other 
possibilities than to perform this repetition with language? Don’t we 
risk losing the other at the very moment we turn to the other in 
language?179 Also my own reading of Blanchot’s story encounters the 
question of the unavoidability of violence in interpretation. 
Ultimately, isn’t it impossible to speak of Blanchot’s stories without 
paraphrasing them (as I actually did here already in referring to the 
English translation of his story)? How do we speak of Blanchot’s 
originality without making a description of his style, of his use of 
language? Eventually, isn’t it impossible to quote the originality of the 
other without making the other “my other”? Isn’t the otherness of the 
other always (as Derrida shows in “Violence and Metaphysics”) the 
otherness of my other? As I claim, these are the questions Blanchot’s 
work poses for us.
As I already stated, the way Blanchot questions the power of 
vision participates in the post-Heideggerian discussion on the ways to 
escape the “metaphysics of presence”. Blanchot takes seriously 
Heidegger’s opinion, according to which “poetic saying”, in 
opposition to the statement (Satz) or assertion (Aussage), “does not 
posit and represent anything as standing over against us or as 
object.”180 Blanchot takes as his task to analyse whether Heidegger is 
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right in claiming that there is nothing in poetical language “that could 
be placed before a grasping or comprehending representation.”181
Blanchot shares with Heidegger the suspicion of the 
representational capacity and the epistemological power of language. 
The ultimate ambiguity and the impersonality of (all) language – 
which poetical language underlines – questions the idea of language as 
the production of the creative subject, from which it follows that 
language (as Blanchot defines it) does not eventually fulfil the 
conditions Austin demands from the performative: as Derrida points 
out in “Signature Event Context”, the most essential of these 
conditions is “the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking 
subject”.182 Although signs in the performative do not refer to 
independent, pre-existing objects, what nevertheless remains is the act 
of objectification: for Austin, the performative utterance can be 
successful only if the engagement of the performing subject is self-
conscious and sincere.183 From this it follows that if literature is not
understood as a self-conscious act of a creative subjectivity, in literary 
writing a successful performative can never be performed. 
In what follows I will show how literary language in 
Blanchot’s analysis aims to ‘do nothing’ by ‘positing nothing’. I 
propose that Blanchot asks us to ponder the possibility of language 
that in contrast to the “constative” (which always refers to something), 
and in contrast to “performative” (which always “does” something) 
“struggles to do nothing with words”.184 In my analysis, essential for 
Blanchot is the ambiguity of all language: although language in its 
constative dimensionality is the violence of conceptuality and light, 
there is always also another possibility, the “other side” of language, 
where language, by doing violence to itself, seeks ways to minimize 
the violence of conceptual thinking.  
In the next chapter I will analyse more closely Blanchot’s 
conception of language. I will suggest that in Blanchot’s work, Hegel 
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and Heidegger are presented as representatives of oppositional ways 
to define the function of language, i.e., language in its constative 
(Hegel) and language in its performative function (Heidegger). As I 
will propose, by criticizing the idea of language as naming both in 
Hegel and Heidegger, Blanchot’s intention is to generate a third 
account of language which, since it neither negates nor creates Being, 
is beyond the metaphysical opposition between Being and non-Being.  
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III The Exteriority of Language  
Language as a Gaze that Kills  
In “Literature and the Right to Death”, known as Blanchot’s key 
philosophical essay on the nature of language, Blanchot takes as his 
starting point the identification of death and language in the notion of 
naming in Hegel’s philosophy. He borrows from Alexandre Kojève 
(1902-1968) the idea according to which naming equals murder for 
Hegel: naming is killing, appropriation and annihilation.185 Blanchot 
clarifies the connection between language, death and absence in the 
following way:   
I say, ‘This woman’, Hölderlin, Mallarmé, and all poets whose 
theme is the essence of poetry have felt that the act of naming is 
disquieting and marvellous. A word may give me its meaning, but 
first it suppresses it. For me being able to say, “This woman,” I 
must somehow take her flesh-and-blood reality away from her, 
cause her to be absent, annihilate her. The word gives me the being, 
but it gives it to me deprived of being. The word is the absence of 
that being, its nothingness, what is left of it when it has lost being – 
the very fact that it does not exist. Considered in this light, 
speaking is a curious right.186
The performative Blanchot uses as his example (I say, This woman)
works as an allusion to Stèphane Mallarmé’s text on poetry, “Crise de 
Vers”. In this famous text the poet describes how the poetic “action” 
of the word “flower” rids us of the original flower and replaces it with 
“the pure notion”. The poet writes: 
What purpose is served by the miracle of transposing a natural fact 
into its almost vibratory disappearance by means of the word’s 
185
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Hyppolite, Logique et existence: Essai sur la logique de Hegel (Paris, 1953), as well 
as Lacan, Séminaire I: Sur les écrits techniques de Freud (Paris, 1975).   
186
 WF322-323. Emphasis is mine. Blanchot’s Hegel citation can be found in 
Hegel’s Gesammelte Werke Bd. 6: Jenaer Systementwürfe I [Hrsg. Klaus Düsing & 
Heinz Kimmerle. Hamburg: Meiner (1975)], 288 (Fragment 20).   
75
action; however, if fact is not that there may proceed from it, 
without the embrassement of an immediate or concrete reminder, 
the pure notion.
I say: a flower! and, out of the forgetfulness where my voice 
banishes any contour, inasmuch as it is something other than 
known calyxes, musically arises, an idea itself and fragrant, the one 
absent from all bouquets.187
By substituting Mallarme’s substantive “flower” (I say: a flower!)
with the substantive of “woman” (I say, This woman) Blanchot 
connects Hegel’s idea of the name-giving power of language to 
Mallarmé’s idea of naming as the act of annihilation. Language is not 
only the ideal absence created by naming, but also the possibility of 
real death, which language in Kojève’s interpretation always accepts. 
Blanchot in other words proposes, following Kojève’s anthropologic 
interpretation of naming in Hegel, that mortality is the condition of 
signification in general.188
“Literature and the Right to Death”, known as Blanchot’s key 
essay on language, is written two decades before the linguistic turn of 
French philosophy: the arrival of Saussurean structuralism in 
France.189 Although Blanchot affirms absence as the condition of 
meaning, his context is not structuralism, but rather Kojève’s 
renowned reading of Hegel, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
(Introduction à la lecture de Hegel), published in 1947. As Stuart 
Barnett shows in Hegel After Derrida (1998), in his Hegel lectures 
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Kojève related language, negativity, and death to each other in a way 
that stimulated a whole generation of French thinkers, including 
Blanchot, Bataille, Sartre, and Lacan, to question the limits of 
language and thinking.190
The key text for Blanchot was the appendix of Kojève’s 
Introduction, entitled “The Idea of Death in Hegel’s Philosophy”
(“L’idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel”).191 Blanchot 
adopts from Kojève’s reading two points which according to Kojève 
make the essence of man for Hegel: the faculty of discourse and the 
consciousness of finitude.192 Both language and death negate being 
and both form a necessary condition for the self-consciousness of 
human beings. As the animal that speaks, a human being has a special 
relation to negation and to death.193 Since understanding and language 
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are both based on the affirmation of man’s temporality, “the 
dialectical or anthropological philosophy of Hegel is in the final 
analysis a philosophy of death.”194
According to Kojève’s interpretation, for Hegel language 
means to separate things from their natural surroundings and to make 
of them things for human consciousness.195 In naming beings, 
language detaches them from their primordial being, “neutralizing” 
them and thus making them beings of consciousness, beings without 
real “existence” or an existence of their own. Kojève explains Hegel’s 
notion of concept in the following way: 
Generally speaking, when we create the concept of a real entity, we 
detach it from its hic et nunc. Thus, the concept of a thing is that 
thing itself is [en tant que] detached from its given hic et nunc.
Thus, the concept ‘this dog’ differs in no respect from the real 
concrete dog to which it is ‘related’, except that this dog is here and 
now, while its concept is everywhere and nowhere, always and 
never. Now, to detach an entity from its hic and nunc is to separate 
it from its ‘material’ support, [which is] determined in a univocal 
manner by the rest of the given spatio-temporal universe, of which 
that entity is a part. That is why that entity can be altered or 
‘simplified’ as we wish, after it has become a concept. It is thus 
that this real dog is, as a concept, not only ‘this dog’, but beyond 
that [it is, as a concept] ‘any dog’ [‘un chien quelconque’], ‘dog in 
general’, ‘quadruped’, ‘animal’ etc., and even simply Being.’ And 
once again that power of separation, which is the source of [all] the 
Or: It is only a name, in a higher sense, since to begin with the name is itself only 
the very superficial spiritual being. By means of the name, however, the object has 
been born out of the I as being. This is the primal creativity exercised by the Spirit. 
Adam gave a name to all things. This is the sovereign right [of Spirit], its primal 
taking-possession of all nature – or the creation of nature out of Spirit” (Hegel and 
the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit,
1805-6), trans. Leo Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State university Press, 1983), pp. 89-91. 
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sciences, arts and crafts, is an ‘absolute’ power, against which 
nature can oppose no effective resistance.196
For Hegel, as Kojève sums up, “all conceptual understanding 
(Begreifen) is equivalent to a murder.”197 The act of naming is an act 
of the negative: language controls and destroys, turns a thing into a 
universal word or a concept, and annihilates the singular reality of a 
given being.198 As Kojève explains, in Hegel’s idea of language things 
named enter into language as ideal and universal, without their “flesh-
and-blood reality”.199 They no longer exist independently, but depend 
on the power of the one who names. Language is a victory of the 
general over the singular: what is denied in naming is the being of the 
singular as a uniquely real thing.200 In the following quotation, Kojève 
uses as his example the word “dog”: 
In Chapter VII of the Phenomenology, Hegel said that all 
conceptual understanding is equivalent to a murder. Let us, then, 
recall what he had in view. As long as the Meaning (or Essence, 
Concept, Logos, Idea, etc.) is embodied in an empirically existing 
entity, this Meaning or Essence, as well as this entity, lives. For 
example, as long as the Meaning (or Essence) of ‘dog’ is embodied 
in a sensible entity, this Meaning (Essence) lives: it is the real dog, 
the living dog which runs, drinks, and eats. But when the meaning 
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(Essence) ‘dog’ passes into the word ‘dog’ – that is, becomes an 
abstract Concept which is different from the sensible reality that it 
reveals by its Meaning – the meaning (Essence) dies: the word
‘dog’ does not run, drink and eat; in it the Meaning (Essence) 
ceases to live – that is, it dies. And this is why the conceptual 
understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a murder.201
In Kojève’s interpretation of naming in Hegel, language neutralizes a 
living thing by replacing it with the concept. Although a living dog is 
annihilated and negated by naming it with the concept of “dog”, it 
nevertheless “endures” in the concept of dog as neutralized, i.e., it 
continues “living” in the word “dog”.202 Whereas “the real concrete 
dog” is “here and now”, “its concept is everywhere and nowhere, 
always and never.”203 Kojève refers to the “Introduction” of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel famously describes the 
dialectical movement of the Spirit as a movement that “endures death 
and maintains itself in it.”204 Hegel writes: “The life of the Spirit is not 
the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself intact from 
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in 
it.”205 Also Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” puts the 
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from death and keeps itself intact from devastation, but rather the life that endures it 
and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment 
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emphasis on the above-mentioned passage of Hegel’s “Introduction”. 
He quotes it four times in his essay (without identifying the source of 
the sentence), in suggesting that the movement of language as 
negativity is like “life that endures death and maintains itself in it.”206
Referring ironically to Hegel, Blanchot writes that language is 
the “amazing force of death”, “the terrible force that draws beings into 
the world and illuminates them.”207 Speaking is first of all letting the 
Spirit turn its mortifying gaze to things, letting death “loose in the 
world.”208 An “I” capable of saying “I am” is a force in the world; 
since for man language guarantees “life’s ease and security”, the 
ownership of the world, by putting everything under his controlling 
eye. Blanchot thus underlines Kojève’s interpretation according to 
which language is negativity and violence for Hegel. As he writes, 
Kojève “demonstrates in a remarkable way how for Hegel 
comprehension was equivalent to murder.”209 Blanchot explains 
Hegel’s idea of language as annihilation as follows:  
In a text dating from before The Phenomenology, Hegel, here the 
friend and kindred spirit of Hölderlin, writes: “Adam’s first act, 
which made him master of the animals, was to give them names, 
that is, he annihilated them in their existence (as existing 
creatures).” Hegel means that from that moment on, the cat ceased 
to be a uniquely real cat and became an idea as well. The meaning 
of speech, then, requires that before the word is spoken, there must 
be a sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary flood plunging all 
creation into a total sea. God had created living things, but man had 
to annihilate them. Not until then did they take meaning for him, 
and he in turn created them out of the death into which they had 
disappeared.210
[Zerissenheit], it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which looks 
away [wegsieht] from the negative […] on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by 
looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering [Verweilen]
with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being (Hegel 1977, 
sect.207, p. 126. Emphasis is mine.) 
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While referring to Kojève’s interpretation, according to which in 
Hegel language “kills” the thing named, turns it in the act of naming 
into a thing for consciousness, and thus replaces the original thing 
with the idea of that thing, Blanchot underlines the simultaneity of 
creating and annihilating in Hegel: for Hegel, naming is not only 
world-making but also destruction, appropriation and annihilation. 
From this follows the interrelatedness of death and language, the fact 
that death “exists in words as the only way they can have meaning.”211
In denying the particularity of things as “existants” writing establishes 
the universal level of being, “existence”, which is based on the 
absence of the uniquely real beings.212 As Blanchot explains Hegel’s 
notion of language, “only instead of beings [êtres] and, as we say, 
existants [existants], there remained only being [l’être], and man was 
condemned not to be able to approach anything or experience 
anything except through the meaning he had to create. He saw that he 
was enclosed in daylight, and he knew this day could not end, because 
the end itself was light, since it was from the end of beings that their 
meaning – which is being – had come.” 213
In Blanchot’s interpretation Hegel tells us that “We cannot do 
anything with an object that has no name.” Since the condition of 
naming is the annihilation and suppression of the thing named, 
negativity and death is a condition of all meaning and 
communication.214 In Hegel this movement of annihilation and death 
is necessary for the sovereignty of the Spirit who with concepts 
constructs the world for itself: thanks to the constitutive power of 
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language, man has the ability to control the world, and eventually the 
Totality of Being, with the power of language. Essential to Hegel is 
the conviction that all things are in principle comprehensible. 
Dialectic can master anything else in its path, i.e. eventually the 
Totality of Being. As dialectic confronts death – the absolutely other 
that negates life – it is capable of transforming even it into a concept
of death and therefore mastering it.215 If the act of naming were a 
gaze, and if language were a vision, each new vision would be larger 
than the previous one, and it would contain the previous vision, using 
it as a moment in its development into the vision of the whole. 
For Hegel, as Kojève interprets him, with its capability to 
create loss and absence language carries with itself the force of 
annihilation and death. Although Blanchot affirms the idea of 
language as absence, for Blanchot from this affirmation follows the 
question, how should one respond to the primordial “violence” of 
language? If language as absence is the only way to communicate 
with the other, and if there is no meaning except by negating (by 
representing and objectifying) there follows the question, what is the 
possibility of language to avoid the violence of metaphysical thinking: 
isn’t it impossible to think of anything without essentializing and 
thematizing it? Isn’t it unfeasible to write without naming anything? 
Can one have a relation to anything without “revealing” it?  
If we ask, why is it that Blanchot replaces Kojève’s example 
“dog” and Mallermé’s example “flower” with the substantive “this 
woman”, the answer might be the following: Blanchot proposes that 
by acknowledging the relation between negativity and language, we 
encounter our responsibility as human beings who use language. As 
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 From Hegel’s idea that “Concept is Time” and “man is Time” Kojève concludes 
that a history of philosophy is possible only at the end of historical time. The thesis 
of the end of history is the condition for the possibility to have absolute knowledge, 
since the whole of Being can be attained only at the end of history; at the end of 
history, when substance becomes subject (and vice versa), absolute knowledge 
realizes itself. For Hegel, a philosopher appears as a thinker who uses the “amazing 
power” of the negative in order to create a conceptual order of the world. As Kojève 
writes, “it is by resigning himself to death, by revealing it through his discourse, that 
Man arrives finally at the absolute Knowledge or at Wisdom, in thus completing 
History” (Kojève 1993, 321).  
83
Blanchot puts it in “Literature and the Right to Death”, that language 
is “life that endures death” becomes our “question” concerning 
language: “ ‘life endures death and maintains itself in it’ in order to 
gain from death the possibility of speaking and the truth of speech. 
This is the ‘question’ that seeks to pose itself in literature, the 
‘question’ that is its essence.”216 In my analysis, Blancot’s choice of 
the substantive “woman” underlines the ethical problem which 
Blanchot – following again Heidegger – finds in the capacity of 
language to annihilate, in its capacity to objectify and to essentialize.  
The clarification of the negative power of language with the 
feminine substantive can also be read as one of the variations of the 
Orphic myth in Blanchot’s work. However, I would also suggest that 
Blanchot’s reference to Mallarmé’s performative (I say: a flower!)
proposes to us to ponder the performative power of language: it is 
worth noticing that while picking up his example from Mallarmé’s 
poetry Blanchot rejects the notion of “naming”, which dominates his 
analysis of language in the first part of the essay; instead of writing “I
name this woman” he chooses to write “I say, This woman.” 
I say, “My future disappearance” 
In Hegel After Derrida, Stuart Barnett introduces Kojève as a 
significant processor of a structuralist notion of language: “Kojève 
argues that signs are an ideal vehicle for spirit because of their 
independence from their referents. What later critics were to call the 
arbitrariness of the sign is for Kojève a necessary precondition of 
absolute spirit. The arbitrariness of the sign enables the transformation 
of nature into sign and thus into a malleable component of 
discourse.”217 The persistence of the Kojèvian reading of Hegel in 
France can be explained by the notions of “sign” and “discourse” 
which Kojève introduces in reading Hegel. According to Barnett, the 
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notion of discourse was taken up by structuralism, which “understood
that  discourse,  much  as  spirit,  encompassed  all  realms  of  human
endeavour  and  that  it  was  the  task  of  criticism  to  account  for  its
variety.”218
Kojève’s ideas of language – the absence of referent, language
as a recombination of linguistic elements – influenced the background
of French philosophy from the 1960s onward, as the majority of
French intellectuals, among them Foucault, Barthes, and Derrida,
dedicated themselves to the examination of discourse and language.219
It is therefore interesting to notice that Kojève’s interpretation of
“sign” and “discourse” in Hegel influenced Blanchot’s thinking of
language already in the 1940s. As has been noted, both Barthes’s idea
of the death of the author and Derrida’s interest in Mallarmé and
literature are in debt to Blanchot’s early writing on language.
Therefore, even if Gerald Bruns is right in writing that Blanchot’s
“concerns are more ontological than logical or linguistic”, there is also
a dimension in his thinking of language that refers back to Kojève’s
analysis of language before structuralism and its conceptual tools.220
Along with Kojève, Blanchot argues that language has its
ability to signify only in the absence of a thing named or referred to.
Language is not only world-making but also destruction, from which
it follows that “language can only begin with the void.”221 The
condition of meaning is death: by naming things language kills their
original way of being and turns them into the things of consciousness,
which Blanchot calls “an immense hecatomb”: “The meaning of
speech […] requires that before any word is spoken there must be a
sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary flood plunging all creation
into a total sea”. This is why death, or the absence of the thing named,
218 Bernett 1998, 21.
219 Barnett 1998, 22. In his later work, Blanchot’s notion of writing was influenced
especially by Derrida and Foucault.  In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot refers to
Foucault’s (Les mots et les choses, 1966) and Derrida’s (L’Écriture et la Différence,
1967) insights on language.
220 Bruns 1997, 51.
221 WF 324.
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“exists in words as the only way they can have meaning.”222 As 
Blanchot puts it, “To write is to know that death has taken place 
though it has not been experienced.”223
Blanchot argues that words are independent marks whose 
ability to signify does not depend on individual things or objects; the 
universality of the word is rather tied to its independency of a singular 
being. From this it follows that even though the origin of language is 
in absence of the thing named, the break between a word and a thing 
is not to be interpreted as “a defect” of language224. Mathematics is 
“the most perfect” language, since its universal concepts do not refer 
to any existing referents: “Is it that words have lost all relation to what 
they designate? But this absence of relation is not a defect, and if it is, 
this defect is the only thing that gives language its full value, so that of 
all languages the most perfect is the language of mathematics, which 
is spoken in a rigorous way and to which no entity corresponds.”225
Already Kojève acknowledges the absence of the natural 
relationship between meaning and word. Forming a concept is 
creating a new thing that is a word, which exists independent of any 
real existing object.226 As Kojève explains Hegel’s idea of the junction 
between language and death, “The Concept ‘dog’ which is my
Concept […] only if dog is essentially mortal. That is, if the dog dies 
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329).
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 Kojève writes: “[T]hanks to the absolute power of the Understanding, the essence 
becomes meaning and is incarnated in a word, there is no longer any ‘natural’ 
relationship between it and its support; otherwise, words that have nothing in 
common among them in so far as [they are] phonetic or graphic spatio-temporal 
realities, whatever they may be (‘dog’, chien, Hund etc.). […] There has been, 
therefore, a negation here of the given as given (with its ‘natural’ relationship 
between essence and existence); that is [there has been] creation (of concepts or of 
word-having-a-meaning, which as words have nothing to do, by themselves, with 
the meaning that is incarnate in them); in other words [there has been] action or 
labour” (Kojève 1993, 326).  
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or is annihilated at every instant of its existence.”227 Without the 
possibility of dying, Kojève concludes, “there would be no Discourse 
(logos) in the World”,228 from which in turn it follows that man “has 
negativity as its ultimate basis.”229 Blanchot follows in “Literature and 
the Right to Death” Kojève’s interpretation of the relation between 
language and death, as he writes:230
Of course my language does not kill anyone. And yet, when I say, 
“This woman,” real death has been announced and is already 
present in my language; my language means that this person, who 
is here right now, can be detached from herself, removed from her 
existence and her presence, and suddenly plunged into a 
nothingness in which there is no existence or presence; my 
language essentially signifies the possibility of this destruction; it is 
a constant, bold allusion to such an event. My language does not 
kill anyone. But if this woman were not really capable of dying, if 
she were not threatened by death at every moment of her life, 
bound and joined to death by an essential bond, I would not be able 
to carry out that ideal negation, that deferred assassination which is 
what my language is. 
Therefore it is accurate to say that when I speak, death speaks in 
me.231
In Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, speaking also requires the finitude 
of the speaker: “the discursive revelation of Being is possible only if 
the revealing or speaking being is essentially finite or mortal.”232 By 
writing that “my language means that this person, who is here right 
now, can be detached from herself”, Blanchot thus refers again to 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel: “If the dog were not mortal”, Kojève 
writes, “one could not detach its Concept from it”.233 For Hegel, the 
condition of possibility for understanding and knowing the world is 
the finite and temporal nature of the world.234
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Blanchot follows Kojève in concluding that “The power to 
speak is alone linked to my absence from being”, from which it 
follows that as soon as I say “I”, “it is as though I were chanting my 
own dirge.”235 Speaking is conditioned not only by the mortality of the 
other but also by my own mortality, which means that absence as the 
ground of meaning refers both to the absence of the “other” and to the 
potential absence of the speaker. As Blanchot writes, “Death ends in 
being: this is man’s hope and his task, because nothingness itself helps 
to make the world, nothingness is the creator of the world in man as 
he works and understands.”236 “Therefore”, concludes Blanchot, “it is 
accurate to say that when I speak, death speaks in me. My speech is a 
warning that at this moment death is loose in the world, that it has 
suddenly appeared between me, as I speak, and the being I address: it 
is there between us as the distance that separates us, but this distance 
is also what contains the conditions for all understanding. Death alone 
allows me to grasp what I want to attain; it exists in words as the only 
way they can have meaning. Without death, everything would sink 
into absurdity and nothingness.”237 As Rodolphe Gasché writes, the 
which makes Being pass from the present, in which it is, into the past, in which it is
not (is no more), and in which there it is therefore only pure meaning (or essence 
without existence).” (Kojève 1993, 325). Temporality is in Hegel, as Kojève 
interprets him, based on “the transformation of the present into the past, that is of 
Being into Concept” (ibid.).  
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implicit reference to Hegel’s idea of voice as articulating the presence of death. 
Giorgio Agamben analyses the connection between language, voice and death in 
Hegel’s Jena lessons in 1805-6. For the Hegel of these lessons, human language is 
“articulated voice” whose origin is in the memory of the animal voice. Human 
language articulates the “pure sound of the animal voice”, namely the voice or the 
scream of an animal as it confronts its violent death. The origin of language is thus 
in death, because in its scream an animal “expresses itself as a removed-self”. As 
Agamben interprets: “In dying, the animal finds its voice, it exalts the soul in one 
voice, and, in this act, it expresses and preserves itself as dead. Thus the animal 
voice is the voice of death” (Agamben 1991, 45). According to Hegel, the 
articulation and the preservation of the animal language give rise to human language 
as the voice of consciousness. “The articulation of the animal voice transforms it 
into the voice of consciousness, into memory and language.” According to 
Agamben, in Hegel the “voice (and memory) of death” means two things: “the voice 
is death, which preserves and recalls the living as dead, and it is, at the same time, 
an immediate trace and memory of death, pure negativity” (ibid. 45). “Only because 
the animal voice […] contains the death of the animal, can human language, 
articulating and arresting the pure sound of this voice […] articulating and retaining 
the voice of death – become the voice of consciousness, meaningful language” (ibid. 
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condition of language in Blanchot as an “idealizing and universal 
medium of signification” is real death, the fact of mortality238:
“Mortality is the condition under which language can proceed to that 
idealizing destruction of a singular reality in the flesh, thus making it 
ideal and, by the same token, the object of a possible address.”239
The idea of death as a necessary condition of meaning is 
analysed also by Derrida in “Signature Event Context” (1967), in the 
way that brings to mind Blanchot’s words in “Literature and the Right 
to Death”:  
When I say “my future disappearance,” I do so to make this 
proposition more immediately acceptable. I must be able simply to 
say my disappearance, my nonpresence in general, for example the 
nonpresence of my meaning, of my intention-to-signify, of my-
wanting-to-communicate-this, from the emission or production of 
the mark. For the written to be written, it must continue to “act” 
and to be legible even if what is called the author of the writing no 
longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have 
signed, whether he is provisionally absent, or if he is dead, or if in 
general he does not support, with his absolutely current and present 
intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that very 
thing which seems to be written “in his name.”240
Neither Derrida nor Blanchot understand the functioning of language 
as naming “in the name of” a self-present consciousness, i.e., in the 
name of my present intention as I write a sentence. As Derrida puts it, 
the sign must be legible “even if the moment of its production is 
45). If the “voice of death” is the original language of nature, a human language that 
is the articulation of this original confrontation with death, and is “both the voice 
and memory of death”:  “For this reason, meaningful language is truly the ‘life of 
spirit’ that ‘brings on’ death and is maintained in death; and so – inasmuch as it 
dwells (verweilt) in negativity – it has the magical power that converts the negative 
into being’. But language has this power and it truly dwells in the realm of death 
only because it is the articulation of that ‘vanishing trace’ that is the animal voice; 
that is, only because already in its very voice, the animal, in violent death, had 
expressed itself as removed. Because it is inscribed in voice, language is both the 
voice and memory of death – death that recalls and preserves death, articulation and 
grammar of the trace of death” (ibid. 46). Also in Heidegger the experience of death 
is related to the ability to speak. In his The Way to Language Heidegger writes: 
“Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But 
animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language 
flashes up before us, but remains still unthought” (107).
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immediately lost, and even if I do not know what its alleged author-
scriptor meant consciously and intentionally at the moment when he 
wrote it.”241 The structure of writing presupposes the possibility of 
absolute absence, which is not to be interpreted as a mode of delayed 
presence or an ontological modification of presence. I am not the 
origin or the anchor of the sentence I write.  
Language itself doesn’t die, since the sentence I have written 
“supports” or “endures” my death and also the death of the one to 
whom I write, the reader of my text. From this it follows (as Blanchot 
underlines also in the essays of The Space of Literature) that language 
is unable to catch the moment of death – death never “happens” in 
language. I cannot witness my own death by writing “I die, now, at 
this moment, I die”. In relation to the act of speech the moment of 
death has already happened or is yet to come. Blanchot, in other 
words, opposes Hegel’s idea that death itself could be conceptualized. 
For human beings, Blanchot argues, death is both the limit and the end 
of (self-) consciousness.242
In Blanchot, a written text is like a textual event which – being 
temporal – resists the metaphysical understanding of meaning as 
presence. In “Signature Event Context” Derrida explains the relation 
between absence, iterability, and the concept of the other in the 
following way:  
A written sign is proferred in the absence of the adressee. How is 
this absence to be qualified? One might say that at the moment 
when I write, the adressee may be absent from my field of present 
perception. But is not this absence only a presence that is distant, 
delayed, or, in one form or another, idealized in its representation? 
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It does not seem so, or at least this distance, division, delay, 
différance must be capable of being brought to a certain absolute 
degree of absence for the structure writing, supposing that writing 
exists, to be constituted. It is here that différance as writing could 
no longer be (an ontological) modification of presence. My 
“written communication” must, if you will, remain legible despite 
the absolute disappearance of every determined adressee or of the 
empirically determinable set of adressees. This iterability (iter, 
once again, comes from itara, other, in Sanskrit, and everything 
that follows may be read as the exploitation of the logic which links 
repetition to alterity), structures the mark of writing itself, and does 
so moreover no matter what type of writing (pictographic, 
hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to use the old 
categories). A writing that was not legible – iterable – beyond the 
death of the adressee would not be writing.243
For Derrida, writing has the capacity to challenge the metaphysics of 
presence only because the absence of the original writer is not only “a 
continuous modification of presence”, but rather “a break in presence, 
’death’, or a possibility of the ‘death’ of the adressee, inscribed in the 
structure of the mark.”244 For Blanchot, as for Derrida, the absence of 
the signified and the signified intention are necessary “absences” 
belonging to the possibility of signification in general.245 The idea of 
language as something that does not ground itself on presence delayed 
or referred but rather on absolute absence challenges the metaphysical 
idea of meaning as presence, as well as the idea of language as 
representation.246
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 In “Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida describes the independence of writing 
on a singular consciousness in the following manner;  “The originality of the field of 
writing is its ability to dispense with, due to its sense, every present reading in 
general. But if the text does not announce its pure dependence on a writer or reader 
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transcendental function. The silence of prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations, 
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 Blanchot’s notion of language as absence contradicts the traditional view of 
writing that, as Derrida shows in his analysis of language in “Signature Event 
Context”, remains bound to the structure of representation. In the conventional idea 
of writing as communication, writing is understood as a neutral way of 
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In Blanchot, the beginning and the ground of meaning is not in 
the consciousness of the one who writes, nor in the consciousness of 
the reader, but in writing itself, or in the event of writing: Derrida’s 
performative (“When I say ‘my future disappearance’”), Mallarmé’s 
performative (“I say: a flower!”), as well as Blanchot’s (“I say, ‘This 
woman’ ”) form a chain of signifiers, which refer to each other 
without a fixed point of departure or end – this is the infinity of 
meaning. As Derrida puts it in “Signature Event Context”, language is 
a kind of “machine” that is able to continue its functioning even in 
one’s absence: “To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a 
kind of machine that is in turn productive, that my future 
disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from 
yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting.”247
The Two Sides of Language 
Blanchot follows Kojève in stating that there is no meaning without 
the absence of the thing named; language necessarily intends 
something, objectifies something, and represents something. Blanchot 
asserts, however, that another perspective to language is also possible. 
He suggests that we divide language into two coexistent sides (pentes,
versants). From one perspective, there is language as negativity and 
death: language that believes in the assertive and ideal force of 
language. Blanchot proposes, however, that language is not only the 
work of negativity and death, the power and the possibility to name, 
but also infinity of dying: “the loss of the power to die, the loss of 
death.”248
Although Blanchot does not believe that we could actually 
divide language into two sides, he proposes that in relation to 
communicating pre-existing meanings, and to extend communication beyond the 
field of oral communication (MP 312).  
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language itself the poet and the philosopher stand on opposite sides: 
on the side of (Hegel’s) philosophy, negativity constructs truths and 
meanings; on the side of poetry, language is non-usefulness and 
extravagancy. It is important to realize that both these sides are always 
present in language. Since language is always negativity, these two 
sides are essentially violent: both have their condition of meaning in 
absence and death. As I understand Blanchot to say, the “two sides” of 
language are two possible ways to think of language.  
On the first side, which is language as naming in Hegel’s sense 
of the word, one believes in the force of negation. Here language tends 
to conceptualize things and to turn them into consciousness: for 
(Hegel’s) philosophy determined by a will to know, language is a tool 
that illuminates things by naming them and by analysing them.  
Along with philosophy, the first side encompasses realistic or 
“meaningful prose”. Blanchot mentions the prose of Flaubert, whose 
goal is to “express things in a language that designates things 
according to what they mean. This is the way everyone speaks; and 
many people write the way we speak.”249 The first side could also be 
called the “metaphysical side” since it makes of presence the ground 
of language. On this side, “Everyday language calls a cat a cat, as if 
the living cat and its name were identical, as if it were not true that 
when we name the cat, we retain nothing of it but its absence, what it 
is not.”250 Although naming on the first side negates the existence of a 
cat, “the cat itself comes to life again fully and certainly in the form of 
its idea (its being) and its meaning: on the level of being (idea), the 
word restores to the cat all the certainty it had on the level of 
existence. […] the idea is definitive, it is sure, we can call it 
249
 WF 332, PF 321. By realistic or meaningful prose Blanchot refers implicitly to 
Sartre’s What is Literature? which privileges prose over poetry because of its ability 
to speak out on contemporary political issues. As Blanchot writes, philosophy and 
“much of literature” appropriate “the movement of negation, by which things are 
separated from themselves and destroyed in order to be known, subjugated, 
communicated” (WF 330, PF 310). 
250
 WF 325.  
93
eternal.”251 The deceitful aim of the first side of language is to make 
us believe that the living cat and its name could be identical.252
What counts on the first side is our ability to think and clarify 
things with language. For Blanchot, however, language is not only a 
functioning of names, concepts, and ideas, but also material writing, 
made of physical words on paper. Language is not only clarity of 
concepts, but also pure sound, the murmur of language, which can be 
heard in places crowded by people. In poetry this materiality comes up 
in the darkness of words – in poetry language is material, dense, 
opaque, and impenetrable rather than immaterial and transparent.253 In 
Blanchot’s analysis, language on the second side does not aim to 
represent, receive and give meanings, or transmit truths and theories. 
On the contrary, the second side is indifferent to the truth of things, to 
their eidos. Literary language underlines “a non-existence made word
”, i.e., the material reality of language, its physical reality as sound 
and black marks on paper.
Although both sides admit absence as the condition of 
meaning, the second side of language is conscious of “a difficulty and 
a lie” included in the idea according to which a word could replace the 
existence of the original thing; “literary language observes that the 
word ‘cat’ is not only the non-existence of the cat but a non-existence 
made word.”254 For Mallarmé, Blanchot says, “The word has meaning 
only if it rids us of the object it names.”255 Or as he writes, as if using 
Heidegger’s words, on the second side of literature the nonexistence 
of the thing named is the condition of meaning: “This is why we can 
say that there is being because there is nothingness.”256 Instead of 
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enclosing the absence in a presence as the first side does, the second 
side of language affirms that the absolute absence of the thing named 
is the unavoidable condition of all meaning.  
For Blanchot, the force of Mallarmé’s poetry is its ability to 
affirm absence and destruction: it does not pretend that it would 
replace things with concepts; it does not believe that it would make 
present that original flower, which it names in pronouncing “this 
flower”. For this reason it seeks not only to name or constate things; 
on the contrary, in emphasizing the “thingness” of the word, its 
materiality, language chooses the opaqueness of things instead of the 
transparency of concepts. This is why, Blanchot explains, in 
Mallarmé’s poetry “language is a thing: it is the written thing, a piece 
of a shell, a splinter of a rock, a brittle fragment in which the reality of 
the earth subsides.”257
In my analysis, the first side of language could be called the 
Husserlian side: on this side language pretends to flow from the 
intentional consciousness of the writer who expresses his thoughts 
with language. The aim of literary language, instead, is to make 
evident that language has no source that could be identified with a 
person or with a specific context. In stressing the materiality of 
language, poetical language highlights its autonomous character, its 
exteriority and independency of a writing subjectivity. For Blanchot, 
the most remarkable feature of Mallarmé’s poems is their 
independency, “the impersonal character of language, the kind of 
independent and absolute existence that Mallarmé lends it.”258
As I interpret Blanchot to say, in affirming absence as the 
condition of meaning, the aim of language on the second side is to 
remember what language as negativity forgets. For this reason it turns 
around and asks: what is beyond the obvious – what is it that we have 
forgotten in order to understand and to represent? Literary language, 
in turning towards its own beginning, asks the Orphic question of 
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what it has left behind: “How can I recover it, how can I turn around 
and look at what exists before, if all my power consists of making it 
into what exists after?”259 Blanchot formulates this question also in 
the following manner: “How can it [language] hope to have achieved 
what it set out to do, since it has transposed the unreality of the thing 
into the reality of language? How could the infinite absence of 
comprehension consent to be confused with the limited, restricted 
presence of a single word?”260 For Blanchot, as I interpret him, the 
second side of language is born from the observation that there always 
remains something exterior that language itself is not able to negate 
and conceptualize. The prime example of something that cannot be 
conceptualized is death, which at the same time is the condition of 
negativity and meaning in general.261
For Mallarmé, as Blanchot interprets, poetry is not the way to 
subjectivity but to the obscure reality of words and with it to a kind of 
“incarnate consciousness, reduced to the material form of words, to 
their sonority, their life.”262 In emphasizing the material autonomy of 
words, Mallarmé’s poetical language underlines their “thing-like” 
quality: for Mallarmé, language appears as the material existence of 
concrete physical words or “beings” (êtres).263 In The Work of Fire,
Blanchot makes several references to surrealism and its non-
instrumental interpretation of language. The surrealists understood 
that language “is not an inert thing; it has a life of its own”; “they saw 
that words have their own spontaneity”, “they move, they have their 
demand, they dominate us”.264 For Blanchot as for the surrealists, 
literature has a truth of its own which is not dependent on any referent 
outside the literary world. For Mallarmé, one could say, poetry is 
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made of words rather than images. In his poems, the blank spaces and 
the invisible silence between the lines are as important as that which is 
visible and stated. Poetical materiality obscures the line between 
visibility and invisibility: although sonority is a sensory quality of 
language, it is not anything that could be seen with the bodily eyes. 
Poetical language is exteriority: in the materiality of language there 
always remains something external and something other that the 
subjectivity of the writer or the reader is not able to interiorize.  
Double Meaning 
Although Blanchot in “Literature and the Right to Death” often refers 
to Mallarmé’s poetry, he does not clarify or illustrate his philosophical 
claims with concrete examples. Could we thus claim that Blanchot 
“uses” Mallarmé’s poems in a way that we could name as 
“constative”, i.e., does he only utilize Mallarmé’s poems as material 
for his own philosophical arguments? Does Blanchot only “constate” 
what Mallarmé’s poems “perform”? I would disagree. Blanchot does 
not use Mallarmé’s poems at all: instead of citing Mallarmé’s obscure 
poems, Blanchot obscures his own writing. He writes:  
I say a flower! But in the absence where I mention it, through the 
oblivion to which I relegate the image it gives me, in the depths of 
this heavy word, itself looming like an unknown thing, I 
passionately summon the darkness of this flower, I summon this 
perfume that passes through me though I do not breathe it, this dust 
that impegrates me though I do not see it, this colour which is a 
trace and not light. What hope do I have of attaining the thing I 
push away? My hope lies in the materiality of language, in the fact 
that words are things, too, are a kind of nature – this is given to me 
and gives me more than I can understand. Just now the reality of 
words was an obstacle. Now, it is my only chance.265
In the passage just quoted, Blanchot refers again to Mallarmé’s text 
“Crise de Vers” where Mallarmé writes: “I say: a flower! and, out of 
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the forgetfulness where my voice banishes any contour, inasmuch as it 
is something other than known calyxes, musically arises, an idea itself 
and fragrant, the one absent from all bouquets.”266 This text, although 
it is not a poem, is poetically written. What does Blanchot want to say 
by changing his own style from theoretical into poetical, and why does 
he choose to cite Mallarmé’s text on poetry instead of Mallarmé’s 
poem?  
In my interpretation, by transforming his own style Blanchot 
underlines his conviction that in all writing both sides of language are 
always co-existent and possible. If he would clarify his philosophical 
analysis by citing Mallarmé’s poem, he would admit the ultimate 
disparity between the two sides of language. Instead, by obscuring his 
own writing and by mixing philosophical terms and poetical language 
he performs what the duplicity of language means in practice. He 
writes, for example, as if in Mallarmé’s words, that in poetical 
language words “no longer signify shadow, earth, they no longer 
represent the absence of shadow and earth which is meaning, which is 
shadow’s light, which is the transparency of the earth: opacity is their 
answer; the flutter of closing wings is their speech; in them, physical 
weight is present as the stifling density of an accumulation of syllables 
that has lost all meaning.”267 Also in the following citation, where 
Blanchot “explains” what happens on the second side of language (in 
order to differentiate this side from the first side of language), the 
difference between the two sides is eventually only blurred: 
The metamorphosis has taken place. But beyond the change that 
has solidified, petrified, and stupefied words two things reappear in 
this metamorphosis: the meaning of this metamorphosis, which 
illuminates the words, and the meaning the words contain by virtue 
of their apparition as things or, if it should happen this way, as 
vague, indeterminate, elusive existences in which nothing appears, 
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the hearth of depth without appearance. Literature has certainly 
triumphed over the meaning of words, but what it has found in 
words considered apart from their meaning is meaning that has 
become thing: and thus it is meaning detached from its conditions, 
separated from its moments, wandering like an empty power, a 
power without power, a power no one can do anything, a power 
without power, the simple inability to cease to be, but which, 
because of that, appears to be the proper determination of 
indeterminate and meaningless existence. In this endeavour, 
literature does not confine itself to rediscovering in the interior 
what it tried to leave behind on the threshold. Because what it 
finds, as the interior, is the outside which has been changed from 
the outlet it once was into the impossibility of going out – and what 
it finds as the darkness of existence is the being of day which has 
been changed from the explicatory light, creative of meaning, into 
the aggravation of what one cannot prevent oneself from 
understanding and the stifling obsession of a reason without any 
principle, without any beginning, which one cannot account for.268
For Blanchot, as I read this passage, language is meaning and 
meaninglessness, both at the same time. The poetical form of 
Blanchot’s own writing, however, put the emphasis on infinity, 
density, impermeability, exteriority, and obscurity. One could say that 
Blanchot chooses the side of poetry instead of conceptuality. Rather 
than “constating” something, Blanchot’s writing is more like a literary 
event performing only its own existence. (Or, as Gerald L. Bruns 
writes of Mallarmé, writing is for Mallarmé “more event than 
mark.”269)
In my analysis, the purpose of Blanchot’s division into two 
sides of language is eventually to show that in practice this division is 
impossible to maintain. Blanchot does not think, and this is important 
for us to realize, that the distinction between the two different sides of 
language (the negative and affirmative, or constative and performative 
sides) could actually be made. Rather, he emphasises that the 
distinction is possible only from “a certain point of view” that merely 
pretends that it could divide language into two sides.270 Language has 
always its two co-existent sides, the material, “sensible” side of 
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physical words, and the ideal, “insensible” side of meanings, which 
only in appearing together make meaning possible. As Blanchot 
writes, “Every time we speak, we make words into monsters with two 
faces, one being reality, physical presence, and the other meaning, 
ideal absence”.271
From this ambiguity it follows that language is not able to 
function without its violent side, i.e., the power of negativity: not even 
the poetical side is able to escape the negativity of conceptuality.272
On the other hand, not even the most understandable scientific 
language is able to eliminate the ambiguity of language completely. 
The negative (conceptual) and the affirmative (poetical) sides of 
language exist simultaneously. Blanchot describes the instability of 
language in the following way: “If we call this power negation or 
unreality or death, then presently death, negation, and unreality, at 
work in the depths of language, will signify the advent of truth in the 
world, the construction of intelligible being, the formation of meaning. 
But just as suddenly, the sign changes: meaning no longer represents 
the marvel of comprehension, but instead refers us to the nothingness 
of death, and intelligible being signifies only the rejection of 
existence, and the absolute concern for truth is expressed by 
incapacity to act in a real way”.273
Our difficulty in defining literature arises precisely from this 
ambiguity. From this duplicity it follows that the process of 
signification goes in two opposite directions:274 on the one hand, there 
is meaning that “illuminates the word”, i.e., language as concepts. On 
the other, there is “the meaning the words contain by virtue of their 
apparition as things, or if it should happen in this way, as vague, 
indeterminate, elusive existences in which nothing appears, the heart 
of depth without appearance.”275 Although there always exists in 
language both meaning and non-meaning, truth and falsity, we do not 
271
 WF 342.  
272
 WF 330, PF 318. 
273
 WF 344. 
274
 WF 343-4.  
275
 WF 331. 
100
know where the one begins and the other ends: “It is not just that each 
moment of language can become ambiguous and say something 
different from what it is saying, but the general meaning of language 
is unclear: we do not know if it is expressing or representing, if it is a 
thing or means that thing; if it is there to be forgotten or if it only 
makes us forget it so that we will see it; if it is transparent because 
what it says has so little meaning or clear because of the exactness 
with which it says it, obscure because it says too much, opaque 
because it says nothing.”276
In The Work of Fire, where “Literature and the Right to Death” 
is also included, Mallarmé is introduced not only as a poet who brings 
forth the poetical exteriority, but also as a writer who is aware of the 
duplicity of language. Although Mallarmé in his material and 
semantically obscure poems is on the side of exteriority, he is also 
aware of the “Hegelian” side of language, language as negativity and 
ideality.277 Blanchot’s idea of the duplicity of language can also be 
clarified by referring to Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics”, where 
Derrida proposes that a linguistic sign can be thought to consist of two 
co-existent inseparable sides. A written sign can function only if one 
recognizes its signifying form, its identity, which constitutes the 
“sameness” of the word.278 This sameness must be identified even 
when the sign is grafted from its original context and inscribed into a 
completely new one. Because of the repeatability of the same 
expression in different contexts, the meaning cannot be definitely 
decided. As Derrida explains, a linguistic mark is characterized by a 
certain amount of “otherness”, which is due to the absence of a fixed 
signified content. There is no present intention or specific context to 
which the sign could be anchored, from which follows not only the 
absence of the referent but also the absence of the specific signified 
sense. For Derrida, the “iterability” (i.e., the repeatability of the same 
expression in different contexts), is not “accidental or an anomaly, but 
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is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even 
have a so-called ‘normal’ functioning.”279 The otherness of the word 
follows paradoxically from the sameness of the word:  
[T]he unity of the signifying form is constituted only by its 
iterability, by the possibility of being repeated in the absence not 
only of its referent, which goes without saying, but of a determined 
signification, as of every present intuition of communication. This 
structural possibility of being severed from its referent or signified 
(and therefore from communication and its context) seems to me to 
make of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as 
we have seen, the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut 
off from its alleged ‘production’ or origin. And I will extend this 
law even to all ‘experience’ in general, it is granted that there is no 
experience of pure experience, but only chains of differential 
marks.280
The otherness and exteriority of language, its ambiguity, is also for 
Blanchot a “normal/abnormal” characteristic of language.281 Because 
of their repeatability, words are able to function in different contexts 
and to produce effects beyond the presence of the original writer, his 
or her intentional consciousness, as well as beyond the presence of the 
original “adressee” of the message.282
In a similar way as Blanchot, Derrida underlines the co-
existence of the two sides of language. As Derrida points out in 
Positions (1971), traditional philosophy easily forgets the sensual 
nature of language. According to Derrida, typical of traditional 
philosophy is to repress the materiality of the sign and treat it like a 
“transparent window” into mental meanings.283 Blanchot suggests, as I 
interpret him, that our answer to the materiality of language must be in 
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a double reading, which acknowledges both the conceptual and non-
conceptual, both the visible and invisible side sides of language. 
Blanchot’s division into two co-existent sides of language can be read 
as a critical comment on Kojève’s analysis of naming in Hegel: 
according to Blanchot, the exteriority of language is something that 
philosophers in most cases want to forget.  
The Exteriority of Language 
As Blanchot’s focus in “Literature and the Right to Death” is on 
Hegel’s notion of language, the emphasis he puts on the materiality of 
language can be read as a way to oppose the Hegelian idea of 
conceptualization, i.e., as a way to move from the outer, external 
reality to the inner reality of ideal meanings or significations.284
Blanchot says, as I understand him, that in language there is always 
something that cannot be negated, interiorized, and conceptualized, 
something that remains definitely exterior, and which cannot be 
internalized with the mental eye of the reader by denying it or by 
reducing it into concepts and ideas of the mind.285
 Hegel’s idea of language as naming is based on a 
metaphysical idea of language which both Blanchot and Heidegger 
disapprove of: the idea of language as a tool at the disposal of the self-
present ego, i.e., language as an element which has the ability to make 
things present, and as if eternal, to consciousness. In The Infinite 
Conversation, Blanchot remarks that with intentionality Husserl’s 
phenomenology maintains the primacy of the subject as the origin of 
meaning.286 In phenomenology, he writes,  
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The act of speech remains one of expression; it is a matter of 
expressing the meaning that always precedes, then of preserving it 
as much as possible in its luminous ideality. Or, in fact, scientific 
truth must be said in order to constitute itself by freeing itself from 
the psychological singularity of the one who is supposed to have 
brought it to light, if, therefore, language has a certain constitutive 
power, one must immediately add that it is the speaking subject 
itself that holds this power. Speech would not therefore take the 
place of the subject in this act that is constitutive 
(phenomenologically speaking, this would be scandalous) – the 
subject speaks […]. Language, the expression of meaning that it 
serves and safeguards; meaning, the ideality of light; a primacy of 
light; a primacy that originates in the Subject with which a 
beginning occurs.287
According to Blanchot’s words, language in Husserl receives its 
characteristics from the idea of consciousness understood as the 
“origin of light”. In Husserl the foundation of meaning is the 
enlightening subjectivity and the primacy of the subject.288 Even if he 
admits that speaking a scientific truth aloud frees it from the 
psychological singularity of just one person (from which it follows 
that even in Husserl language has a certain “constitutive power”), in 
Husserl “the speaking subject itself holds this power”: in his 
philosophy, the essential function of language is to articulate pre-
existing thoughts and to express pre-linguistic meanings. In 
phenomenology the origin of meaning is the light of consciousness, 
from which it follows that in phenomenology the act of speech 
remains one of expression”.289 For Husserl, the act of speech “is a 
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matter of expressing the meaning that always precedes, then of 
preserving it as much as possible in its luminous ideality.”290
As Blanchot interprets it, in Husserl’s phenomenology 
language is “the expression of a meaning that receives it, that it serves 
and safeguards; meaning, the ideality of light; a primacy of light that 
originates in the Subject with which a beginning occurs; finally, 
experience.”291 In giving privilege to man “with its divine attributes” 
(i.e., “consciousness in the first person, the transparency of light, a 
speech that sees and says meaning, a speaking gaze that reads it”) 
Husserl excludes from his philosophy “all Presence that is radically 
other”.292
Blanchot maintains that language is not an expression of “my” 
creativity: “I” do not speak in language, but rather language speaks in 
me. It is not the action or labour of the speaking subject that “kills” 
and negates things in naming them; instead, language kills, negates 
and signifies.293 The interrelatedness of negativity and the life of the 
Spirit in Hegel (which Kojève expresses by writing that “Man is not 
only mortal; he is death incarnate; he is his own death”294) is in 
Blanchot transformed into the anonymity of speech, and into the idea 
that death speaks in man. As he writes: “It is accurate to say that when 
I speak: death speaks in me. My speech is a warning that at this very 
moment death is loose in the world.”295 Whereas for Hegel language is 
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this discourse. The basic premise of structuralism, then, is that sociological or 
cultural practices can be analysed as signifying systems (Barnett 1998, 18).  
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parle: la mort parle en moi. Ma parole est l’avertissement que la mort est, en ce 
moment meme, lâchée dans le monde […]” (PF  313).  
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first of all a tool in the hands of man, for Blanchot there is always an 
inhuman, uncanny element in language that speaks in spite of the 
speaking subject.296
In Blanchot, the one who uses language is not in the outer or 
upper position in relation to language, but always involved in it; he is, 
as Blanchot says, on the side of language.297 It is not the author who 
speaks in literature; instead, in literature “no one speaks”. The “no one 
speaks” of language challenges both the Husserlian idea of the 
traditional subjectivity, which controls language with intentional 
decisions, and the Hegelian idea of the Spirit which constructs the 
world for itself with the negativity of language. Most of all, the 
anonymity of literary speech challenges the idea of the traditional 
subjectivity that controls language with his or her intentional 
decisions.
In opposition to both the Hegelian idea of language as the tool 
of the Spirit and the Husserlian idea of the consciousness of 
subjectivity as the origin of meaning, for Blanchot the condition for a 
word to continue its signifying beyond the existence of a writing or 
reading subjectivity is the materiality and the repeatability of the 
written mark.298 The otherness of language, its exteriority and 
296
 In “The idea of death in the philosophy of Hegel” Kojève cites Hegel’s words in 
Phenomenology:  “In my opinion, which can be justified only through the exposition 
of the System itself, everything depends on this, that one expresses and understands 
(aufzufassen) the True (Wahre) not [only] as substance, but rather as much as 
subject” (Kojève 1993, 311).  
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 In “The Essential Solitude” Blanchot describes the powerlessness of the writer in 
the following way: “To the extent that, being a writer, he does justice to what 
requires writing, he can never again express himself, anymore than he can appeal to 
you, or even introduce another’s speech. Where he is, only being speaks – which 
means that language doesn’t speak any more, but is. It devotes itself to the pure 
passivity of being“ (SL 26-27). 
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 In my analysis, materiality serves for Blanchot the same purpose as the notion of 
“spacing” in Derrida’s “Signature Event Context” (“Signature événement context”,
1972). That a sign can be transferred into a new context is in Derrida’s words “due 
to the spacing which constitutes the written sign”. Spacing is defined by Derrida as 
the condition of meaning as repetition, i.e., as the condition for any written mark to 
be extracted from its original context. Whereas Blanchot speaks of materiality as the 
“hope of language”, Derrida states that spacing is “not the simple negativity or lack, 
but the emergence of the mark”, the “force of rupture”, which follows from the 
possibility of iteration and repetition of any mark in a new context, and which 
challenges the metaphysics of presence. Derrida writes: “The spacing which 
separates it [the sign] from other elements of the internal contextual chain (the 
always open possibility of its extraction and grafting), but also from all the forms of 
106
obscurity, is due to the possibility of repeating marks and extracting 
them from their original contexts. As repeatable, words have the 
ability to continue their existence independently, beyond the 
intentionality of a single subjectivity. Blanchot’s description of the 
“savage freedom” of names and words also anticipates Derrida’s idea 
of meaning as a chain of signifiers. He writes:  
Take the trouble to listen to a single word: in that word, 
nothingness is struggling and toiling away, it digs tirelessly, doing 
its utmost to find a way out, nullifying what encloses it – it is 
infinite disquiet, formless and nameless vigilance. Already the seal 
which held this nothingness within the limits of the word and 
within the guise of its meaning has been broken; now there is 
access to other names, names which are less fixed, still vague, more 
capable of adapting to the savage freedom of the negative essence – 
they are unstable groups, no longer terms but the movement of 
terms, an endless sliding of “turn of phrase” which do not lead 
anywhere. Thus is born the image that does not directly designate 
the thing but, rather, what the thing is not; it speaks of a dog instead 
of a cat.299
a present referent (past or to come in the modified form of the present past to come) 
that is objective or subjective. This spacing is not the simple negativity or lack, but 
the emergence of the mark” (MP 317).   
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 WF 326. In my view, Blanchot’s notion of language radicalizes Kojève’s idea of 
the autonomous reality of language and the following possibility of “error”. Already 
Kojève affirms the spatial and temporal existence of a word and the autonomous 
reality of language. As he writes, “the meaning does not float in the void: it is 
necessarily the meaning of a word or of a discourse – [words or discourses] 
pronounced, written or only thought, but existing always in the midst of the spatial 
and temporal world.” The condition of meaning is based on the possibility of man to 
detach a word from its referent, or as Kojève also puts it, the autonomous reality of 
language is due to the ability of man to separate “the essence from its natural 
support” and to procure for it an “’empirical-existence of its own’ by incarnating it 
in a spoken, written or thought word or discourse” (Kojève 1993, 327). As Kojève in 
a quite modern way concludes, because of its “freedom,” i.e. its lack of a fixed 
referent or context, in language “error” is always possible: “For the meaning 
embodied in the word and in discourse is no longer subject to the necessity that rules 
essences bound to their respective natural supports [that are] determined in a 
univocal manner by their hic et nunc. Thus, for example, the meaning embodied in 
the word ‘dog’ can continue to subsist even after dogs have disappeared from the 
earth; it can (by being transmitted by radio, for example) overcome obstacles [that 
would be] insurmountable for a real dog; it [the word] can be placed where there 
would be no room for the latter [the real dog]; and so forth. And it is this ‘separated 
freedom’ and the ‘absolute power’ from which flows that condition of possibility of 
error, of which pre-Hegelian philosophers could never account. For this Freedom 
allows the meaning embodied in words to be combined otherwise than the 
corresponding essences, bound to their natural supports, would be” (Kojève 1993, 
327).
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Blanchot’s idea of the independent existence of language comes close 
to Derrida’s idea of language in Margins of Philosophy, where 
Derrida writes of the written sign “that is abandoned to its essential 
drifting”300: “This essential drifting, due to writing as an iterative 
structure cut off from an absolute responsibility, from consciousness 
as the authority of the last analysis, writing orphaned, and separated at 
birth from the assistance of its father, is indeed what Plato condemned 
in Phaedrus.” According to Derrida, Plato’s gesture is “the 
philosophical movement par excellence,” which represents the 
metaphysics of presence that dominates the tradition of philosophy in 
general.301 Against this metaphysical tradition, Blanchot underlines 
absence as the basis of meaning. 
 As I claim, Blanchot takes exteriority as the starting point for 
his analysis of language. In his analysis, the materiality (and 
exteriority) of language is the only hope of language to mean 
anything. As he writes, Mallarmé’s poems show us that the only 
“hope” of a poet to attain what representative language forgets “lies in 
the material reality of language, in the fact that words are things, too, a 
kind of nature”.302 As I interpret Blanchot to say, the independency of 
language is grounded on its materiality. Even if the author would die, 
because of their relative independency his works still have their ability 
to signify.  
Whereas on the first side of language obscurity is an obstacle 
to comprehension, on the second side this same obscurity is our way 
to exteriority. I would even suggest that for Blanchot, language as 
ambiguity is the answer to the philosophical problem of exteriority. In 
Blanchot’s analysis, we can approach otherness only because there is 
language, and not language in the traditional meaning of “logos” in 
the possession of man: in Blanchot man is “possessed” by language. 
As I interpret Blanchot, in his analysis language as materiality is 
“always already” on “the side of things” in a way that can be seen as 
300
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analogical to Dasein’s way of being “always already-alongside” things 
and entities, in Heidegger’s philosophy.303 As Blanchot writes in 
“Literature and the Right to Death”, Françis Ponge, the poet, has in his 
poems “gone over to the side of objects: sometimes he is water, 
sometimes a pebble, sometimes a tree.”304
Already Heidegger defines poetical discourse as a kind of 
expression of exteriority that opens Dasein’s eyes to its own Being.305
Analogically for Blanchot, the hope of man to transgress his limits 
rests not in the negativity of language as the power of the subject, but 
in the fact that in language the subject is “always already” on the side 
of the other, or on the side of exteriority. As Blanchot poetically 
writes, “The language of literature is searching for this moment that 
precedes literature. Literature usually calls it existence: it wants the 
cat as it exists, the pebble taking the side of things, not man, but the 
pebble, and in this pebble what man rejects by saying it, what is the 
foundation of speech and what speech excludes in speaking, the abyss, 
Lazarus in the tomb and not Lazarus brought back into daylight, the 
303
 By emphasizing the historicity and temporality of Being, Heidegger comes to the 
conclusion that a subject is neither present nor transparent to himself, but rather 
partakes in different pre-theoretical practices of human life, as well as in the lived 
experiences of these practices. The idea that man as Dasein is not a subject that 
constitutes the world is in opposition to Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness and 
the idea of subjectivity as a disinterested observer of the external world. From the 
idea that the world is not anything that could be objectified it follows that Dasein is 
always already “thrown” into the world, which precludes any extrawordly 
perspective demanded by Husserl: as a decentralized subjectivity Dasein is not the 
centre of its world. For Heidegger, Dasein’s finite transcendence was a condition of 
intersubjectivity as our always already intentional relation to Being and to other 
beings (BT 89). To encounter the Other, Dasein does not have to first abandon its 
inner space, since, as Heidegger writes, “the perceiving of what is known is not a 
process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has 
gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and perceiving, the Dasein 
which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein” (BT 89). In an analogical 
way, Heidegger later claims that man is always already “in language”, since 
language is man’s way to be in the world and with others. To be a human being 
means to “be there”, as if “thrown” into the world, always in some community, with 
some language, in some position.  
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 In section 34 of Being and Time Heidegger states that poetry has an ability to 
express “Dasein’s transcendence”. Heidegger writes that “In ‘poetical’ discourse, 
the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind can become 
an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing existence” (BT 205).  
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one who already smells bad, who is Evil, Lazarus lost and not Lazarus 
saved and brought back to life.”306
The Infinity of Meaning 
In putting the emphasis on the materiality of language, Mallarmé’s 
poems show the ability of language to seduce with its optical 
properties to the point where language is not light, not the conceptual 
clarity of meaning, but rather the obscurity of words – their material, 
dense, and opaque being.307 As Blanchot writes, in poetry “A name 
ceases to be the ephemeral passing of nonexistence and becomes a 
concrete ball, a solid mass of existence; language, abandoning sense, 
the meaning which was all it wanted be, tries to become senseless. 
Everything physical takes precedence: rhythm, weight, mass, shape, 
and then the paper on which one writes, the trail of ink, the book.”308
In accentuating the material appearance of language as sounds 
and blank spaces, Mallarmé’s poems fragment language, and in this 
way resist the dialectical movement of negativity. As Bruns writes, for 
Mallarmé poetry is “the blank space on which nothing is seen, the 
white space that occurs as such in the appearance of letters”.309 In a 
way, poetry shows us means to escape the violence of the negative 
which dominates the first side of language. As I interpret Blanchot to 
say, Mallarmé’s poetry, conscious of the violence it does to things by 
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form of words, to their sonority, their life, and giving us to believe that this reality 
opens up who knows what path to us into the obscure heart of things” (WF 42). 
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 WF 327. One could also say that Blanchot’s definition of language as negativity 
underlines the loss of the “signified”, the abyss between a word and a thing, which 
metaphysics has been trying to forget. The purpose is not to transfer writing from 
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Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art” puts the emphasis on the materiality 
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naming them, directs the violence to language itself. In making 
language obscure and useless, poetical language refuses to 
conceptualize and internalize things. Instead, it uses the negative 
power of language against itself.310
Blanchot proposes, as I interpret him, that by putting the 
weight on its materiality poetical language performs its refusal to 
clarify and reveal things. By obscuring itself, poetry “protects against 
revelation”, Blanchot says. As if answering Sartre’s question “what is 
literature”, he writes:  
Literature is a concern for the reality of things, for their unknown, 
free, and silent existence; literature is their innocence and their 
forbidden presence, it is the being which protects against 
revelation, it is the defiance of what does not want to take place 
outside. In this way, it sympathizes with darkness, with aimless 
passion, with lawless violence, with everything in the world that 
seems to perpetuate the refusal to come into the world. In this way 
too, it allies itself with the reality of language, it makes language 
into matter without contour, content without form, a force that is 
capricious and impersonal and says nothing, reveals nothing, 
simply announces – through its refusal to say anything – that it 
comes from night and will return to night.311
Since the second side of language takes as the starting point the 
radical absence of the thing named, its principal aim is not to represent 
reality, but rather to make a reality of its own. While the goal of 
language in philosophy is to clarify and illuminate things, poetical 
language is “the realm of the unrevealed”.312 As I propose, these 
words can be interpreted to defend the right of literature in its own 
reality against Sartre’s political demands in What is Literature?
Blanchot states that the task of poetry is not to tell truths or ideas 
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 According to Michel Foucault, this characteristic can also be found in Blanchot’s 
own writing: “Blanchot does not use language dialectically. To negate dialectically 
brings what one negates into the troubled interiority of the mind. To negate one’s 
own discourse, as Blanchot does, is to cast it ceaselessly outside of itself, to deprive 
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about reality surrounding us, nor does it ask how things really are, but 
it asks the question concerning its own being.313
In my interpretation of “Literature and the Right to Death”, 
Kojève’s analysis of naming in Hegel inspired Blanchot to develop in 
it an account of language which would oppose the Hegelian idea of 
language as “revealing Being”. As Kojève interprets in Introduction to 
the Reading of Hegel, in Hegel every word has a function of revealing 
some object in the world: in naming beings with concepts man 
transforms being into a concept, which Kojève interprets to mean that 
in transforming things a man “creates (new things)”, that is, 
concepts.314 In his early essay Blanchot challenges Hegel’s idea 
according to which words “reveal” the particular singularities that 
constitute the totality of being. As I interpret Blanchot’s division into 
two sides of language, the aim of the second side is to approach things 
without naming, revealing and thus objectifying them.315 This is why, 
on its second side, language “refuses to reveal anything”, as Blanchot 
writes. According to Blanchot, poetical language does not aim to 
clarify things by saying them; rather, it takes as its aim to write 
“without saying anything”, or to withdraw “in order to say 
nothing”.316
That literature “reveals nothing”, “sympathizes with darkness”, 
and “allies itself with the reality of language” by listening and opening 
itself to the mystery of language is its effort to avoid the violence of 
naming and negativity317: as Blanchot writes, “By turning itself into 
an inability to reveal anything literature is attempting to become the 
revelation of what revelation destroys. […] Literature says: ‘I no 
longer represent, I am; I do not signify, I present.’ ”318 Further, “The 
313
 WF 328. 
314
 “If Man can understand (reveal) Being by the Concept, it is because he 
transforms (given) Being in terms of this Concept (which is then a Project) and 
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ideal of literature could be this: say nothing, speak and say 
nothing.”319
In The Space of Literature (1955) Blanchot also suggests that 
poetical language does not seek to represent anything but rather to 
“withdraws”. Literary language is, he writes as if quoting Heidegger, a 
way of speaking without causing anything to appear: in language 
something appears, but only to disappear. Blanchot follows Heidegger 
also in suggesting that the condition of meaning is in that which is not 
present but which rather “withdraws in appearing”. The existence of 
language is both a condition of possibility for any entity to appear as 
something and a condition of possibility for approaching something 
without making it appear as an entity. As Blanchot writes, again as if 
in Heidegger’s words, in literature “concealment tends to appear”:
When beings lack, being appears as the depth of concealment in 
which it becomes lack. When concealment appears, concealment, 
having become appearance, makes “everything disappear,” but of 
this “everything has disappeared” it makes another appearance. It 
makes appearance from then on stem from “everything has 
disappeared.” “Everything has disappeared“ appears. This is 
exactly what we call an apparition. It is the “everything has 
disappeared” appearing in its turn. And the apparition says 
precisely that when everything has disappeared, there is still 
something: when everything lacks, lack makes the essence of being 
appear, and the essence of being is to be there still where it lacks, to 
be inasmuch as it is hidden…320
According to Blanchot, the experience of language as the continuous 
movement of appearing challenges the dialectical movement where 
“concealment tends to become negation”.321 In language “everything 
that has disappeared appears”322: something appears, although only to 
disappear in the same movement of appearing.323 This is almost what 
Heidegger writes in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. He writes that 
what is, is only by virtue of its concealment: “Every being which we 
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encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of 
presencing, and in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a 
concealment. The clearing in which it stands is in itself at the same 
time concealment”.324
Blanchot’s answer to the question of whether there is language 
that would be beyond all objectifying and essentializing of 
representative thinking, is in the negative. Although our hope of 
encountering exteriority is in the otherness of language, it is not 
possible to close one’s eyes to the negative and the representative side 
of language, either. As Blanchot concludes, literature’s effort to turn 
“itself into an inability to reveal anything” is unfeasible: its “Orphic” 
will to catch things “before” meaning, language and consciousness is 
an impossible, “tragic endeavour”.325 Blanchot writes:  
By turning itself into an inability to reveal anything, literature is 
attempting to become the revelation of what revelation destroys. 
This is a tragic endeavor. Literature says: ‘I no longer represent, I 
am; I do not signify, I present.’ But this wish to be a thing, this 
refusal to mean anything, a refusal immersed in words turned to 
salt; in short, this destiny which literature becomes as it becomes 
the language of no one, the writing of no writer, the light of 
consciousness deprived of a self, this insane effort to bury itself in 
itself, to hide itself behind the fact that it is visible – all this is what 
literature now manifests, what literature now shows. If it were to 
become as mute as a stone, as passive as the corpse enclosed 
behind the stone, its decision to lose the capacity for speech would 
still be legible on the stone and would be enough to wake that 
bogus corpse.326
Why is it, then, that language fails in “attempting to become the 
revelation of what revelation destroys”? The answer is, Blanchot 
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proposes, in the duplicity of death. In his analysis, the second side of 
literature puts the weight on all that which the first side is not able to 
deny even if it tried to. First of all, it emphasizes the materiality of 
language as the residue of meaning: materiality itself is something that 
evades conceptualization and the movement of negativity. For 
Blanchot, the prime example of something which cannot be negated 
and conceptualized is negativity itself: the moment of death which 
escapes all our efforts to catch death with language. In Blanchot’s 
analysis, it is not possible for language to reach its own beginning, the 
moment of negation, the moment of death. Death as the ultimate 
exteriority is something that makes meaning possible, remaining at the 
same time beyond our ability to catch it.  
Even if I would try to negate the spatial existence of a thing, its 
living existence in the world by creating a concept, what I cannot 
negate is another existence that in the word continues its being despite 
my effort to deny it in turn. From this it follows that although 
language is based on absence and death, language itself “cannot die”; 
it expresses “the impossibility of going out”,327 as Blanchot says. In 
contrast to Heidegger’s idea of death as “the possibility of 
impossibility” Blanchot speaks of the impossibility of language 
attaining its own death, i.e., the moment when it would cease to 
signify. Although the possibility to speak is rooted in our death, 
language can never attain its origin (death) as such. Language delays 
death, prevents it from happening and expressing itself. In searching 
the moment before speech, literature encounters only language’s 
inability to deny itself – it meets the endless continuity of its own 
meaning, the “signification in general”, as Blanchot writes:  
When literature refuses to name anything, when it turns a name into 
something obscure and meaningless, witness to the primordial 
obscurity, what has disappeared in this case – the meaning of the 
name – is really destroyed, but signification in general has 
appeared in its place, the meaning of the meaninglessness 
embedded in the word as an expression of the obscurity of 
327
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existence, so that although the precise meaning of the terms has 
faded, what asserts itself now is the very possibility of signifying, 
the empty power of bestowing meaning – a strange impersonal 
light.328
Language is the impossibility to stop signifying, it cannot stop making 
sense. As such, language is a kind of eternal return of meaning, or as 
Blanchot says, language “becomes the disappearance of every way 
out”329; literature is the “process through which whatever ceases to be 
continues to be”, and “whatever dies encounters only the impossibility 
of dying.”330 There is no exit from language, which is why the 
question of the condition of meaning has to be found from language 
itself. This is why Blanchot opens his essay by suggesting, “Let us 
suppose that literature begins at the moment when literature becomes 
a question.”331
Blanchot proposes in “Literature and the Right to Death” that 
literature’s way of being a kind of passive subjectless consciousness 
comes close to what Levinas intends with his notion of the il y a. Both 
the experience of language in Blanchot and the experience of the 
“there is” in Levinas challenge the subjectivity and the identity of the 
self. In a way analogical to the exteriority of language questioning a 
reader’s authority, Levinas’s il y a (as Levinas writes) “will strip my 
consciousness of its very ‘subjectivity’”.332
Blanchot refers to Levinas’s Existence and Existants in 
“Literature and the Right to Death” in suggesting that literature 
encounters horror in its experience of anonymity: “This is why 
existence is his [the human being’s] only real dread; as Emmanuel 
Levinas has clearly shown, existence frightens him, not because of 
death which could put an end to it, but because it excludes death, 
because it is still there underneath death, a presence in the depths of 
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absence, an inexorable day in which all days rise and set.”333 From the 
horrifying infinity of meaning it follows that in spite of for what 
reasons and in which style the novelist writes, in the end he has only 
one subject: “The horror of existence deprived from the world, the 
process through which whatever ceases to be continues to be  […]
whatever dies encounters the impossibility of dying. This process is 
day which has become fatality, consciousness whose light is no longer 
the lucidity of the vigil but the stupor of lack of sleep, it is existence 
without being, as poetry tries to recapture it behind the meaning of 
words, which reject it.”334
Blanchot refers to Levinas’s idea according to which dread is 
not caused by our “being towards death” (as Heidegger in Being and 
Time maintains), but rather by the impossibility of death in the 
experience of the universality of existence. When meaning and 
consciousness are unavoidable, being becomes a torture, the feeling of 
an endless process of dying. Blanchot cites Levinas in asking, “Isn’t 
dread in the face of being – horror of being – just as primordial as 
dread in the face of death? Isn’t fear of being just as primordial as fear 
for one’s being? Even more primordial, because one could account for 
the latter by means of the former.”335
Whereas Levinas speaks of the interminability of existence, 
Blanchot sees in language an impossibility to stop making sense.336
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(Bruns 2002, 222).  I disagree with Bruns’s interpretation according to which in 
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Literature is movement where that which disappears appears again; its 
mode of being is “existence without being.”337 Writing never attains 
the experience of the final death but rather the infinite experience of 
dying. As the infinity of existence encountered in literature excludes 
the possibility of death, literature becomes the “process through which 
whatever ceases to be continues to be”, and “whatever dies encounters 
only the impossibility of dying”.338 What is heard in the endless 
murmuring of language is the voice of “nothingness at work”, or the 
voice of the un-negatable being, pure existence, to which Levinas 
gives the name “there is” (il y a).
Whereas Levinas in Existence and Existants underlines the 
otherness of being, Blanchot stresses the fundamental exteriority of 
language. Both death and language are meta-phenomenological in a 
fundamental way, borderline cases which demarcate the limits of 
phenomenological experience and language.339 Blanchot’s idea of the 
otherness of literary language reminds us also of the “createdness” of 
art in Heidegger, the solitary, uncanny character of art, which creates 
an experience we cannot put into concepts but which, nevertheless, 
continues its being.  
For Blanchot, literature is “consciousness” without a subject; it 
is not the consciousness of an I, not the “unconscious” side of a 
subject, but rather “the experience through which the consciousness 
discovers its being in its inability to lose consciousness, in the 
movement whereby, as it disappears, as it tears itself away from the 
meticulousness of an I, it is recreated beyond unconsciousness as an 
impersonal spontaneity, the desperate eagerness of a haggard 
knowledge which knows nothing, which no one knows, and which 
Blanchot the main question concerns the alterity of “things”. Rather, as I will argue, 
the question is of the alterity of writing as neutrality. See Chapter Five in this study.  
337
 PF 322, WF 334. 
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 PF 335 
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 See Simon Critcley, “Il y a – holding Levinas’s hand to Blanchot’s fire” (in 
Maurice Blanchot. The Demand of Writing, pp. 108–122) and Very Little… Almost 
Nothing. Death, Philosophy, Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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ignorance always discovers behind itself as its own shadow changed 
into a gaze.”340
For Blanchot, it is not one’s consciousness that speaks through 
language, but rather language as “consciousness without the ability to 
lose consciousness.”341 If language is born by transforming negativity 
into a concept, the movement of negativity as a chain of signifiers can 
never stop, i.e., it does not “die”, which means that in language death 
is always deferred (language cannot stop signifying). Writing never 
attains the experience of final death but rather the experience of 
eternal dying, the infinity of death. Language is a continuous 
anticipation of death which never arrives. It is consciousness without 
subjectivity, a kind of awareness or consciousness without anybody 
being conscious or aware. Literature’s “consciousness” does not refer 
to any singular living consciousness (“because writing itself, of 
course, neither lives nor dies”, as Leslie Hill writes)342, from which 
follows also its infinity and groundlessness. 
In Blanchot’s stories, the infinity of meaning is indicated also 
by their beginnings and endings, which are often left open and 
indeterminate. The beginning of Thomas the Obscure, for example, 
leaves the reader without information of what has happened earlier, 
before the story. The ending of The Madness of the Day, in its turn, 
tries to deny its own existence in letting the last line ask: “A story?” 
And the story answers: “No. No stories. Never again”.343 Even though 
the story denies the possibility of any future stories, the story itself is 
already a story about telling a story. Writing is unable to negate its 
own continuation: even if it tried to deny its own existence, it always 
signifies something. Between the first and the second version of 
Thomas the Obscure, there is also an important difference, which 
indicates the loss of its author’s belief in closed endings. In the first 
1941 version, the chapter where Thomas is reading his text closes with 
the word “FIN”. From the 1950 version, this important word is 
340
 WF 331-2. 
341
 WF 331. 
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 Hill 1997, 97.
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 The story asks, “A story? No. No stories. Never again” (MD 18, FJ 32-33). 
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missing. From these open beginnings and endings follow the 
experience of meaning as a kind of endless horizon (the space of 
literature) without a fixed origin or end.344
In my analysis, Blanchot challenges Hegel’s idea of language 
as pure negativity and conceptuality with his idea of the infinity and 
ambiguity of language. Although Blanchot defines the second side of 
language as a non-objectifying way of speaking, i.e., as a “refusal to 
say anything”, by following Kojève’s idea of negativity as the ground 
of all meaning he finds violence in the core of language itself. 
Blanchot defines language as negativity and affirmation, visibility and 
invisibility, conceptuality and non-conceptuality, all at the same time. 
This ambiguity of all language is (as I will suggest in the 
following chapters) the main difference between the answer Blanchot 
and Heidegger give to the problem concerning the violence of 
representative language. Whereas Heidegger sees poetic language as 
an affirmative, non-violent, and “aletheic” way of approaching Being, 
Blanchot underlines the co-existence of the negative and the 
affirmative, i.e., the violent and the non-violent side in all language.  
The Force of Language  
In Hegel’s Phenomenology, the ego’s reality is the product of the 
labour in which the ego struggles to find itself an identity. In 
Blanchot, instead, writing is beyond both the notion of labour and of 
subjectivity. Because of its independency language has a way of being 
that is not anchored to the intention of the present subjectivity. Neither 
is it possible to assimilate the entities, phenomena, experiences, and 
situations in the literary world to those in the real or 
phenomenological world.  
344
 See Leslie Hill’s analysis of the ending of Thomas the Obscure in Hill 1997, 56-
7. Hill writes that the ending of Thomas the Obscure is “like the ultimate 
condemnation of both Thomas and the literary discourse that carries his name, the 
final proof, so to speak, that the only possible end to writing is in fact the 
interminable impossibility of such ending” (Hill 1997, 57).  
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As I have claimed, by adopting from Mallarmé the idea of 
language as materiality and physicality, Blanchot is able to develop
the idea of language as autonomous, as anonymity, i.e., the idea of 
language as signification without the idea of subjectivity as the origin 
or foundation of meaning. From Blanchot’s view of language as an 
autonomous field follows in turn both his idea of the dissolution of the 
theoretical subject and the impairment of the analytical gaze. As I 
interpret Blanchot, the experience of the impoverishment of the “I” in 
the encounter with the textual other leads him in turn to criticize those 
philosophies and theories based on the primacy of “intentional”, 
“enlightening”, “mastering” subjectivity.  
Because of its independency, language should also be freed 
from the demand of truth. As something that remains beyond the 
opposition between the true and the false, the notion of literary writing 
in Blanchot comes close to the definition of the linguistic performative 
in Austin. According to Austin, the analysis of the performative 
should be kept free from the authority of the value of truth.345 In 
Derrida’s interpretation, however, Austin’s definition of the 
performative fails, since it does not take into consideration what 
Derrida himself calls “the intrinsic conventionality” of the mark. 
Blanchot, instead, underlines the independency of writing, its way of 
being a kind of consciousness without anyone being conscious or 
aware.346
As Derrida interprets, in defining the performative as a 
linguistic act that “does something with words” Austin substitutes the 
345
 As Derrida interprets in Margins of Philosophy, unlike Heidegger’s truth as 
aletheia or truth as assertion, Austin’s performative does not aim to tell or uncover 
the truth: “The performative is a ‘communication’ which does not essentially limit 
itself to transporting an already constituted semantic content guarded by its own 
aiming at truth (truth as an unveiling of that which is in its Being, or as an 
adequation between a judicative statement and a thing itself)” (MP 322).  On 
Heidegger’s notion of truth, see Chapter Five of this thesis.  
346
 As I interpret Blanchot, his thinking is in line with Derrida’s notion of 
intentionality two decades later: although he does not deny the category of 
consciousness, or of intentionality, he challenges the idea of the subject as its self-
present basis. As Derrida says, even if we affirm the iterability and the 
independency of the mark, and take it as the ground of meaning, “the category of 
intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from this place it will no 
longer be able to govern the entire scene and the entire system of utterances” (MP 
326).
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value of truth with the value of force: the idea of language as 
something that is able to cause effects is based on the idea of language 
as active and forceful.347 Derrida points out that Austin’s analyses 
always demand the idea of “an exhaustively determinable context”:348
Austin thinks of the context as the ground or “the circumstance of the 
statement”349 that secures the successfulness of the given 
performative. As such, the context refers to consciousness as its basis. 
With the demand of the determinable context, the ultimate 
responsibility for the success of the performative is given to “a free 
consciousness present for the totality of the operation, of an absolutely 
full meaning that is master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction of a 
total field whose intention remains the organizing centre.”350
According to Derrida, to understand where the performative 
gets its force (and how meaning in general is possible) demands an 
understanding of “what the ‘occurring’ or the eventhood of an event 
consists of, when the event supposes in its allegedly present and 
singular intervention a statement which in itself can be only of a 
repetitive or citational structure, or rather […] an iterable structure.”351
Derrida does not reduce the “force” or the “power” of language (its 
ability to signify) to an exhaustively determinable context or to the 
consciousness of the writing subjectivity. For Derrida, as for Blanchot, 
the power of language is rather in its repetitive or citational structure; 
as I propose, the idea of language as repetition comes up already in 
Blanchot’s early essays on language.  
In Derrida’s words, the absence of intention can be understood 
as “the structural unconsciousness” of language, which again comes 
close to Blanchot’s notion of language in “Literature and the Right to 
Death”, where language is a “consciousness without the ability to lose 
consciousness”, or “the light of consciousness deprived of a self.”352
Blanchot defines absence as the force of language, which makes 
347
 MP 321.
348
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350
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 MP 326. Emphasis is mine. 
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 WF 328, 331. 
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language continue the never ending movement towards the goal it can 
never attain. Language is not able to reveal its origin, since the 
movement of writing is all there is. That writing is “consciousness 
without ability to lose consciousness” means that writing is 
independent, autonomous, and as if orphaned in the sense that it is not 
– and cannot be – dependent on the existence of its creator or of its 
reader. If language were a gaze, it would be a gaze unable to close its 
eyes.  
Blanchot suggests (in a similar way as the post-structuralists 
after him) the possibility to cut off the word (or the “mark”, to use 
structuralist vocabulary), from its context of production.353 The 
functioning of writing necessitates the radical absence of the context, 
in a similar way as it necessitates the radical absence of the writer and 
the reader. As Derrida writes in Margins of Philosophy, from 
understanding language as a textual event follows “the subtraction of 
all writing from the semantic horizon or the hermeneutic horizon 
which, at least as a horizon of meaning, lets itself be punctured by 
writing.”354 In Derrida’s words, a written sign “carries with it a force 
of breaking with its context, that is, the set of presences which 
organize the moment of its inscription.”355
In “Literature and the Right to Death” Blanchot in his turn 
asks: if literature as “an impersonal power” does not get its force from 
the writer or from the specific context, and if literature “does not act”, 
where, then, does literature get its power? He answers: from language 
itself. Literary language is, Blanchot writes, “a force that is capricious 
and impersonal and says nothing, reveals nothing”, and in this way 
“makes language into matter without content, content without 
form.”356 Understood as a textual event, literature is a “meaning 
detached from its conditions, separated from its moments”, which 
wanders “like an empty power, a power no one can do anything with, 
a power without power, the simple inability to cease to be, but which, 
353
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because of that, appears to be the proper determination of 
indeterminate and meaningless existence.”357
In place of Hegel’s concept of language as pure negativity, 
Blanchot develops the idea of language as “worklessness” or un-
working (désœuvrement), i.e., language as an infinite movement 
which bases itself on nothingness without being able to name this 
nothingness itself. From the infinity of signification follows the 
impossibility to finish a work; instead of a completed work there is the 
interminable process of signification in its endless becoming. This 
concept is not to be understood as the dialectical opposition to the 
concept of a work of art (œuvre); it refers to the interminable process 
of signification, which due to the repeatability of words cannot be 
anchored to the intentionality of the writer or the reader, and which 
therefore undoes the idea of the finished work, of which the writer 
would have the image in his mind at the moment of finishing the 
work.
In Blanchot, the materiality of the word is like the “the 
structure of the iterability” for Derrida, in that it takes the work away 
from the activity of the writer and instead underlines the radical 
passivity of language, its independency of a single consciousness, and 
the infinity of signification. In other words, if Hegel’s concept of 
language as negativity and communication underlines the constative 
or assertative function of language, Blanchot’s concept of literary 
language, rather, takes from it the power to “operate”, or the force to 
“transform situations” (which is the power Austin gives to the 
performative). Blanchot’s conception of language is beyond the 
opposition between language as referring to something and language 
as doing things. He proposes that we think of a third way of defining 
language, which neither constates nor performs things. As Blanchot 
writes in The Infinite Conversation “to write is to make (of) speech (a) 
work, but that this work is an unworking [désœuvrement]; that to 
357
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speak poetically is to make possible a non-transitive speech whose 
task is not to say things”.358
Because of the possibility of repetition and iterability, language 
is never “mine” or “ours”; as an element that consists of signs and 
words independent of a single writer or a reader, language should be 
understood rather as an anonymous field, in which we always already 
live, act, and make plans. In Blanchot, the exteriority of language 
takes the place of a controlling subjectivity. As Derrida suggests, “By 
absolutely virtualizing dialogue, writing creates a kind of autonomous 
transcendental field from which every present subject can be 
absent.”359 The ultimate ambiguity and the impersonality of literary 
language questions the idea of poetry as the production of the creative 
subject. From this it follows that poetical language does not eventually 
fulfil the conditions Austin demands from the performative: as 
Derrida points out in “Signature Event Context”, the most essential of 
these conditions is “the conscious presence of the intention of the 
speaking subject.”360 Although signs in the performative do not refer 
to independent, pre-existing objects, what nevertheless remains is the 
act of objectification: according to Austin, the performative utterance 
can be successful only if the engagement of the performing subject is 
self-conscious and sincere.361 From this it follows, that if literature is 
not understood as a self-conscious act of a creative subjectivity, in 
literary writing a successful performative can never be performed. As 
Blanchot puts it:    
When I first begin, I do not speak in order to say something, rather 
a nothing demands to speak, nothing speaks, nothing finds its being 
in speech and the being of speech is nothing. This formulation 
explains why literature’s ideal has been the following: to say 
nothing, to speak in order to say nothing. That is not the musing of 
a high class kind of nihilism. Language perceives that its meaning 
derives not from what exists, but from its own retreat before 
existence, and it is tempted to proceed no further than this retreat, 
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to try to attain the negation itself and to make everything of 
nothing. If one is to talk about things except to say what makes 
them nothing, well then, to say nothing is really the only hope to 
say everything about them.362
Blanchot’s description of language brings to mind Heidegger’s 
question at the beginning of his Introduction to Metaphysics, where 
Heidegger asks “why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” If 
Heidegger is understood to be asking how can we have a relation to 
something that is defined as not-a-thing, that is, nothingness, one 
could answer with Banchot’s words: that literary language does 
“nothing” by “positing nothing”, or at least something impossible to 
determine or approach with the seriousness of the philosophical 
reflection, since language creates nothing that “is”.  
Blanchot underlines the ultimate ambiguity of all language: 
although language in its “constative” dimensionality is violence of 
conceptuality and light, there is always also another possibility, the 
other side of language, where language, by doing violence to itself, 
seeks ways to minimize the violence of conceptual thinking. In 
addition to the distinction between constative and performative, we 
could therefore propose a third possibility, that – in contrast to the 
constative, which always refers to something, and in contrast to the 
performative, which always “does” something – struggles to do 
nothing with words.363
In an interview in December 2003 Jacques Derrida relates to 
the performative a conventional idea of the right to do things with the 
power of words. Derrida differentiates between this power and the 
event, which is something more or something other than the 
performative. Derrida asks, how can the event – which I understand to 
be a textual event – constitute the truth. For Derrida, the event 
constitutes the truth which is beyond traditional truth. This truth is 
“always revolutionary” or as he says, as if referring to Heidegger, “de
362
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 As Mark Taylor writes, we should pose the question “whether words sometimes 
are neither constative nor performative but function as an unthought third that allows 
words to do nothing” (Taylor 1990, 210).  
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type poétique si vous voulez, ou du type de l’événement.” This non-
objectifiable and non-thematizable truth cannot even be thought of. In 
adding that this kind of poetical or event-like truth is not “du type du 
théorème, de ce qu’on peut voir devant soi ou transmettre”, Derrida is 
speaking as if through Blanchot’s mouth. The difference is, however, 
the following: as I will underline in the following chapters, Blanchot 
always shuns speaking of truth in relation to writing.364
364
 Derrida says: “L’événement ne peut pas être performatif. Le performatif implique 
la maîtrise dans l’observance d’une convention donnée et inflexible. Donc, un 
événement plus que performatif ou autre que performatif, comment peut-on dire 
qu’il constitue une vérité? Eh bien, pourtant je le crois. Je crois que la vérité, celle 
qui m'intéresse au-delà du concept traditionnel de vérité, est toujours 
révolutionnaire, de type poétique si vous voulez, ou du type de l’événement, et non 
du type du théorème, de ce qu'on peut voir devant soi ou transmettre. C'est une 
mutation qu'on peut après coup essayer de réfléchir. On peut tenter de la 
transformer en vérité transmissible, avec tous les risques que cela comporte, mais 
au moment où cela arrive, ce n'est pas pensable, thématisable, objectivable.”  (In 
“La vérité blessante, ou le corps à corps des  langues. Entretien avec Jacques 
Derrida.” /Europe: Revue littéraire mensuelle, /82ème année, mai 2004, No. 901, 
pp. 8-27, here p. 20; cf. pp. 19-20). 
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IV From Perception to Fascination, and from Representation to
Image: Literary Experience in Blanchot
The cornerstone of Blanchot’s notion of language as it is presented in
his early essays from the 1940s, is the idea of meaning without an
intending or anchoring subjectivity. “Literature and the Right to Death”
already presents language as a kind of subjectless field which
challenges the idea of meaning as intentionality. As well, in Blanchot’s
essays  from  the  50s,  collected  in The Space of Literature, both the
writer and the reader encounter in the force of language an event which
questions the functionality of the classical subject-object-dichotomy. In
The Space of Literature Blanchot speaks of the literary experience as
the experience of fascination (la fascination), which challenges seeing
as intentionality and making present by the gaze.
In “The Essential Solitude” (“La Solitude Essentielle”, 1955)
fascination is presented as an experience that derives from the special
nature of literary language. The experience of fascination is born as we
encounter in the otherness of the text something we can neither
comprehend nor relinquish: the text remains radically separate; it
cannot be studied as an object of knowledge. Blanchot’s notion of
fascination comes close to the surrealist experience of automatic
writing to which Blanchot also refers several times in The Space of
Literature. As Gerald Bruns notes, for Blanchot the surrealists stand
for the noninstrumental notion of language.365 As Blanchot writes in
The Work of Fire, “The surrealists became well aware – they made use
of it admirably – of the bizarre character of words: they saw that words
have their own spontaneity. For a long time, language had laid claim to
a kind of particular existence: it refused simple transparency, it was
not just a gaze, an empty means of seeing; it existed, it was concrete
thing and even a colored thing. The surrealists understand, moreover,
365 Bruns 1997, 10.
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language is not an inert thing; it has a life of its own, and a latent
power that escapes us.”366
In the experience of fascination the subject loses its ability of
subjectivity and its ability to analyse its perception by giving meanings
to  it:  “What  fascinates  us  robs  us  of  our  power  to  give  sense.  It
abandons its ‘sensory’ nature, abandons the world, draws back from
the world, and draws us along. It no longer reveals itself to us, yet it
affirms itself in a presence foreign to the temporal present and to
presence in space.”367 In fascination, we are no longer in a cognitive
relation to the text. We no longer look, think, or gaze at it as as
aesthetic object; instead, it gazes at us. As Levinas explains Blanchot’s
notion of fascination, “If vision and knowledge consists in being able
over their objects, in dominating them from a distance, the exceptional
reversal brought about by writing comes down to being touched by
what one sees – to being touched from a distance. The gaze is seized
by the work, the words look at the writer (This is Blanchot’s definition
of fascination.)”368
In Blanchot’s words, in the experience of fascination the gaze
finds the power which neutralizes it: “Of whoever is fascinated it can
be said that he doesn’t perceive any real object, any real figure, for
what he sees does not belong to the world of reality, but to the
366 WF 88-9, PF 93. Emphasis is mine.
367 SL 32, EL 29.
368 Levinas 1996, 132. Levinas’s concept of desire reminds of Blanchot’s notion of
fascination in that they both replace the phenomenological concepts of
intentionality. For Levinas the power which moves us unto the exteriority of the
other is not philosophical contemplation or conceptual thinking; it is not the
movement of a dialectic thinking of which Plato already writes in his cave allegory.
The relationship to exteriority cannot be that of fusion or “bringing together”, but
requires distance. In Levinas’s view, the other can be approached only if the
distance between myself and the other is radical: “This remoteness is radical only if
desire is not the possibility of anticipating the desirable, if it does not think it
beforehand, if it goes toward it aimlessly, that is, as toward the absolute,
unanticipated alterity, as one goes forth unto death. Desire is absolute if the
desiring being is mortal and the Desired invisible. Invisibility does not denote an
absence of relation; it implies relations with what is not given, of which there in no
idea. Vision is an adequation of the idea with the thing, a comprehension that
encompasses. Non-adequation does not denote a simple negation or an obscurity of
the idea, but – beyond the light and the night, beyond the knowledge measuring
beings – the inordinateness of Desire” (Levinas 1996, 34).
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indeterminate milieu of fascination.”369 In the experience of fascination,
light is not the light of subjectivity and reason, but rather the black light
of things and beings which attract one’s gaze like the dark surface of
water: “This milieu of fascination, where what one sees seizes sight and
renders it interminable, where the gaze coagulates into light, where
light is the absolute gleam of an eye one doesn’t see but which one
doesn’t cease to see since it is the mirror image of one’s own look –
this milieu is utterly attractive. Fascinating. It is light which is also the
abyss, a light one sinks into, both terrifying and tantalizing.”370
In what follows, I will read the fourth chapter of the revised
Thomas the Obscure (1950) as a world of fascination. In this chapter,
Blanchot presents to us an act of reading, or as Gerald L. Bruns writes,
the chapter “represents language” in a way that “we might figure as a
sort of surrealist allegory of reading” or “a surrealist allegory of poetic
experience”.371  One can also propose that Thomas’s relation to the
book he is reading is determined by fascination, as Blanchot in The
Space of Literature defines the notion. In Blanchot’s story, Thomas’s
act of reading turns from “seeing as staring” to the experience of
fascination which according to Blanchot is beyond both seeing and not-
seeing. As I argue, reading, for Blanchot, is eventually not seeing as
staring or seeing as Umsicht, but is determined by the experience of
fascination, which is neither the ability to see nor the ability to stop
seeing. I will first argue that Blanchot replaces Heidegger’s term
Umsicht with “fascination” and Heidegger’s term “revelation” with the
term “image”: in the experience of fascination, the text turns from the
object into something which Blanchot calls “the image” (l’image). I
suggest that with these concepts Blanchot both affirms and challenges
the central points of Heidegger’s thinking on art.
369 SL 32, EL 29.
370 SL 32-3.
371 Bruns 1997, 35.
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The Gaze of the Text
There is a scene in Blanchot’s novel The One Who Was Standing apart
from Me (Celui qui ne m’accompagnait pas, 1953) which tells about
an encounter with words and which is close to the experience of
fascination as Blanchot defines it in The Space of Literature. The story
recounts how the narrator experiences in words “impersonal presence,
the frightening affirmation of something”, which he is not able to
comprehend:
Beautiful hours, profound words which I would like to belong to,
but which would, themselves, also belong to me, words empty
and without connection. I cannot question them and they cannot
answer me. They only remain close to me, as I remain close to
them. That is our dialogue. They stand motionless, as though
erect in these rooms; at night, they are concealment of the night;
in the day, they have transparency of the day. Everywhere I go,
they are there.
What do they want? We’re not familiar to one another, we don’t
know one another. Words from the empty depth, who has
summoned you?...
I don’t know that they press on me, but I sense it. I see a sign of
it in the immobility which, even when they seem to wander, even
when I leave them, keeps them crowded around me in a circle
whose centre I am in spite of myself…
Am I their goal, what are they seeking? I will not believe it. But
sometimes they stare at me with a power so restrained, a silence
so reserved, that this silence points me out to myself; then I have
to remain firm, I have to struggle with my refusal to believe…
I didn’t invoke them, I am without power over them, and they
have no relations with me…
They are always together. No doubt this means I can only see
them together, together even though unconnected, motionless
around me though wandering. I see them all, never one in
particular, never one single one in the familiarity of an undivided
gaze, and if, even so, I try to stare at one of them separately,
what I’m looking at then is terrible, impersonal presence, the
frightening affirmation of something I don’t understand, don’t
penetrate, that isn’t here and that nevertheless conceals itself in
the ignorance and emptiness of my own gaze. 372
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This scene recounted in The One Who Was Standing Apart from Me
resembles the scene of reading narrated in the fourth chapter of
Thomas the Obscure. In both these stories the characters are effaced
with a kind of gaze of being that takes from them their ability to
approach things by the power of the gaze. Being looked at by words is
what happens also to the protagonist of Thomas the Obscure: in this
story, the act of reading is not controlled by the desire of Thomas, the
reader, but by the seductive force of the text which does not only
“challenge the reader” (as is said of difficult texts) but also fascinates
him.
In Chapter Four of Thomas the Obscure, the opening lines
present Thomas reading a book in his room. He reads with rapt
attention, so deep in concentration that he doesn’t notice if someone
enters the room. The open book, interpreted as a feminine praying
mantis, is just about to take control, just about to consume the reader.
Thomas, in turn, is like a male mantis at the moment of being devoured
by the female:
Thomas stayed in his room to read. He was sitting with his hands
joined over his brow, his thumbs pressing against his hairline, so
deep in concentration that he did not make a move when anyone
opened the door. Those who came in thought he was pretending
to read, seeing that the book was always open to the same page.
He was reading. He was reading with unsurpassable
meticulousness and attention. In relation to every symbol, he was
in the position of the male praying mantis about to be devoured
by the female. They looked at each other.373
The praying mantis, mantis religiosa, signifies in Greek a seer and a
prophet, i.e., someone who has second sight. Although the praying
mantis has been named after its way of crossing its front legs as if it
were praying, in truth it waits in this position for the right moment to
attack its prey. The comparison of the reader to a seer (and to its
victim) can be read to imply that something/somebody is to be revealed
372 CAP 139-43, OW 74-76.
373 TTO 25.
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to the reader, or that the story is going to pose a question of the
structure of revelation and of a prophetic event.374 The praying mantis
can also be seen as a sign or an omen to the reader. It can be read at
the same time as a promise of insight and a warning: be careful, or the
story, like the mantis, will deceive and devour you.375
In the mythical figure of a mantis, sexuality and death confront
each other: the adult female usually eats the male after or during
mating. The mantis’s grasping response is extremely fast, hardly visible
to the eyes; the motion is barely a flicker if perceived at all. In order to
stay alive the male must therefore to be extremely cautious: as soon as
it catches the gaze of the female, it must begin approaching so slowly
that the female it not able to see it moving. Jacques Lacan, the French
psychoanalyst and philosopher, pays attention to the link the story
makes between death and castration. In his seminar Identification
(L’Identification, 1962), Lacan analyses the relation between sight and
anxiety in Thomas the Obscure. In Lacan’s interpretation, the figure of
the mantis relates the gaze and anxiety to each other, since to surrender
to the other’s gaze means giving oneself up to the anxiety.376
For Thomas concentrating on his reading, the most significant
thing is the object of his gaze, the text. Like any reader, he wants the
text to uncover its secret. For Blanchot, reading is a distracted desire
for illumination, an attempt to bring concealed meaning from darkness
to light, in the same way as Christ called upon Lazarus: Lazare, veni
foras, “Lazarus, come forth”.377 However, as Thomas encounters in
the text someone or something that looks at him, he also becomes
aware of his own gaze, of himself looking at the text, and of the
separating distance between him and the object of his gaze. One could
propose also, as Lacan does, that in trying to catch the meaning of his
374 Schestag 1998,224.
375 The figure of mantis can also be interpreted as referring to the Greek oracle
who, by giving a “sign” to the people, does not give a sign in the linguistic meaning
of the word. The sign of the oracle is rather a hint, warning, or clue, which in turn
must be interpreted. As Heraclitus writes, “The Oracle of Deplhi does not speak, it
gives a sign” (Fr. 93).
376 Gondek 1990, 21-28.
377 EL 257.
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gaze Thomas becomes aware of the gaze of the other – which he needs
in order to catch the meaning of his own gaze. For Lacan, what is
essential is not that I am looking, but that I am looked at while I am
looking at. The other looks at me. For Lacan, the questions heard
between the lines are: Why am I looked at? Why does the other look at
me? What does it want from me? How does it want me?378
However, without going deeper to Lacan’s psychoanalytic
analysis, what in my view is essential in the encounter between the
reader and the text in Blanchot’s story is not Thomas’s consciousness,
the reader’s intentionality, but rather the activity of the text, or the
gaze of the other. From the first moment of his reading Thomas is
conscious of feminine seducing desire, which he senses from the text:
The words, coming forth from the book which was taking on the
power of life and death, exercised a gentle and peaceful
attraction over the glance which played with them. Each of them,
like a half closed eye, admitted the excessively keen glance which
in other circumstances it would not have tolerated. And so
Thomas slipped toward these corridors, approaching them
defenselessly until the moment he was perceived by the very
quick of the word. Even this was not fearful, but rather an almost
pleasant moment he would have wished to prolong. The reader
contemplated this little spark of life joyfully, not doubting that he
had awakened it. It was with pleasure that he saw himself in this
eye looking at him.379
The text is not, however, simply a desiring or a seducing subjectivity:
although the text has the power to seduce with its gaze, already at the
next moment it turns from the seducing subject into the seducing
object, as if playing with both positions. Like a male mantis Thomas is
fascinated by the words looking at him; the text, like the female praying
mantis, is like a catastrophic omen to which Thomas, the male mantis,
378 According to Hans-Dieter Gondek, Lacan picks up precisely these questions in
his unpublished seminar from 1962. Lacan ponders how it would feel to confront
the giant mantis, to be opposite to it, but hiding behind a mask (Gondek 1992, 21-
23).
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remains blind.380 The deeper Thomas sinks into the text he is reading,
the more unordinary he feels his new position:
The pleasure in fact became very great. It became so great, so
pitiless that he bore it with a sort of terror, and in the intolerable
moment when he had stood forward without receiving from his
interlocutor any sign of complicity, he perceived all the
strangeness there was in being observed by a word as if by a
living being, and not simply by one word, but by all the words
that were in that word, by all those that went with it and in turn
contained other words, like a procession of angels opening out
into the infinite to the very eye of the absolute.381
The “eye of the absolute” brings to mind the Judeo-Christian idea of
the all-seeing eye of God, and also the idea of the Holy Book as an eye
of God that stays on readers’ thoughts. As well, the angels guarding
the words associate themselves with the gaze: angels, having eyes also
in their wings, have the power to see everywhere. The word “eye” also
entails a reference to the corporeality of seeing, i.e., to the fact that
seeing is always conditioned by a certain location – a certain body,
perspective or point of view, or as Blanchot writes in “Reading”
(“Lire”, 1955), “Each painting, each piece of music makes us a present
of the organ we need to welcome it; each one ‘gives’ us the eye and
the ear we need to see and hear it.”382
Despite the reference to the eye of the absolute, nothing
transcendental breaks out from Thomas’s book.  Inside every word
there is only another word and inside it other words. The sliding of the
words into other words, this movement of “signifiers” one could say, is
“like a procession of angels opening out into the infinite to the very eye
of the absolute.”383 The eye of the absolute is eventually as empty of
meaning as the line of words referring to it; the words “eye” or “eyes”
are marked by the absence of meaning: the meaning of the word eye
disseminates into the multiplicity of signifying words, and in this
380 Schestag 1998, 224.
381 TTO 25.
382 SL 192.
383 TTO 25.
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movement also the all-seeing absoluteness of the transcendental eye
disseminates into the multiplicity of potential views.
As Thomas tries to eliminate the distance between him and the
text by approaching the other he hopes to encounter, he is like Orpheus
looking at Eurydice: instead of reaching the other, his gaze breaks up
the preceding connection. The effort of the reader to make the book
transparent, to dissolve its secret with a penetrating gaze, is
condemned to fail. The work is neither a mirror which reflects back an
image of man, nor a window through which we could see our world as
new and enlightened. Thomas reading the text resembles Narcissus of
Ovid’s myth: as Blanchot writes in The Writing of the Disaster,
Narcissus “bending over the spring, does not recognize himself in the
fluid image that the water sends back to him. It is thus not himself, not
his perhaps nonexistent ‘I’ that he loves or – even in his mystification –
desires. And if he does not recognize himself, it is because what he sees
is an image, and because the similitude of an image is not a likeness to
anyone or anything: the image characteristically resembles nothing.
Narcissus falls ‘in love’ with the image because the image as such –
because every image – is attractive: the image exerts the attraction of
the void and of death in its falsity.”384
One could again refer also to the story of Lazarus, which
Blanchot often uses to clarify the role of the reader: if Lazarus does not
come out from his tomb, it is because he is already dead, and nothing
can eliminate this exteriority. Face to face with the strange faceless
exteriority, Thomas becomes frightened: the other no longer only
fascinates him, it is uncanny to be observed by the word and not only
by one word but with it all possible words.385 The fascination turns to
terror, and Thomas feels like he is losing his position as a sovereign
reader: “Rather than withdraw from a text whose defenses were so
strong, he pitted all his strength in the will to seize it, obstinately
refusing to withdraw his glance and still thinking himself a profound
reader, even when the words were already taking hold of him and
384 WD 125.
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beginning to read him.”386 Words look at Thomas, read him, and under
their pressure it is as if his whole being were substituted by words: “He
was seized, kneaded by intelligible hands, bitten by a vital tooth; he
entered with his living body into the anonymous shapes of words,
giving his substance to them, establishing their relationships, offering
his being to the word ‘be’. For hours he remained motionless, with,
from time to time, the word “eyes” in the place of his eyes (avec, à la
place des yeux, de temps en temps le mot yeux); he was inert,
captivated and unveiled.”387
From sinking into the text follows the division of Thomas into
two coexistent sides, the subject and the object, the reader and the text,
the spectator and the thing being looked at. The spectacle of reading is
not inside the text or inside the reader but rather in the ‘between’, in
their encounter. This is shown by the different meanings of the word
“eye”, which transform the stage of reading into the stage of writing: in
the spiral movement of signifying words, meanings escape into new
meanings, coexistent and layered. “Eyes” is a word that contains other
words; the word “eyes” takes from time to time the form of the eye
and then the word “eyes” looks at Thomas. “Each word is like an eye –
eyes, however, is, at times, a word.”388 Instead of the fixed context to
which a word could refer there is, as Blanchot writes in “Literature and
the Right to Death”, “within the limits of the word […] access to other
names, names which are less fixed, still vague, more capable of
adapting to the savage freedom of the negative essence – they are
unstable groups, no longer terms but the movement of terms, an
endless sliding of ‘turn of phrase’ which does not lead anywhere.”389
Words in the book Thomas is reading are not only dense with
linguistic meaning; the play with the word “eyes” calls attention to the
openness of the “perceptual ground”, of which Heidegger talks. Every
385 TTO 28.
386 TTO 26.
387 TTO 27.
388 Schestag 1998, 228.
389 WF 326.
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determinate element in the text evolves out of the indeterminate chain
of signifiers and is tied to this indeterminate ground. It is not possible
to look at the word “eyes” without taking into account other words in
the background. Reading becomes a shifting back and forth between
the word and its context, or between the “figure” and the “ground”, to
use Heidegger’s terms. Words resist Thomas’s sight and his effort to
make them transparent; he cannot tell where one word (“eyes”) ends
and other (“eyes”) begins. Meaning is not created by the reference of
words to things but from words to words.
The play of words signifying “eyes” and acting like “eyes” takes
intentionality away from the reader in order to give it to the text. The
word “eyes” in Thomas’s book seems to refer both to the marks on the
page as well as to Thomas’s own eyes. One could even suggest that the
story presents the gaze of the eyes as a quasi-object that remains
beyond the reach of the intentional consciousness. The text seems to
literally give Thomas the eyes he needs in reading, only to take these
organs away from him. Thomas is able only passively to witness the
activity of the text, the scene and the event of writing. He is now
literally a victim of the gaze: words penetrate him, consume,
dismember and replace him. As Blanchot writes in The Infinite
Conversation, for sight, writing is “war and madness”: “The terrifying
word passes over every limit and even the limitlessness of the whole: it
seizes the thing from a direction from which it is not taken, not seen,
and will never be seen; it transgresses laws, breaks away from
orientation, it disorients.”390 Thomas, the reader, is no longer the one
who “devours a book” or “devours with his eyes”, but the text attacks
Thomas (who now resembles Orpheus after the second death of his
beloved Eurydice, as the furious bacchants dismember him): “And even
later when, having abandoned himself and, contemplating his book, he
recognized himself with disgust in the form of the text he was reading,
he retained the thought that (while, perched upon his shoulders, the
word He and the word I were beginning their carnage) there remained
390 IC 28.
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within his person which was already deprived of its senses obscure
words, disembodied souls and angels of words, which were exploring
him deeply.”391
From Umsicht to Fascination
“Thomas stayed in his room to read.” The opening sentence of the
chapter encloses the reader and the text into the proximity of each
other, into the literary space (l’espace litteraire), which is the stage of
this encounter. On this stage, Thomas is forced to answer the text’s
demand. The story presents language as a loss of everything that
grammar, logic, rhetoric, and science is able to bring under conceptual
control. As such, the narrative inquires about the relation of the
reading subject to that which remains exterior, other and unknown.
Reading is a risk the reader takes. “The work of art is linked to risk; it
is the affirmation of an extreme experience.”392 Even a refusal not to
look is an expression of the power of the work since, as Blanchot
writes of Picasso’s painting, “one cannot live with a painting in plain
sight.”393 The one who rejects the painting by turning his look away is
not mistaken: “Not to look at it does not put him in the wrong; it is a
form of his sincerity, an accurate premonition of the force that closes
his eyes.”394 In Blanchot, the task of reading is not to remove the
obscurity of language in order to enter into its hidden meaning, but to
risk oneself, to loosen the strangeness of language, and to let go of that
which is securely grounded. For Blanchot, as for the later Heidegger,
language is a way of letting go of firm ground. The task of reading is
not to eliminate darkness, but to enter into it.
The story asks what the relation between the gaze, the vision
and the manifestation of artwork is, and what is to appear if we talk of
391 TTO 26.
392 SL 236.
393 SL 192, EL 253.
394 EL 253.
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literary language. What is that which remains beyond the scope of
seeing and reading, although it conditions both? What must be thought
from the fact that the gaze itself cannot be seen, that one cannot see
one’s eyes, nor the distance between the gaze and its object, although
they are necessary for anything to be seen? The act of reading
described in Thomas the Obscure is a kind of meta-phenomenological
event that questions the ordinary prejudices and dichotomies
concerning the act of seeing.
Blanchot writes that in the experience of fascination, the surface
of the work does not stay at a distance, as something perceptible and
transparent, but is seen as a kind of density and materiality of being
into which the gaze sinks. The reader no longer understands what he
reads, but is rather swallowed up by the words he is reading. The
question this experience poses is “What happens when what is seen
imposes itself upon the gaze, as if the gaze were seized, put in touch
with its appearance?” In Blanchot’s words in The Space of Literature,
“What happens is not an active contact, not the initiative and action
which there still is in real touching. Rather, the gaze gets taken in,
absorbed by an immobile movement and a depthless deep.”395
The experience of fascination opposes the classical
phenomenological theories of reading where reading is understood as
an act of the reading consciousness, and where the task of the reader is
to animate the “death letter of the text”, which Husserl talks about. In
Blanchot’s story, intentionality changes direction. As Blanchot writes
in The Space of literature, “Whoever is fascinated doesn’t see,
properly speaking, what he sees. Rather, it touches him in an
immediate proximity; it seizes and ceaselessly draws him close, even
though it leaves him absolutely at a distance. Fascination is
fundamentally linked to neutral, impersonal presence, to the
indeterminate They, the immense, faceless Someone. Fascination is the
relation the gaze entertains – a relation which is itself neutral and
impersonal – with sightless, shapeless depth, the absence one sees
395 EL 28, SL 32.
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because it is blinding.”396 Experiencing fascination is blinding since it
means losing one’s distance and one’s perspective to that by which one
is fascinated. To be fascinated is to be like a literary text without a
fixed perspective or standpoint.
In Blanchot’s story the reader does not build a Gestalt out of
the text, as does, for example, the reader in Wolfgang Iser’s
phenomenological theory of reading. In contrast to Roman Ingarden’s
classical theory of the phenomenology of literature, where meaning is
seen as the result of the reading process and text as material for
meaning, for Blanchot reading is not a subjectivist act, but turns from
consciousness to affection, and from perception to fascination. In
contrast to the reception theories of reading that define reading as a
conscious act, Blanchot refuses to think of reading as an appropriation
or a domination of the text. The phenomenological idea of
intentionality as a ray or light emanating from a subject is also
watchfully avoided: in Blanchot’s story Thomas does not think he
would have “awakened” “the little spark of life” that glitters in the eye
of the text.397 His reading has not illuminated the text. As Blanchot
writes in The Space of Literature, “Reading does not produce
anything, does not add anything. It lets be what is. It is freedom: not
the freedom that produces being or grasps it, but freedom that
welcomes, consents, says yes, can only say yes, and, in the space
opened up by this yes, lets the work’s overwhelming decisiveness
affirm itself, lets be its affirmation that it is – and nothing more.”398 As
Paul de Man interprets, the text has in Blanchot an “ontological
priority over the reader.”399
396 SL 33.
397 TTO 25. The reflection of another in the surface of the text and the following
statement that Thomas did not doubt that he had awakened the spark of life in the
text reminds one of the myth of Narcissus Ovid describes in Metamorphoses.
Narcissus says: “I am on fire with love for my own self. It is I who kindle the flame
which I must endure. What should I do? Woo or be wooed?” (Ovid, 86). The
encounter between Thomas and the text does not follow the logic of narcissistic
reflection, since Thomas does not seek a reflection of himself in the surface of the
text, nor does he recognize his own image in it.
398 SL 194
399 de Man 1971, 64.
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The passivity of reading, the requirement not to add anything to
the text, can also be compared to Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, the
attitude of “letting beings be”. As Heidegger scholar Michel Levin
interprets, Heidegger suggests that we have to learn to see further than
the horizon determined by our present vision, which demands that we
learn to “release” the openness of the horizon from the grasp of
perspective.  Vision should be open to the “event of openness”, instead
of representing what gives itself to be beheld. This requires an attitude
Heidegger calls Gelassenheit, or letting-be.400 Thomas’s way to
encounter the world in Thomas the Obscure could, up to a certain
point, be described by Heidegger’s notion of Umsicht as it is explicated
in Being and Time. I argue, however, that eventually Blanchot’s idea
of fascination opposes Heidegger’s analysis of seeing in Being and
Time. In my analysis, the target of Blanchot’s criticism is the relation
between seeing, truth and language in Heidegger’s philosophy. In order
to illuminate Blanchot’s departure from Heidegger’s thinking, I will
shortly outline Heidegger’s analysis of the relations between seeing and
truth in Being and Time and in “The Origin of the Work of Art”.
Heidegger claims that the traditional notion of truth as
correspondence prevents us from seeing a more primordial sense of
truth as aletheia in the Greek sense of the word as unhiddenness. In
Heidegger’s analysis, from the idea of Being as presence it follows that
we understand truth as “the correspondence (Angleichung)  of  the
matter to knowledge.”401 He suggests that turning from the truth as
correspondence to the truth as aletheia demands turning from the
dominance of eidos (truth as ideality, atemporality) to the event of
Being (“unconcealment” of whatever appears, Ereignis).402
400 Levin 1997, 425.
401 BW 118.
402 Heidegger writes: “If we translate al theia as ‘unconcealment’ rather than
‘truth,’ this translation is not merely literal; it contains the directive to rethink the
ordinary concept of truth in the correctness of statements and to think it back to
that still uncomprehended dislosedness and disclosure of beings. To engage oneself
with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such
engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal
themselves with respect to what and how they are, and in order that presentative
correspondence might take its standard from them” (BW 125).
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Encountering truth as aletheia is not posed in order to attain
something “present-at-hand”, but rather to think of the event of Being,
the ontico-ontological difference, and finally, in the later Heidegger,
the open dimensionality of language as the Sprachereignis, the
happening or the event of language.403 Truth is thus something that
gets “discovered or uncovered.”404
As I interpret Heidegger, in differentiating truth as
correspondence from truth as aletheia, he aims to open a path to a less
violent way of seeing.405 According to Heidegger we have to ask,
what is the condition of the possibility of truth, if truth is not driven
back to the metaphysical idea of seeing as making present or to the
subjectivity of the human subject?406 The purpose is to show that a
sense of aletheia is a precondition for understanding truth as
prepositional correctness, and that the traditional concept of truth as
correspondence is ontologically grounded in truth as aletheia.407 The
only possibility of differentiating between the traditional conception of
403 That logos is true does not mean that it agrees with something or that there is a
correspondence between logos and the entities of which one is talking, but that “the
entities of which one is talking are [with logos] taken out of their hiddenness; one
must let them be seen as something unhidden” (BT 56).
404 BT 57, n. 1. What appears as truth is what “is given” in aletheia. This
“givenness” Heidegger describes with his famous notion es gibt which describes the
“givenness” of that whose appearing is anonymously appearing being, like the
appearing of language as a kind of subjectless field in Blanchot.
405 In Heidegger’s analysis, metaphysics does not only forget to ask the ontological
meaning of Being but also the ontological meaning of the notion of truth (BT 228).
In defining beings as objects “present-at-hand” and in equating this presence-at-
hand with the meaning of Being in general, we let the question of truth slip into the
same oblivion as the question of the meaning of Being: “Metaphysics does not ask
the truth of [Being] itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of the
human being belongs to the truth of [Being]. Metaphysics has not only failed up to
now to ask this question, the question is inaccessible to metaphysics as such”
(Heidegger 1998, 246). Along with such philosophical concepts as intentionality,
subjectivity, and Being, the notion of truth needs therefore to be thought through
again by going into its ontological nature.
406 Although the concept of aletheia comes up already in Being and Time (sect. 7
and 44) it is only in The Essence of Truth (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 1931), where
Heidegger gives a full analysis of this notion. According to Heidegger in The
Essence of Truth, Plato’s allegory of the cave in the Republic initiates the decline of
a-létheia into correctness and truth as agreement, which have dominated
metaphysical thinking ever since. Therefore Plato’s allegory of the cave presents
the “event of metaphysics” (BW 111-138). As Derrida writes in “Violence and
metaphysics”, for Heidegger Plato marks “the moment at which the thought of
Being forgets itself” (WAD 81).
407 BT 268.
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truth as correspondence and the truth as aletheia is to ask the way in
which beings become accessible to us.408 In Heidegger’s interpretation,
Plato’s mistake is to assimilate truth into light and seeing into
knowing.409 Heidegger himself insists that a-létheia – if understood as
Lichtung rather than a physical light – is a condition of seeing and
looking. Truth as aletheia cannot be ‘seen’ or ‘comprehended’, since
the truth as aletheia does not come to us in the form of an object, and
neither does it depend on the correctness of statements.
With his ontological analysis of seeing, Heidegger’s goal is to
give to the concept of seeing a new meaning that would no longer be
based on making-present, and which would help us to uncover a non-
appropriative relation to Being. He therefore warns us to understand
his expression “sight” in a metaphysical way, but to read it in its
ontological context: seeing does not mean just seeing with bodily eyes,
nor with Husserl’s mental eyes.410
408 For Plato, the visible things outside the cave are only illustrations of the
immaterial eternal ideas, or the resemblance of ideas in human perceptions. Human
beings who take visible things as the real are like the prisoners who do not
recognize their prison for what it is. We recognize something as something in the
light of the corresponding idea, and that which we presume to be real is only a
shadow of this idea. For Heidegger, however, the proper dimension of Plato’s story
is the movements of passage out of the cave into the daylight and then back into the
cave (Heidegger 1998, 165). These passages require that the eyes can “accustom
themselves to the change from darkness to brightness and from brightness back to
darkness” (ibid.). In Plato’s allegory, the ignorance of the soul is equivalent to the
blindness of its physical eyes. From this Heidegger concludes that “Just as the
physical eye must accustom itself, slowly and steadily at first, either to the light or
to the dark, so must the soul, patiently and through an appropriate series of steps,
accustom itself to the region of beings to which it is exposed” (1998, 166). This
movement from darkness to light requires that the soul “turns around as regards the
fundamental direction of its striving.” Heidegger’s point is that this “turning
around” opens our eyes to a transformation in the essence of truth, which happens
in Plato’s story. The turning around means an orientation that transforms a human
being’s relation to the “unhidden” (1998, 167-8).
409 According to Heidegger, in Plato’s doctrine of truth, “the inquiry into what is
unhidden shifts in the direction of the appearing of the visible form, and
consequently toward the act of seeing that is ordered to the visible form, and toward
what is correct and toward the correctness of seeing” (Heidegger 1998, 177).
410 Heidegger writes that “Seeing does not mean pure non-sensory awareness of
something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand” (BT 187). In Being and Time
he describes the interrelatedness of Being and seeing by saying that “Dasein is sight
[Sicht]” (BT 186). “Dasein is sight” means that Dasein is sight in each of its basic
ways of its Being. Heidegger’s goal is to give “an existential signification to ‘sight’
” in a similar way as he gave an ontological interpretation to the concepts of Being,
subjectivity and intentionality (ibid.).
144
The starting point for Heidegger’s study of different ways to
see is his view according to which our Being in the world is always
already grounded or determined from a certain perspective. From this
it follows that man does not have an omnipotent outer vision of the
totality of things but is tied to its restricted perspective.411 Heidegger
suggests that we experience or see the world only to the extent that it
‘experiences’ and ‘sees’ us and only if we define seeing not as
representing but openness to the Being as withdrawal. A subject does
not “face the world”, but is rather “faced by the phenomena themselves
in their closure”.412
Heidegger differentiates different kinds of seeing in Being and
Time by suggesting that in a similar way as Dasein already always
understands its Being-in-the-World some way, it equally already
always sees and looks at the world and itself in some way or another.
We can differentiate between two basic ways of Being and seeing: one
that stares, observes, and by objectifying things makes them “present-
at-hand”, and the other that is seeing as “concern” or “caring”
(Umsicht). Equivalent to the truth as correspondence is seeing as
“staring”. “The grasping look” characterizes the modern age where
vision tends to become a fixed staring at something that is purely
present. Heidegger claims that precisely when we merely stare at
something as if from a safe distance, we cease to understand it.413
Heidegger’s way to define seeing distinguishes itself from the
way the tradition of philosophy has oriented itself towards seeing,
namely “as a way of access to entities and to Being.”414 In contrast, the
existential signification Heidegger gives to ‘sight’ does not refer to
seeing that objectifies and represents, but to seeing that “lets entities
which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in
themselves.”415 According to Heidegger, to resist objectifying thinking
411 As Blanchot puts it in The Infinite Conversation: that which is “a prior” is not
“a priority of a subject, that is, of a transcendental subjectivity” (IC 250).
412 Clark 1992, 25.
413 BT 190.
414 BT 187.
415 BT 187.
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demands uncovering a more primary, non-reflective and non-
appropriate relation to the ontological difference between beings and
Being and to the “light of Being” (Lichtung), with which Heidegger
replaces Husserl’s idea of the rays of light of a perceiving, intentional
consciousness. Since our habitual ways of seeing are forgetful of the
“lighting” which makes seeing possible, a seeing that would recollect
the “lighting of Being” would see in a more truthful way.416
In Being and Time, Heidegger relates to Dasein’s Being a
special kind of seeing, seeing as Umsicht, or “caring”, which can be
interpreted as a critical alternative to the prevalent idea of seeing as
knowing.417 For Dasein, the world is not just something to be seen as a
projection of consciousness but a “dwelling place”. As “The Origin of
the Work of Art” argues, the world is not anything we could represent
to ourselves: “The world is never an object that stands before us and
can be seen. The world is the ever-nonobjective to which we are
subject.”418 Rather than objectifying, manipulating and producing,
Umsicht holds back from these attitudes. Umsicht thus describes
Dasein’s caring attitude towards the world, into which Dasein is
thrown; it means pre-reflective, circumspect vision, as the viewer is not
outside a visual field but hermeneutically situated within it. The
horizon, which the eye of the viewer cannot control, is limited by what
can be seen from his or her position. Dasein’s caring way of seeing is
equal to Dasein’s Being as “Being-already-alongside” things and
entities in the world: in contrast to a theoretical attitude and
representation, seeing as Umsicht renounces the traditional subject-
416 BT 410. See also section 36.
417 In Being and Time, Heidegger defines “perception” ontologically as a way of
Being-in-the-world, and not as a “procedure” executed by consciousness. He writes:
“What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions,
and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive
retention of the assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is
not to be interpreted as a ‘procedure’ by which a subject provides itself with
representations [Vorstellungen] of something which remains stored up ‘inside’ as
having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they
‘agree’ with actuality can occasionally arise” (BT 89).
418 BW 170.
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object distinction.419 “Letting something be encountered is primarily
circumspective; it is not just sensing something, or staring at it. It
implies circumspective concern.”420 Since knowing is always founded
beforehand in Dasein’s Being-already-alongside-the-world, its Being
cannot be “just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-
hand.”421 On the contrary, as “concern”, Dasein’s Being-in-the-world
“is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned.”422
Thomas’s way to encounter the world in Thomas the Obscure
could, up to a certain point, be clarified by the notion of Umsicht: not
as a relation to the world but as being that is “already ‘alongside’ its
world.”423 At the beginning of his reading, Thomas “stares” at the text:
to use Heidegger’s terms, his reading is more like “staring” than
“circumspective concern” or “caring”. Rather than objectively grasping
the world from an outer position, Dasein is, as Thomas in Blanchot’s
story, in the grasp of the world.
Blanchot’s analysis of the experience of fascination also comes
close to the same term in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger
defines as fascination the experience where one feels being “already-
alongside” things and entities, and not on the side of the subject: a
subject does not experience or encounter objects, but rather objects
come to subjectivity; the subject does not look at the world, but the
world looks at the subject, as happens to Thomas in Blanchot’s story.
In Blanchot, however, the experience of fascination questions both the
idea of reading as a way of seeing and the idea of reading as opening
oneself to truth, even if truth would be defined as aletheia. For
419 BT 89.
420 BT 176. Heidegger writes: “In its projective character, understanding goes to
make up existentially what we call Dasein’s sight. With the disclosedness of the
‘there,’ this sight is existentially; and Dasein is this sight primordially in each of
those basic ways of its Being which we have already noted: as the circumspection
[Umsicht] of concern, as the considerateness [Rücksicht] of solicitude, and as that
sight which is directed upon Being as such [Sicht auf das Sein als Solches], for the
sake of which Dasein is as it is. The sight, which is related primarily and on the
whole to existence, we call ‘transparency’ “ (BT 186).
421 On the subject of “staring” in Being and Time, see also p. 98, 104, 190.
422 BT 88.
423 BT 88.
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Blanchot, language is beyond both truth and non-truth – for the
reasons that I will analyse in what follows.
Il y a – “it watches”
In the sections of The Space of Literature, where Blanchot presents his
concepts of la fascination and l’image, the relation to Heidegger’s
philosophy is evident, although Heidegger’s name is rarely mentioned:
as already discussed, Blanchot writes so close to Heidegger’s
vocabulary that it seems as if he is citing Heidegger, even if at the same
time, if one reads him closely, he also distinguishes between his and
Heidegger’s thinking. This is the case for example in the essay entitled
“The Essential Solitude”, where he writes: “The writer belongs to a
language which no one speaks, which is addressed to no one, which
has no centre, and which reveals nothing. To the extent that, being a
writer, he does justice to what requires writing, he can never again
express himself, anymore that he can appeal to you, or even introduce
another’s speech. Where he is, only being (être) speaks – which means
that language doesn’t speak any more, but is. It devotes itself to the
pure passivity of being”. 424
As Gerald Bruns writes in Maurice Blanchot. The Refusal of
Philosophy (1997), although Blanchot’s account of the essential
solitude is “much a derivation of Heidegger’s notion of the work of art
as alien and uncommunicative”, “being” in The Space of Literature is
not Heidegger’s Being of beings, but, as Bruns puts it, “only a sheer
fact or event of existing”.425 I my analysis, Heidegger’s notion of Being
is too commanding for Blanchot, whose aim is to find a neutral way of
speaking about language that would remain beyond the opposition
being/non-being. I propose further that the reason why being in The
Space of Literature is pure existence or existence without being, rather
than Heidegger’s ontological difference, follows from his criticism of
424 SL 26-27.
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Heidegger’s idea of language as “revealing Being”, which Blanchot
also in the above-quoted passage implicitly criticizes, in writing that
“The writer belongs to a language which no one speaks, which is
addressed to no one, which has no centre, and which reveals nothing.”
Language for Blanchot is instability, which cannot reveal anything as
anything, or as he writes, in referring to Levinas, its way to be is
“existence without being.”426
Language is existence without being because it is all that is left
after the disappearance of the knowing subject. Essential to the literary
experience in Blanchot is the inability of the subject to say “I”, the
experience of the loss of subjectivity, where the phenomenological ego
is replaced by a feeling of the presence of some featureless “third” (and
thus not of the “Other”, as in Levinas) anonymous and faceless being,
which Blanchot names “il” (he/she/it) or “quelqu’un” (someone or
somebody). As the writer enters the space of literature, “he is no
longer himself; he isn’t anyone any more. The third person substituting
for the ‘I’: such is the solitude that comes on the writer on account of
the work. It does not denote objective disinterestedness, creative
detachment. It does not glorify consciousness in someone other than
myself or the evolution of a human vitality which, in the imaginary
space of the work of art, would retain the freedom to say ‘I.’ The third
person is myself become no one, my interlocutor turned alien; it is my
no longer being able, where I am, to address myself and the inability of
whoever addresses me to say ‘I’; it is his not being himself.”427
For Blanchot, the otherness of language is without a face and a
name; it cannot be reduced to a single origin, for example a personal or
intentional other. In contrast to the French literary theorist George
Poulet, for instance, Blanchot does not reduce the otherness of
language to the consciousness or thoughts of an original author. Nor is
this otherness the personal other of Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy.
As Blanchot writes in The Infinite Conversation, the strangeness, or a
425 Bruns 1997, 57.
426 PF 322, WF 334.
427 SL 28.
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“relation of the third kind” (le rapport du troisième genre) experienced
in literature is “occasioned by another kind of speech or by the other as
speech (as writing).”428 For Blanchot, the otherness of “the third” is
not personal or human exteriority, neither otherness in me (like the
unconscious self) or the otherness of God. The voice heard in literature
does not belong to anybody, nor is language understood as an
anonymous speaker, whose identity should be revealed by the reader.
The ‘room’ where the text seduces Thomas is the literary space,
where everything is other than usual, where the indeterminate has
replaced the determinate and the unfamiliar has replaced the familiar.
The “somebody” or “something” which nears Thomas and surrounds
him is the text he is reading; it is the strange, invisible, ungraspable and
nevertheless inescapable “being” or “presence” which the story names
as “monstrous absence”, and which haunts Thomas as a reader:
The first time he perceived this presence, it was night. By a light
which came down through the shutters and divided the bed in
two, he saw that the room was totally empty, so incapable of
containing a single object that it was painful to the eye. The book
was rotting on the table. There was no one walking in the room.
His solitude was complete. And yet, sure as he was that there
was no one in the room and even in the world, he was just as
sure that someone was there, occupying his slumber,
approaching him intimately, all around him and within him. On a
naïve impulse he sat up and sought to penetrate the night, trying
with his hand to make light. But he was like a blind man who,
hearing a noise, might run to light his lamp: nothing could make
it possible for him to seize this presence in any shape or form. He
was locked in combat with something inaccessible, foreign,
something of which he could say: That doesn’t exist… and which
nevertheless filled him with terror as he sensed it wandering
about in the region of his solitude. 429
The experience of language in Blanchot, as it is described in his stories
and in his essays, comes close to the notion of the il y a in Levinas’s
philosophy. Blanchot refers in a footnote of “Literature and the Right
to Death” to Levinas’s book Existence and Existants (De l’existance à
428 IC 384.
429 TTO 26–27.
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l’existant, 1947) where Levinas states that it is not Heidegger’s Being
that has been forgotten in the history of philosophy, but rather the
strangeness of Being. To this strangeness of Being, which according to
Levinas can be experienced especially in art, he gives the name “il y a”,
“there is”.
What Levinas is trying to describe with the il y a is the event of
Being in general. According to Levinas, the infinity of the il y a is a
critical alternative to the “generosity of Heidegger’s es gibt”. He asks
his readers to imagine “all beings, things and persons, reverting to
nothingness.”430 The complete annihilation of all existence, and the
very nothingness of all existence, would be experienced as an
impersonal, neutral and indeterminate feeling that “something is
happening” although one does not know what. Levinas proposes that
we name this indeterminate sense of something happening in the
absence of all beings with the impersonal third person pronoun (“il”),
that designates the action when the author of that action is unknown or
not relevant, for example as one says “il pleut” (“it  is  raining”) or “il
fait nuit” (“it is night”). Levinas refers to Blanchot’s Thomas the
Obscure and its themes as “the most fitting example of the il y a”:
“The presence of absence, the night, the dissolution of the subject in
the night, the horror of being, the return of being to the heart of every
negative movement, the reality of irreality are there admirably
expressed.”431
In Blanchot’s essay “Literature and the Right to Death”
Levinas’s il y a functions as an alternative to Hegelian negativity.
430 Levinas 1978, 57. Levinas writes: “The breakup of continuity even on the
surface of things, the preference for broken lines, the scorning of perspective and
the ‘real’ proportions between things, indicate a revolt against the continuity of
curves. From a space without horizons, things break away and are cast toward us
like chunks that have weight in themselves, blocks, cubes, planes, triangles without
transitions between them. They are naked elements, simple, absolute, swellings or
abscesses of being. In this falling of things down on us objects attest their power as
material objects, even reach a paroxysm of materiality. Despite the rationality and
luminosity of these forms when taken in themselves painting makes them exist in
themselves, brings about an absolute existence in the very fact there is something
which is not in its turn an object or a name, which is unnameable and can only
appear in poetry” (Levinas 1978, 56-57. Emphasis is mine).
431 Levinas 1978, 63.
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Literature’s existence, its passive consciousness without subjectivity in
Blanchot is like the absurd cogito of the “it watches”, which Levinas
associates with the experience of “there is”. As Simon Critchley writes,
the consequence of the experience of the il y a is reversed
intentionality: we no longer regard things, but they seem to regard
us.432 For Levinas, night is the proper environment of this experience:
the “there is” describes the nocturnal experience where it is no longer
possible to distinguish between inwardness and exteriority, the subject
and the object.
The experience of the il y a is not a tranquil night of sleep and
rest, but a night which is interminable, a night of pure vigilance. In the
night, the one who does not get sleep lays in bed with eyes wide open,
feeling the passive watch of the surrounding darkness as the night itself
seems to be awake.433 The experience of this passive watching strips
the subjectivity of its cognitive mastery over surrounding objects. As
the familiar forms dissolve in the night, it is no longer possible to
distinguish between inwardness and exteriority; darkness is neither an
object nor the quality of an object, which questions the ability of
consciousness to determinate its object by objectivizing it. As is
recounted in Blanchot’s story, in his encounter with the night, “it was
not that he [Thomas] saw anything, but what he looked at eventually
placed him in contact with a nocturnal mass which he vaguely
perceived to be himself and in which he bathed.”434
For Levinas, the event of the il y a is experienced as the
presence of something which at the same time is absent, and which can
be neither denied nor affirmed; “there is” describes the voice that is
heard even after negating it.435 Fascination is, for Blanchot, like the
experience of il y a in Levinas, the experience where both as absence
and presence are so absolute that it is no longer possible to negate
anything:
432 Critchley 1997 ,57.
433 As Levinas writes, “La veille est anonyme. Il n’y a pas ma vigilance à la nuit,
c’est la nuit elle-même qui veille. Ca veille” (Levinas 1993, 111).
434 TTO 14.
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The time of time’s absence is not dialectical. In this time what
appears is the fact that nothing appears. What appears is the
being deep within being’s absence, which is when there is nothing
and which, as soon as there is something, is no longer. For it is as
if there were no beings except through the loss of being, when
being lacks. The reversal which, in time’s absence, points us
constantly back to the presence of absence – but to this presence
as absence, to absence as its own affirmation (an affirmation in
which nothing is affirmed, in which nothing ever ceases to affirm
itself with the exhausting insistence of the indefinite) – this
movement is not dialectical. Contradictions do not exclude each
other; nor are they reconciled. Only time itself, during which
negation becomes our power, permits the ‘unity of contraries. In
time’s absence what is new renews nothing, but represents itself
and belongs henceforth and always to return.436
When both presence and absence are absolute, nothing can be denied:
fascination is time without beginning, end or future; time where “here”
means the same as “nowhere.”437 As such, it can be interpreted as an
antithesis of the “here” and “now” of Husserlian phenomenology.
The anguish of Thomas arises not only from his experience of
the otherness of language but also from his effort to in vain deny the
presence of this “being”. As Thomas sinks into the profundity of the
text he experiences horror, which Blanchot links to the experience of
fascination and Levinas to the il y a. Thomas encounters something
which cannot be grasped or named but which, despite his effort to deny
its existence, continues to be.
Blanchot’s story seeks to name the presence of this strange
somebody or something: “The first time he perceived this presence, it
was night”, and: “nothing could make it possible for him to seize this
presence in any shape or form.” “Something” or “somebody” coming
closer to Thomas cannot be attached to any singular existent, which the
sentence “That doesn’t exist” (cela n’existe pas) announces: “He was
locked in combat with something inaccessible, foreign, something of
which he could say: That doesn’t exist… and which nevertheless filled
435 Levinas 1978, 94-5.
436 SL 30.
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him with terror as he sensed it wandering about in the region of his
solitude.”438 Even if Thomas denies existence to this presence, already
the next sentence affirms its existence by calling it “being” (être):
Having stayed up all night and all day with this being (cet être),
as he tried to rest he was suddenly made aware that a second had
replaced the first, just as inaccessible and just as obscure, and yet
different. It was modulation of that which did not exist, a
different mode of being absent, another void in which he was
coming to life. Now it was definitely true, someone was coming
near him, standing not nowhere and everywhere, but a few feet
away, invisible and certain. By an impulse which nothing might
stop, and which nothing might quicken, a power with which he
could not accept contact was coming to meet him. He wanted to
flee. He threw himself in the corridor. Gasping and almost beside
himself, he has taken only a few steps when he recognized the
inevitable progress of the being coming toward him. He went
back into the room. He barricaded the door. He waited with his
back to the wall. But neither minutes nor hours put an end to this
waiting. He felt ever closer to an ever more monstrous absence
which took an infinite time to meet. He felt it closer to him every
instant and kept ahead of it by an infinitely small but irreducible
splinter of duration. He saw it, a horrifying being which was
already pressing against him in space and, existing outside time,
remained infinitely distant. Such unbearable waiting and anguish
that they separated him from himself.439
In Thomas the Obscure, anguish is in connection to ambiguity: the
being which comes closer to Thomas evades the text’s effort to name
it. As soon as the text names it “being” (or “présense” or “être”), it’s
existence is transformed into something else. The first being (“être”) is
replaced by another being, which is mentioned as being as obscure but
nonetheless different from the first. Thomas has thus encountered a
being, or a modulation of being, which one cannot annihilate by saying
“that doesn’t exist”. It cannot be denied or affirmed by speech; its
being is something between presence and absence.440 The “presence”
437 EL 26
438 TTO 27.
439 TTO 27.
440 Thomas’s obsession with the threatening “presence”, with its dialectical
movement of concealment and disclosure, could be interpreted to refer to
Heidegger’s philosophy of Being, or even to clarify what Heidegger says about
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which Thomas is trying to deny resembles the interminable meaning of
literature, its indefinite being as the impossibility of dying which, as
Blanchot writes, follows literature “like its own shadow turned into a
gaze”.441
At the end of the reading process, Thomas goes through a
painful metamorphosis: “It was in this state that he felt himself bitten or
struck, he could not tell which, by what seemed to him to be a word,
but resembled a giant rat, an all-powerful beast with piercing eyes.”442
Thomas is forced to struggle, tasting the venom of the creature in his
mouth, “for an immeasurable time” with this “horrible beast of the
text”.443 The giant rat, or the serpent, associates with the beast of the
Bible. However, whereas the devil is responsible for Eve and Adam
becoming conscious of the existence of both good and evil, the “beast
of the text” is responsible for Thomas losing his consciousness. Filled
with a fear of being completely visible Thomas seeks to hide himself by
“obscuring” himself, by crawling into a dusty corner of his room: “He
stuck his head under the bed, in a corner full of dust, resting among the
rejectamenta as if an a refreshing place where he felt he belonged more
properly than in himself.”444
Thomas attempts to put an end to the struggle by giving himself
totally to the text, “by tearing out his eyes to force the beast inside.”445
But there is no longer a reference point to the “inside” or to the
“outside”. Thomas is divided in two: “I” (Je) and “He” (Il) battle inside
Being. Following this observation we might feel tempted to read the sentences
which describe Thomas’s encounter with the “presence” concretely as referring to
the emergence and dissolution of the “figure-ground” structures that, according to
Heidegger, form the event of perception and depend on the way our looking lets
them emerge out of the including field of visibility. Using Heideggerian language,
in Thomas’s encounter with the text, it would thus be a question of our attitude
towards the “ground”, or as Levin claims Heidegger to ask, of the status of the
ground to us: “whether or not its dynamism, its openness, its dimensionality, is
granted by the corresponding receptive openness of our perception – our
willingness, for example, to let perception be decentreed, drawn into abysses of
invisibility, radically surprised” (Levin 1999, 125).
441 WF 332.
442 TTO 28.
443 TTO 28.
444 TTO 28.
445 TTO 28.
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him, and in this fight his whole being is substituted by the text, by its
words and marks. Eventually Thomas is only “a sort of Thomas” (“une
sorte de Thomas”) – not the same as earlier but not completely
different either: “A sort of Thomas left his body and went before the
lurking threat.”446 As Levinas writes of the experience of the il y a:
“there is transcends inwardness as well as exteriority; it does not even
make it possible to distinguish these.”447 The violent metamorphosis of
Thomas seems like a parody of a sovereign reader controlling reading
with his subjectivity and gaze. Also the reciprocity between the reader
and the text – the leading idea of the phenomenological idea of the
reader response theories – is rejected. The text is absolutely
transcendent: we are not talking about reading anymore, but of
butchery.448
As a consequence of Thomas’s metamorphosis Blanchot’s
reader does not eventually know if the story refers to Thomas or to the
beast of the text as it reports how the battle between the two looks: “It
was almost beautiful for this dark angel covered with red hair, whose
eyes sparkled.”449 Thomas is now like a praying mantis to which the
text was compared in the beginning of the chapter: as Thomas sees his
enemy in the figure of a giant rat, he cannot “escape the desire to
devour (dévorer) it, to bring it into the deepest possible intimacy with
himself.”450 Eventually, as the obscure words enter his being, word-by-
word, letter-by-letter the obscure text replaces its reader:
One moment, the one thought he had triumphed and, with
uncontainable nausea, saw the word “innocence”, which soiled
him, slipping down inside him. The next moment, the other was
446 TTO 27.
447 Levinas 1989, 309.
448 Blanchot also speaks about “a cutting movement” and “a butchery” of writing
in his essay “Speaking Is Not Seeing ” where writing is through an etymological
play brought close to déchirure, which in French means crack, agony or wound.
The etymological connection is in Blanchot’s words an “incisive reminder” that
“the proper tool for writing was also proper for incising: the stylet” (IC, 28, EI, 38–
39). Writing is always cutting with a stylet: it is violence and death because is
breaks the immediate relation or contact with being and with the other.
449 TTO 28.
450 TTO 29.
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devouring him in turn, dragging him out of the hole he had come
from, then tossing him back, a hard, emptied body. Each time,
Thomas was thrust back into this being by the very words which
had haunted him and which he was pursuing as his nightmare and
the explanation of his nightmare. He found that he was ever more
empty, ever heavier; he no longer moved without infinite fatigue.
His body, after so many struggles, became entirely opaque, and
to those who looked at it, it gave the peaceful impression of
sleep, thought it had not ceased to be awake. 451
Thomas, transformed into the text he is reading, full of obscure words,
is now Thomas the Obscure, as the title of the book states.452 At the
end of the story the figure of a female praying mantis can also be seen
as a kind of Eurydice figure, in the guise of whom Thomas has
encountered death. Thomas, full of obscure words from the text, is like
Orpheus, a mediator between night and day, who has disappeared in
order for the work to appear.
As Thomas lies on the floor of his room eyes closed, the text is
gone, but Thomas is entirely awake. His being is similar to the text: the
inability to lose consciousness, wakefulness, and appearance without
the intentional act of the subject. We could refer to “Literature and the
Right to Death”, where Blanchot asks: “Then where is the work? Each
moment has the clarity of a beautiful language being spoken, but the
work as a whole has the opaque meaning of a thing that is being eaten
and that is also eating, that is devouring, being swallowed up, and re-
creating itself in a vain effort to change itself into nothing.”453
451 TTO 29.
452 Thomas Schestag asks in his article”Mantis, Relics”, how the title of Thomas
the Obscure should be interpreted. One possibility is to interpret it as telling the
truth about Thomas: ambiguousness is the truth about his character. But the title
can also mean the reverse: the essence of his character is not necessarily obscure –
it remains opaque only to us who try to see through it. That which in our
interpretation appears as a “revelation” of Thomas’s essence (“Thomas’s essence is
dark”), makes in the other interpretation the truth withdraw from us – “not only
does Thomas’s essence remain dark, but Thomas himself remains hard to see”. In
the case of Thomas l’obscur, ambiguity and obscurity are qualities that can refer
both to the text and its reader, and when obscure words fill Thomas, he becomes
what the title promises – Thomas the Obscure (Schestag 1998, 222).
453 WF 336.
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The Two Versions of the Imaginary
In the appendix to The Space of Literature, entitled “The Two
Versions of the Imaginary”, Blanchot asks: “But when we are face to
face with things themselves – if we fix upon a face, the corner of a wall
– does it not also sometimes happen that we abandon ourselves to
what we see?”454 This is exactly what happens to Thomas. In the
experience of fascination our relation to the text changes and the being
of the text turns into something which Blanchot calls l’image. As
Blanchot writes, the experience of fascination “happens because the
thing we stare at has foundered, sunk into its image, and the image has
returned into that deep fund of impotence to which everything
reverts.”455
Thomas’s body, “entirely opaque” at the end of his reading,
reminds one of the being of the image (l’image) introduced in “Two
Versions of the Imaginary”. In my analysis, what Blanchot calls the
image comes close to the concept of fascination as its counterpart: for
Blanchot, the experience of the latter is a condition for the appearance
of the first. In the experience of fascination, seeing becomes an
experience where that which is looked at touches the gaze, gets hold of
it, and attracts it in order to get it in contact with something, which
Blanchot calls the image456: “What is given us by this contact at a
distance is the image, and fascination is passion for the image.”457
Whereas Heidegger differentiates between two versions of truth
(truth as correspondence and truth as aletheia), Blanchot differentiates
between two versions of the image. On the one hand, there is the image
in the sense of classical art, whose ideal is that art resembles the
represented object. According to an ordinary analysis of the image, the
image comes after the object. This image is grounded on the “vital
454 SL 255.
455 SL 255.
456 EL 28-9.
457 SL 32.
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movement of the comprehensive action”, i.e., in the ideal operation
which puts the work into the service of the world and its truth.458
Classical art, in taking resemblance as its ideal, privileges nature as its
highest ideal.
Whereas the first version of the image is characterized by
truthfulness, harmony and beauty, the other version of the image gives
up on these ideals. In literature, words cease to be only marks, or
comprehensible concepts in the service of truth; they rather become
images, the images of words rather than images of things in the world.
Literary text itself is the image par excellence. In literature, language
becomes the image of itself: “We do not mean a language containing
images or one that casts reality in figures, but one which is its own
image, an image of language (and not a figurative language)”.
One could say that the other version of the imaginary gives up
the Platonic model in which the image comes after or imitates the
original object or eidos. For Plato, a painting is a copy of a thing which
in its turn is a copy of an idea (eidos), from which it follows that a
copied thing is closer to the truth than a work of art which is only the
image of the image. As Plato writes in The Republic, the image “is and
is not” what it is, since it borrows its reality from something other than
itself without actually being that other.459 Blanchot comments on the
Platonic idea of art as a copy of the real in the following way:
What are we seeking to represent by saying this? Are we not on a
path leading back to suppositions happily abandoned, analogous
to the one which used to define art as imitation, a copy of the
real? If, in the poem, language becomes its own image, doesn’t
this mean that poetic language is always second, secondary?
According to the common analysis, the image comes after the
object. It is the object’s continuation. We see, then the image.
After the object comes the image. “After” seems to indicate
subordination. We really speak, then we speak in our
imagination, or we imagine ourselves speaking. Wouldn’t poetic
language be the copy, the dim shadow, the transposition – in a
space where the requirements of effectiveness are attenuated – of
the sole speaking language? But perhaps the common analysis is
458 SL 255.
459 Plato, Republic 477a.
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mistaken. Perhaps, before going further, one ought to ask: but
what is the image?460
Instead of asking what is the relation of a work of art to the truth
Blanchot asks what we mean by the image. He answers: literary
language is not a figurative language. It is not language that would be a
false copy of something absent, but it rather “issues from its own
absence, the way the image emerges upon the absence of the thing; a
language addressing itself to the shadow of events as well, not to their
reality, and this because of the fact that the words which express them
are, not signs, but images, images of words, and words where things
run to images.”461 By image Blanchot does not mean the images of
literature in the classical sense: “the poem is not a poem because it
contains a number of figures, metaphors, comparisons; on the contrary,
the poem’s particular character is that nothing in it functions as
image.”462 (Accordingly, Heidegger writes that “The truth that
discloses itself in the work can never be proved or derived from what
went before.”463) Poetical or literary language is not an imaginative
projection of the subject; it is not imitation, a copy or a representation
of something that would exist before the poem. The text that has
become “its own image” does not imitate or represent the real world,
nor does it refer to the world. The absence of the world, “the neutrality
and the fading of the world” is rather a condition for the image to
appear.
That language is its own image means that language as such is
exteriority and otherness. The materiality of language is emphasized in
language as image, which in Blanchot’s words is the “formless weight
of being, present in absence”.464 Literary language discredits the
distinction into form and substance. As Blanchot writes, although the
image can “represent the object to us in a luminous formal aura […] it is
460 SL 34.
461 SL 34.
462 SL 34.
463 BW 200.
464 SL 258.
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nonetheless with substance that the image is allied – with the
fundamental materiality, the still undetermined absence of form”.465
That language is more substance than form says that language does not
clarify things by saying them, or as Foucault puts it, poetry “must no
longer be a power that tirelessly produces images and makes them
shine, but rather a power that undoes them, that lessens their overload,
that infuses them with an inner transparency that illuminates them little
by little until they burst and scatter in the lightness of the
unimaginable.” Foucault finds this imageless writing from Blanchot
whose “fictions are, rather than images themselves, their
transformations, displacement, and neutral interstices. They are precise;
the only figures they outline are in grey tones of everyday life and the
anonymous.”466
In the second version of the image there is something
extravagant, excessive and horrifying, which Blanchot in The Space of
Literature ends by comparing to the strangeness of a cadaver. Both a
cadaver and a work of art are there, present, and at the same time
undeniably absent. They are not present for me but somehow present
in spite of me. Like a work of art, “What we call mortal escapes
common categories.”467 The cadaver, the dear departed, although
present is other than itself. Or as the narrator of Blanchot’s story
Death Sentence (Arrêt de mort, 1948) reports after the death of his
friend J., “She who was once absolutely alive was now no more than a
statue.” (“Elle n’était déjà plus qu’une statue, elle absolument
vivante.”468 Whereas the first image is totally safe and joyful to look at
from a distance, in the second version of the image there is something
unreal and impossible, which no one can recognize and which therefore
465 SL 255.
466 Foucault 1990, 23. Foucault continues: “The fictitious is never in things or in
people, but in the impossible verisimilitude of what lies between them: encounters,
the proximity of what is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very midst.
Therefore, fiction consists not of showing the invisible, but of showing the extent to
which the invisibility of the visible is invisible” (ibid.).
467 SL 256.
468 DS 20, AM 35.
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frightens us.469 It is a thing “as distance, present in its absence”.470 In a
similar way as the words in literature do not represent anything a
corpse is no one else’s image, since it “impresses the living of the
appearance of the original never perceived before”.471 Blanchot writes:
The cadaver is its own image. It no longer entertains any relation
with this world, where it still appears, except for that of an
image, an obscure possibility, a shadow ever present behind the
living from which now, far from separating itself from this form,
transforms itself entirely into shadow. The corpse is a reflection
becoming master of the life it reflects – absorbing it, identifying
substantively with it by moving it from its use value and from its
truth value to something incredible – something neutral which
there is no getting used to. And if the cadaver is so similar, it is
because it is, at a certain moment, similarity par excellence:
altogether similarity, and also nothing more. It is the likeness, to
an absolute degree, overwhelming and marvellous. But what is it
like? Nothing.
That is why no man alive, in fact, bears any resemblance yet. In
the rare instances when a living person shows similitude with
himself, he only seems to us more remote, closer to a dangerous
neutral region, astray from himself and like his own ghost
already: he seems to return no longer having anything but an
echo life. 472
These last lines could be read to refer to Thomas’s being, transformed
into the text at the end of his reading: also his being is neutral, remote,
opaque, and almost lifeless. In “The Two Versions of the Imaginary”
Blanchot asks, how does the ambiguity of language become
manifested, i.e., “what happens, for example, when one lives an event
as an image?” And he replies:
To live an event as an image is not to remain uninvolved, to
regard the event disinterestedly in the way that the aesthetic
version of the image and the serene ideal of classical art propose.
But neither is it to take part freely and decisively. It is to be
taken: to pass from the region of the real where we hold
ourselves at a distance from things the better to order and use
them into that other region where the distance holds us – the
469 SL 34, 255.
470 SL 256.
471 SL 258.
472 SL 258.
162
distance which then is the lifeless deep, an unmanageable,
inappreciable remoteness which has become something like the
sovereign power behind all things.473
That the image “continues to affirm things in their absence”, as
Blanchot writes, is to say that in the image the meaning is not based in
the presence of things, but rather in the impossibility of having them
present.
From the ambiguity of language follows its pure exteriority, its
obscurity, the fact that a work of art is not just “another world, but the
other of all worlds, that which is always other than the world.”474 For
this reason our task as readers cannot be to imagine the world where
everything is different; rather, the literary world is a world which
cannot be imagined since it is “beyond all possible worlds”.475
Although the appearing of the image requires “the neutrality and the
fading of the world”,476 the question is not of the phenomenological
reduction of the real world in order to analyze the intentional content
of consciousness without presuming the actual existence of the given
object. The literary world constitutes a world with its own laws,
independent both of the writer and of the reader. We do not make a
reduction; rather, the “reduction” (if this is a right word) happens in
spite of the experiencing subjectivity. In Thomas the Obscure, the
narrator tells, playing with the word “image”, how the whole world
suddenly becomes an image and in this act takes away the capacity to
see: “My being subsists only from a supreme point of view which is
precisely incompatible with my point of view. The perspective in which
I fade away for my eyes restores me as a complete image for the unreal
eye to which I deny all images. A complete image with reference to a
473 SL 261.
474 SL 228.
475 As Michel Foucault writes, Blanchot’s concept of the image is part of his
thinking as the “thought from outside”, le pensée du dehors, as Foucault calls it
(Foucault 1990, 23).
476 SL 254.
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world devoid of image which images me in the absence of any
imaginable figure.”477
Behind this Mask there Is Nothing
In The Space of Literature the finished work is compared to a cadaver.
In Blanchot’s analysis, the completed work, drifting freely and
independent of its author, reminds the anonymous and independent
being of a cadaver. Since a cadaver is characterized rather by a self-
resemblance than a resemblance to something, a human corpse is also a
perfect example of an image. It is only a shadow of a person we once
knew and whom we loved: “Man is made of his own image: this is
what we learn from the strangeness of a cadaver. But this formula
should first of all be understood this way: man is unmade according to
his image. The image has nothing to do with signification, meaning, as
implied by the existence of the world, the effort of truth, the law and
the brightness of the day.”478
That the image is its own image means that it refers only to
itself. In order to be its own image, the image must first distance itself
from itself. If we look at a corpse, we can see a distance in it: it is still
the person we knew but also something else, which we do not
recognize and which does not belong to our world. The corpse is
distanced from the person who was alive. The cadaver challenges our
metaphysical prejudices: it is here, and at the same time it is not. It is
“nowhere”, or rather in some place between here and nowhere. As
frozen in its place it is totally present, and nevertheless it fills the house
with its absence. It looks at us, and it does not look at us. Even
thought it is there, it does not possess a standpoint or perspective. Its
open eyes are blind and (as dead) non-blind at the same time. At this
moment, as the cadaver becomes anonymous, as if neutral, it starts to
resemble itself.
477 TTO 106.
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Blanchot’s notion of the image does not refer only to
Heidegger’s analysis of the death mask, but also to Levinas’s analysis
of art as an image in “Reality and its Shadow” (“La réalité et son
ombre”, 1948), where Levinas states: “The most elementary procedure
of art consists of substituting for the object its image.”479 Although
Levinas speaks positively of art – he finds from Blanchot’s Thomas the
Obscure the intrusion of exteriority – he eventually rejects art, because
it offers only images, not concepts, and in this way evades all ethical
responsibility. For Levinas, every work of art is in the end a blind
statue, an idol, a caricature of life.480 For Levinas, the philosopher of
ethics, art is irresponsible and reckless: “There is something wicked
and egoist and cowardly in artistic enjoyment. There are times when
one can be ashamed of it, as of feasting during a plague.”481 As
careless, the “poet exiles himself from the city”, leaving behind him
blind statutes and caricatures.482
The position given to the exteriority of art is thus different in
Levinas and Blanchot. For Blanchot, nothingness or exteriority
encountered in language as the realm of neutrality is nothing that could
even be transcended. Levinas, in contrast, demands that the
strangeness of the il y a – which can be experienced especially in
poetry – has to be transcended with the help of ethics as the “first
philosophy”. Like Heidegger, Levinas seeks for the truth, which he
doesn’t find from art. Even if Levinas thus praises Blanchot’s fictional
stories for casting us “upon a shore where no thought can land”, where
“the idealist metaphysics of esse-percipi comes to an end”483, in “The
Reality and its Shadow” his conclusion on art in general – and on the
ethical power of Blanchot’s fiction –  remains skeptical: he finds in
Blanchot’s thinking the same ethical “neutrality” of which he accuses
478 EL 350, SL 260.
479 Levinas 1989, 132. Levinas’s essay is published for the first time in Temps
Modernes, 38 (1948), 771-89.
480 Levinas 1989, 138.
481 Levinas 1989, 138.
482 Levinas 1989, 138.
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Heidegger. There is something “inhuman and monstruous” in art484,
which is why the otherness of literary language is finally an obstacle, a
thing that must be left behind and surpassed, on the way to ethics.485
As Blanchot notes in The Infinite Conversation, “Levinas mistrusts
poems and poetic activity.”486
Blanchot’s analysis of the image refers implicitly also to
Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” in explaining how “a
tool, when damaged, becomes its image”: the damaged tool, “no
longer disappearing into its use, appears. This appearance of the object
is that of resemblance and reflection: the object’s double, if you
will”.487 Analogically, a cadaver, like a work of art, is an image of
itself: “The category of art is linked to this possibility for objects to
‘appear’, to surrender, that is, to the pure and simple resemblance
behind which there is nothing – but being. Only that which is
abandoned to the image appears, and everything that appears is, in this
sense, imaginary.”488 Blanchot does not take up the etymology of the
word “image” in the Latin word imago which means death mask.489
Neither does he mention Heidegger, although his example of the
cadaver as image par excellence is obviously indebted to Heidegger’s
analysis of the image and the death mask in Kantbuch.490 In
484 Levinas 1989, 141.
485 Despite Levinas’s suspicious attitude towards the “neutrality” of art, his
criticism of vision-generated language also in aesthetics as well as his insights of
the materiality of a work of art were, as Gerald L. Bruns notes, “an important
contribution to modernist aesthetics for the way it articulates the ontological
significance of modern art and its break with the aesthetics of form and beauty that
comes down to us from classical tradition and from Kant” (Bruns 1992, 207).
486 EI 76; IC 53.
487 SL 258.
488 SL 259.
489 Nancy 2003, pp. 147-79.
490 Heidegger’s analysis was in turn inspired by the appearance of Ernst Benkard’s
Undying Faces (Das ewige Antlitz) in 1926, at the same time as Heidegger himself
was giving lectures on Kant (these lectures were later published as Kantbuch).
Benkard’s book presented photographs of over a hundred death masks of famous
personalities, among them for example Newton, Beethoven, and Pascal. See Ernst
Benkard, Das ewige Antlitz: Eine Sammlung von Totenmasken, with a foreword by
G. Kolbe (Berlin: Frankfurter Verlangsanstalt, 1926). Undying faces. A collection
of death masks from the 15th century to the present day (London: Hogarth Press,
1929). Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant focused on the notion of the imagination
as a way to guarantee the synthesis of the manifold of perception with the concept
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Heidegger’s analysis, the death mask produces a real effect, since
through it we can see what the mask is representing, i.e., the face of a
dead man. The question arises, however, of what is it that the death
mask represents. How can we explain the fact that the death mask
resembles the man we knew and at the same time refers only to itself?
Heidegger explains that in appearing in a space between empirical
sensory diversity and a rational unity of concepts, the death mask
offers a perfect example of the method of schematism. In this way,
Heidegger’s question of the metaphysics of presence in Kant turns into
the question of image.491 What, then, is the difference between the
image in Heidegger and the image in Blanchot?
Blanchot writes in “The Two Versions of the Imaginary” that
the place occupied by the corpse is “drawn down by it, sinks with it,
and in this dissolution attacks the possibility of a dwelling place even
for us who remain.”492 Although Blanchot does not mention
Heidegger’s name, the reference is clear. For Heidegger, the world or
the work of art is not just what we see as a projection of our
consciousness but a “dwelling place”. In “The Letter on Humanism”
(“Brief über den Humanismus”, 1946) Heidegger writes in turn that
“Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who
think and those who create with words are guardians of this home.”493
Although Blanchot agrees with Heidegger that the space of the poem is
not a place which the reader creates but which the reader encounters,
he seems to find in Heidegger’s term “dwelling” a positive aspect
which makes it an inappropriate term in defining language.  Blanchot
wants to underline that reading understood as fascination does not
“give” us anything, nor does it offer us a more truthful way to see. For
of the understanding. Heidegger, who interpreted Kant’s schema-image as the
perfect example of the metaphysics of presence (as it was constructed on the
adequation model of truth), made in his analysis a differentiation between
representation (Vorstellung) and presentation (Darstellung), which he defined as a
“depiction”. As the example of presentation as depiction Heidegger used the death
mask.
491 Nancy 2003, pp. 147-79.
492 SL 257.
493 BW 217.
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Blanchot, art is “exile from truth”494. The experience of the image
prevents us from recognizing what it is that we have encountered.
For Blanchot, language that is its own image escapes truth. This
is because images in language (as Blanchot defines them) have no
anchors outside themselves. They are not tied to any concepts or
representations of the pre-existing ideas: “The fixed image knows no
repose, and this is above all because it poses nothing, establish nothing.
Its fixity, like that of the corpse, is the position of what stays with us
because it has no place.”495 For Blanchot, the image has nothing to do
with signification, meaningfulness, or truth, since the image of an
object is not the sense of this object, nor does it aim to understand this
object; rather, “it tends to withdraw the object from understanding by
maintaining it in the immobility of a resemblance which has nothing to
resemble.”496
In The Space of Literature, in the essay entitled “The Original
Experience” (which precedes the essay “Two Versions of the
Imaginary” and can thus be read as an introduction to it) Blanchot
speaks of “a contemporary philosopher” – without mentioning
Heidegger’s name – who “names death as man’s extreme
possibility”.497 Blanchot is not satisfied with Heidegger’s solution to
name death Dasein’s possibility for understanding life more
authentically and truthfully. In Blanchot’s analysis, Heidegger is not
able to solve the problem that eventually death remains beyond our
possibility to experience; it is not possible to say, “I die, at this moment
I die”. Death escapes one’s capability of experiencing it, and from this
it follows that death cannot make one’s experience of life more
494 SL 240. In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot criticizes Heidegger’s notion of
a “dwelling place” by analysing the experience of temporality in suffering.
Although the person who suffers is not beyond the grasp of time, he is “delivered
over to another time – to time as other, as absence and neutrality; precisely to a
time that can no longer redeem us, that constitutes no recourse. […] A time without
event, without project, without possibility; not that pure immobile instant, the spark
of the mysticism, but an unstable perpetuity in which we are arrested and incapable
of permanence, a time neither abiding nor granting the simplicity of a dwelling
place” (IC 44).
495 SL 259.
496 SL 260.
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authentic. As Blanchot writes, “in death the possibility which is death
dies too”.498 Death is not a possibility, and neither is it possible to
figure or imagine death: the death mask is only an effort to give a face
to something, which eventually cannot be imagined or figured. The
death mask is the mask behind which there is nothing – or there is
precisely this nothing, i.e., death (which cannot be faced or seen). In
Blanchot’s view, as I understand him, the mistake of Heidegger is to
think that the ambiguity of language – which eventually is duplicity of
the negative as death – could be resolved and transgressed by
transforming it into possibility, authenticity, and truth. For Blanchot, in
contrast to Heidegger, the ambiguity of death – death as possibility and
death as impossibility – “always remains present in the choice itself”.499
In “The Two Versions of the Imaginary” Blanchot points out
that the two versions of the image always exist simultaneously and that
only mutually can they make possible what is called image,
imagination, and meaning. This duplicity is analogical to the division of
language into two coexistent sides that Blanchot makes in “Literature
and the Right to Death”. For Blanchot, the simultaneity of language as
conceptuality (ideal meaning) and ambiguity (obscurity) is grounded in
the double meaning of the negative: negativity as death and negativity
as the infinity of dying. In Blanchot’s words, the two versions of the
imaginary “come from the initial double meaning that the power of the
negative brings with it and from the fact that death is sometimes truth’s
elaboration in the world and sometimes the perpetuity of that which
admits neither beginning nor the end.”500 The duplicity of language is
present even in classical art. With its ideal of being faithful to the
figure, it ends up with impersonality which eventually betrays it.501 It is
as if there were two Eurydices: the one whom Orpheus recognizes in
the daylight, and the other whom he encounters in the night of death.
As Orpheus, having turned his eyes towards Eurydice, sees his beloved
497 SL 240.
498 SL 261.
499 SL 261.
500 SL 261.
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face to face, he does not see the woman he once lost, but the gaze or
rather the mask of death: Eurydice transformed into an image of
herself.
For Blanchot, language is beyond the opposition between the
conceptual and non-conceptual, truth and untruth. It is not the case
that language would be untrue (poetry) or true (philosophy) but we do
not know what language at each moment is. From this it follows that it
is not relevant to reflect on poetry in the context of truth or to speak of
it with the vocabulary of truth, as Heidegger does. As Blanchot writes,
“the image can certainly help us to grasp the thing ideally, and in this
perspective it is the life-giving negation of the thing; but at the level to
which its particular weight drags us, it also threatens constantly to
relegate us, not to the absent thing, but to its absence as presence, to
the neutral double of the object in which all belonging to the world is
dissipated.”502 The duplicity of the imaginary refers back to the
duplicity of all language. The two sides of language are always present
in language. Language is violence and non-violence, both at the same
time, from which it follows that our ability to distinguish between the
two sides is always uncertain. Blanchot does not, in other words,
believe that the step beyond the violent side could ever be possible – in
Blanchot, it wouldn’t be possible to choose between seeing as
Umsicht, staring, or fascination; nor does the experience of fascination
teach one to see more truthfully. From the ambiguity of language it
follows that language is not only beyond the opposition violent/non-
violent, but also beyond the opposition truth/untruth. This, I argue, is
the point where Blanchot stops following Heidegger.503
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V Writing Otherwise than Seeing  
The Question of the Neutral  
In The Infinite Conversation, in the essay entitled “The Most Profound 
Question” (1969), Blanchot pays attention to the tendency of thinking 
and sight to address a “whole” or a “totality”. He writes, as if 
criticizing the interpretative method of hermeneutics (in which our 
capability for understanding is related with the horizon structure of 
our vision), that in our thinking “every view is a general view”, and 
although “sight holds us within the limits of a horizon”, our perception 
is always “planted in the earth and forming a link between the 
immobile boundary and the apparently boundless horizon – a firm 
pact from which comes peace.”504 Also for Heidegger, says Blanchot, 
the question of Being becomes a “totalizing question”, to which the 
philosopher subordinates all other questions.
In Blanchot’s interpretation, the goal of Heidegger’s 
ontological difference is to approach anew the question where Hegel’s 
dialectics failed, namely “the question of the whole”. The aim of 
Heidegger’s ontological difference is to entail not only what “is” but 
also Being that surrounds it. As Heidegger writes, “A more 
fundamental ontology claims to take up this question beyond question 
anew by transforming it into a question of the difference between 
[B]eing and what is (the ‘whole’ elaborated by the work of the 
dialectic involves not [B]eing, but what is).”505
Blanchot claims that even though Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology claims to think of that which remains beyond the whole of 
the dialectical movement (by transforming it into a question of the 
ontological difference between Being and what is), Heidegger’s 
ontology itself is not able to avoid the same totalizing movement of 
which it accuses Hegel’s philosophy. Heidegger’s question of the 
504
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whole of Being is, as Blanchot writes, “like a question of God”: both 
are too “ultimate” and too “general” a question, aiming to bear all 
other questions.506 As Blanchot concludes, “The thought that asks 
about being, that is to say, about the difference between being and 
what is – the thought that thus bears the first question, renounces 
questioning.”507
In Blanchot’s interpretation, Hegel’s dialectic and Heidegger’s 
ontology (as well as Levinas’s critique of ontology) “have the same 
postulate: all three deliver themselves over to the One, be it that the 
One accomplishes itself as everything, be it that it understands being 
as gathering, light, and unity of being, or be it that, above and beyond 
being, it affirms itself as the Absolute”. Blanchot claims that even 
Heidegger’s thinking is eventually more towards the affirmation of the 
totality of Being than towards the affirmation of exteriority. As I 
interpret Blanchot, he says that both Hegel’s dialectic and Heidegger’s 
ontology aim to be comprehensive. To cite Mark C. Taylor, “To think 
the ground of all things is to comprehend everything”.508 For Blanchot 
this ground in Heidegger is the ontological difference between beings 
and Being.  
Blanchot, instead, proposes that in the place of the totalizing 
questions of dialectics and ontology – which still remain trapped 
within the metaphysics of presence – we would ask the question that 
in the history of philosophy is not posed and has been unthought of.509
For Blanchot, the question that “escapes the reference to the One” is 
the question of writing understood as exteriority and as neutrality:510
“this question that is not posed; a question we will call, in defiance, in 
derision and with rigor, the most profound question – or the question 
of the neutral.”511
Whereas Heidegger in Being and Time claims that the history 
of metaphysics has forgotten the question of Being, Blanchot thus 
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accuses the entire history of philosophy of leaving the neuter 
unthought of: from it we can find “an effort either to acclimatize or to 
domesticate the neuter by substituting for it the law of the impersonal 
and the reign of the universal, or an effort to challenge it by affirming 
the ethical primacy of the Self-Subject, the mystical aspiration to the 
singular Unique. The neuter is thus constantly expelled from our 
languages and our truths.”512
In the essay entitled “René Char and the Thought of the 
Neutral” (“René Char et la pensée du neutre”) Blanchot criticizes the 
ontological difference for not being neutral enough, even if it “calls to 
think in the neutral”.513 Although “Heideggerian philosophy can be 
understood as a response to this examination of the neuter and as an 
attempt to approach it in a non-conceptual manner”, Heidegger’s 
ontology “must also be understood as a new retreat before that which 
thought seems only able to entertain by sublimating it.”514 In a 
footnote to his essay Blanchot continues:
Reflection upon the difference between being and beings – a 
difference that is not the theological difference between the 
Transcendental and the finite (less absolute and at the same time 
more original than the latter), a difference that is also entirely other 
than that between the existing being and its manner of existing – 
seems also to call upon thought and upon language to recognize in 
Sein a fundamental word for the neuter or neutral; in other words, it 
calls one to think in the neutral. But it is also necessary to rectify 
this immediately and say: the dignity accorded to being in the 
summons that would come to us from it, everything that relates in 
an ambiguous manner Being and the divine, the correspondence 
between Sein und Dasein, the providential fact that being and the 
comprehension of Being go together – being being that which 
illuminates itself, opens, and destines itself to beings that become 
an opening of clarity; the relation, therefore, between Sein und 
truth, a veiling unveiling itself in the presence of light – all this 
does not prepare us to seek the neutral as it is implied by the 
unknown.515
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Blanchot does not only seek a way of thinking that would not 
privilege seeing, but also a way of thinking that would not privilege 
Being. He claims that Heidegger’s ontological distinction is not 
neutral enough, since it thinks of absence as the absence of Being, 
which is why Heidegger’s notion of Being still returns meaning to 
Being. In my view, Blanchot’s concept of writing as neutral (le 
neutre) can be interpreted as a critical reply to Heidegger’s ontological 
difference between Being and beings which, as Blanchot says, in 
making a relation between Sein and truth, “a veiling unveiling itself in 
the presence of light”, is not neutral enough even thought it “calls one 
to think in the neutral.”516 Whereas in Heidegger truth, art, and Being 
still maintain a “correspondence” to Dasein, Blanchot seeks a way of 
speaking and writing that would bring us neither Being nor non-Being 
but would be engaged with what he calls the neuter. According to 
Blanchot, we should not think of the neuter as a structure which has a 
relation to Being, but as a possibility of “saying that which would say 
being without saying it, and yet without denying it either” (“de dire 
qui dirait sans dire l’être et sans non plus le denier”).517 As he says, 
the neuter “does not belong to any questioning that the question of 
being might precede.”518
In my view, the neuter can thus be understood as Blanchot’s 
answer to the philosophical debate concerning the relation of writing 
to nothingness which circled around Blanchot’s first fictional 
narrative, Thomas the Obscure, and the questions relating to it, such as 
“Can we reach for anything without somehow determining it? Does 
thinking always require thematization? Doesn’t language always, as 
soon as something is said, pose a relation to being? Isn’t it impossible 
to negate somehing without positing it beforehand?” In the essay “The 
Narrative Voice (the ‘he,’ the neutral)”, Blanchot explains the concept 
of the neutral in the following way: 
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The exigency of the neutral tends to suspend the attributive 
structure of language: the relation to being, implicit or explicit, that 
is immediately posed in language as soon as something is said. It 
has often been remarked – by philosophers, linguists, and political 
analysts – that nothing can be negated that has not already been 
posited beforehand. To put this another way, every language begins 
by declaring and in declaring. But it may be that recounting 
(writing) draws language into a possibility of saying that which 
would say being without saying it, and yet without denying it either.
Or again, to say this more clearly, too clearly: it would establish the 
centre of the gravity of speech elsewhere, there where speaking 
would neither affirm being nor need negation in order to suspend 
the work of being that is ordinarily accomplished in every form of 
expression.519
Blanchot’s “neuter” can be seen as a continuation of his earlier 
concepts “existence without being” (““Literature and the Right to 
Death”) and image (The Space of Literature): all three concepts 
challenge the idea of language as “revealing” or “illuminating” Being, 
as well as the idea of language as creating something new, or as 
making something to appear as something.  
As has been noticed by many Blanchot scholars, in the essays 
of The Space of Literature (L’espace littéraire, 1955) Blanchot writes 
so close to Heidegger’s terminology that Heidegger’s influence is 
easily recognized.520 However, already in The Space of Literature
Blanchot’s interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking is “personal”, as for 
example Anne-Lise Schulte Nordholt notes.521 The discrepancy 
between Blanchot and Heidegger becomes gradually stronger in 
Blanchot’s essays written during the 1950. In the following pages I 
will analyse from different points of view how Blanchot’s essays, 
written in the 1960s, introduce the neuter as a critical equivalent to 
Heidegger’s thinking. I will analyse the neuter (first) in terms of 
Blanchot’s criticism of the notion of “revealing” as it comes up in 
both Hegel and Heidegger; (secondly) in terms of Blanchot’s criticism 
of Heidegger’s notion of naming, and (thirdly) in terms of Blanchot’s 
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criticism of Heidegger’s vocabulary which for him is “still too 
metaphysical”.  
Heidegger’s Ontological Analysis of Language 
As I tried to show in the previous chapter, Blanchot’s way of 
challenging the phenomenological theory of reading with the notion of 
fascination echoes Heidegger’s ontological investigation of seeing as 
Umsicht in Being and Time. I propose further that the division into the 
two versions of the imaginary that Blanchot makes in The Space of 
Literature can be read as commenting on the differentiation Heidegger 
in his turn makes between the representational and the affirmative 
dimension of language as Dichtung. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
differentes between the “assertative” function of philosophical 
language and the “aletheic” function of poetical language. Whereas 
Hegel is a representative of the assertative and Heidegger of the 
aletheic function of language, Blanchot steps beyond this opposition 
in proposing a third account of language. As I have proposed, 
Blanchot seeks from the beginning a third way to define language, 
which would not be language in its “negative”, “representational”, 
“constative” or “assertative” function, nor language in its 
“performative” or affirmative function as “creating” or making 
something appear as something. In my analysis, both the ambiguity of 
language in “Literature and the Right to Death” and the image in The 
Space of Literature aims to describe language in its third dimension. 
In The Infinite Conversation, as I interpret it, Blanchot names this 
third type “language as neutral”.  
As I proposed, the neuter can be read as Blanchot’s critical 
reply to Heidegger’s way of understanding language. Heidegger 
argues in Being and Time that seeing and using language are always 
related: the foundation of any sentence is in the way we see and 
observe the world in which we are. Just as there are different ways of 
seeing, there are different ways of understanding language, although 
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they all have the same origin in Dasein’s practical concern for the 
world. As Heidegger reminds us, the Greeks already connected 
speaking with seeing and thus with knowing: “Among the Greeks 
their existence was largely diverted into talking with one another, but 
at the same time they ‘had eyes’ to see.”522 From ancient times 
linguistic assertion has thus been understood as the “locus” of truth: 
language in its Greek meaning logos (?????) has always been related 
to the question of truth, i.e., to the question of how something appears 
to us. 
Heidegger argues that language is based on the way we look at 
the world, from which it follows in turn that seeing the world and 
using language are ontologically connected. Since Dasein’s ways of 
Being are dependent on the ways it sees and looks, Dasein as a being 
who “has language” always expresses its ways to be and to see the 
world. From the interrelatedness of seeing, understanding, and 
language it follows that Dasein has the possibility to investigate its 
way of Being by investigating its relation to language. Language is 
both a way of understanding one’s own Being, and a way of 
communicating with others and expressing oneself to them.  
As the goal of Heidegger’s ontology is to find a more truthful 
way to look and see the world, this also becomes the goal of language. 
Thus the starting point of Heidegger’s ontological analysis of 
language is that in order to challenge the idea of language as 
representation we need the right concept of language. In order to attain 
a more open relation to Being, we must find a more truthful way to 
speak of Being. As Heidegger asks in Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, “How do intentional experiences, belonging as they 
do to the subjective sphere, relate to transcendental objects?”523 This 
question is, in my interpretation, Heidegger’s way to poetry.   
Even though the focus of Heidegger’s ontological analysis in 
Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is in 
Dasein’s Being, and even if language in these writings is not in such a 
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central position as it is in Heidegger’s later writings, already Being
and Time includes strategic references to language as poetry. One of 
these can be found in sections 4-5, where poetry is mentioned as one 
of Dasein’s ways to investigate its Being. Heidegger writes that the 
question of Being can be answered only if Dasein’s Being is 
investigated in “an ontologically adequate manner.”524 Even though 
Dasein always has some kind of “pre-ontological” understanding of its 
own Being, the true nature of this Being remains concealed from it, 
since Dasein has a tendency to also objectify its own Being, 
understanding it as something present-at-hand.525 For this reason it 
needs specific ways to open its eyes even to its own Being. Although 
Dasein’s understanding of Being changes (“develops or decays”) in 
time, depending on what kind of Being Dasein possesses,526 it is only 
by actively seeking different ways to investigate and understand its 
Being that Dasein has also the possibility to influence what is its 
current mode of Being.527 Dasein has the possibility to progress in its 
ways of seeing Being, which means that Dasein can “develop the 
different possibilities of sight.”528 While listing different ways Dasein 
has at its disposal in investigating its Being, Heidegger mentions 
poetry: along with philosophy and various sciences, poetry can 
participate in the interpretation of Dasein’s Being, presuming that it 
explicitly points toward the problem of Being itself:529
Not only, however, does an understanding of Being belong to 
Dasein, but this understanding develops or decays along with 
whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time; 
accordingly there are many ways in which it has been interpreted, 
and these are all at Dasein’s disposal. Dasein’s ways of behaviour, 
its capacities, powers, possibilities, have been studied to varying 
extents in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and 
‘political science’, in poetry, biography, and the writing of history, 
each in different fashion. […] Only when the basic structures of 
Dasein have been adequately worked out with explicit orientation 
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towards the problem of Being itself, will what we have hitherto 
gained in interpreting Dasein get its existential justification.530
In section 34 of Being and Time Heidegger defines poetry as a kind of 
expression of exteriority that has the ability to open Dasein’s eyes to 
its own Being: “What is expressed [in poetry] is precisely this Being-
outside […]. In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the 
existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind can become an aim in 
itself, and this amounts to a disclosing existence.”531 Poetical 
discourse is a way to express “Dasein’s transcendence”, its way to be 
always already outside itself, which Heidegger in Being and Time
understands as a condition for Dasein’s Being.532
In my view, the most important point of Being and Time
concerning language is Heidegger’s claim that language has the 
capacity to open one’s eyes to Being understood not as a presence-at-
hand but also as a condition of possibility for understanding and 
communicating in general. If seeing the world is usually understood as 
presenting the world to the subject with representative and thus violent 
language, in order to create a more open relation to the world and to 
Being one must find a less violent way to use language: language that 
defines the relation between seeing and using language in a new way. 
From this observation follows in turn the question of what kind of 
language is needed in order to not objectify Being, but rather to open 
oneself to Being and to the existence of other people? In order to 
answer this question we need an ontological analysis of different ways 
to use and understand language.  
After Being and Time Heidegger came to the opinion that the 
ontological analysis of Dasein was not enough to challenge the 
traditional subject-object schema, since from the analytic of Dasein 
still followed the paradoxical pre-eminence of Dasein, i.e., the idea of 
man as Dasein as the origin of meaning, although ontologically 
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grounded. As Heidegger already puts it in Being and Time, the main 
problem of his ontology was the lack of adequate “words” and 
“grammar”, with which it would be possible to grasp entities in their 
Being. Heidegger’s solution to the violence of the ego and theory was 
the turning from the analytic of Dasein to the anonymous speech of 
language, i.e., to the structure of meaning without subjectivity. With 
language it should be possible to speak of the appearance of the 
meaning of Being without presupposing the metaphysical idea of 
subjectivity. 
On the same basis that Heidegger distinguishes “theoretical 
seeing” and “circumspective seeing”, he makes a distinction between 
two ways to understand or interpret language. When we base our 
interpretation on truth as correspondence, we see things in their 
prepositional truth, and language as a medium for transmitting these 
truths, i.e., as signifying something that already exists in the world. 
But when an assertion is posited on the horizon of circumspective 
concern (Umsicht) the meaning of a sentence is different than when it 
is read in a theoretical context. In the same way as Being makes the 
appearing of beings possible, language in the sense of aletheia makes 
appearance and signifying possible.  
In my view, Blanchot’s description of the first side of language 
in “Literature and the Right to Death” can be read as commenting on 
Heidegger’s analysis of the “assertative” function of language in 
Being and Time. In understanding language as a tool at the disposal of 
the self-present ego, assertative language follows the idea of thinking 
as representation, as well as the metaphysical model of the subject-
object relation, which sees man as an observer independent of the 
external world. Since logos in the Aristotelian tradition has been 
reduced to assertion, and since logos is traditionally understood as 
“letting something be seen” with language, its effect has been 
understood to be based on its ability to make its object “present-at-
hand”.533 When an entity is understood as the object of assertion, it is 
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turned from something “ready-to-hand” to something merely “present-
at-hand”; assertion cuts off an entity from its environment, thus 
objectifying its Being. A theoretical assertion in Heidegger’s analysis 
is the linguistic equivalent of seeing as “staring”, i.e., seeing as 
objectifying, making present.534 As Heidegger puts it, “Representing 
the relation to what is represented” follows the conception of “idea as 
perception.”535
Being and Time highlights that a linguistic assertion is not 
“free-floating behaviour” but includes and requires “a fore-having” or 
a foresight of that which is asserted.536 Eventually each linguistic 
assertion has its ontological source in primordial understanding and 
interpretation based on circumspective seeing.537 Since all the 
different ways of seeing and knowing presuppose the same structure 
of prior projection, all interpretation is based on some kind of 
“foresight” (Vorsicht), i.e. hermeneutical preconception (Vorgriff) of 
something, which is yet to come, but which we always unavoidably 
grasp somehow in advance.538 This fore-having or preconception has 
later become known as the hermeneutical fore-conception or the 
“horizon” that determines and shapes the meaning for the interpreting 
eye. According to Heidegger, a consequence of the interpretative 
dimension of seeing is the violence of interpretation, i.e., our tendency 
to objectify and essentialize that which is coming.539 From this it 
follows that the violence of language and thinking is necessarily 
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involved in all interpretation.540 Heidegger is thus again faced with the 
question of violence and the problem of is it ever impossible to 
approach entities and Being without violence, if hermeneutical 
ontology also is, due to its dependence on the structure of a projection, 
necessarily tied to the violence of interpretation. 
Despite this observation of unavoidable interpretative violence, 
Heidegger insists that poetical discourse can fulfil the task which all 
previous philosophical tradition (primarily representative thinking and 
truth as correspondence) has neglected – to open our eyes to the open 
dimensionality of Being. As a non-assertive way to use language, 
literary language is a way to experience something exterior, something 
totally other.541 From the exteriority of art it follows that art is a 
potential place for a different kind of seeing: as something that 
conceals itself, art resists theoretism and its objectifying way of 
seeing. In teaching us to see objects anew, art can alter our sense of 
the whole of beings, i.e., of that context in which objects we see 
inhere. As Heidegger suggests in “The Nature of Language”, a 
“thinking experience with language” offers a fundamental mode of 
truth and knowledge. Poetical language has the capacity for a more 
primordial and more “authentic” way of seeing which has, similar to 
the philosophical and the everyday way of seeing, its own way to be in 
connection with thinking and knowing.  
Heidegger thus finds in poetry the alternative to the 
representative way to use language which corresponds to what 
Blanchot in “Literature and the Right to Death” says of the second 
side of literature. Poetry is for both of them a way of speaking that 
challenges the metaphysical way of thinking. Heidegger, however, 
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defines poetry also as a more truthful and therefore less violent way of 
seeing that is able to transgress the violence of representation because 
of its truthfulness. He suggests that the shift to an ontologically more 
justified idea of truth demands us to listen to a mode of discourse or 
“saying” that is not assertive but rather “poetizing”. In 
“Phenomenology and Theology”, dating from 1927, Heidegger turns 
from the objectifying way to use language to poetry. From Rilke’s The
Sonnets to Orpheus (1923, Sonetten an Orpheus), in its “poetic 
saying”, he finds a way of speaking that does not “posit and represent 
anything as standing over against us or as object”, since “There is 
nothing here that could be placed before a grasping or 
comprehending representation.”542
Heidegger suggests that in poetry we encounter something that 
is not “present” in the same manner as a being or an entity is present. 
Even though that which is present and that which is “presencing” 
appear only as not distinguished, poetry has the ability to make us 
aware of the difference between the two. It makes us realize that 
“What is present does not have to stand over against us; what stands 
over against us does not have to be empirically perceived as an 
object.”543 While avoiding metaphysical articulations based on the 
oblivion of the ontological difference, a work of art becomes a perfect 
example of thinking of Being. Heidegger thus concludes that “an 
example of an outstanding non-objectifying thinking and speaking is 
poetry.”544 For Heidegger, poetry is the answer to the problem of how 
is it ever possible to “enter the side of things” and to be open to “the 
phenomena as they offer themselves.” Poetry is, in short, a place for 
more truthful truth (as aletheia) to appear.
For Blanchot, writing is not a mode of seeing or thinking of 
truth, even if truth would be defined as truth as aletheia, since in his 
interpretation to speak of art as any kind of truth is to subordinate it to 
something else, in Heidegger’s case to ontology and to the ontological 
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difference.545  The task of art in Blanchot is not to clarify or illuminate 
something else, but rather to perform its own existence. Blanchot thus 
seems to follow Levinas’s interpretation, according to which the 
concept of art in Heidegger establishes the world and a place for truth 
to appear. In opposition to Heidegger, in Blanchot art “does not 
condition truth,” as Levinas puts it.546 In Levinas’s words, in 
Heidegger the light of art comes from on high, from the “light of 
Being,” whereas the “light” of art in Blanchot is “a black light, a night 
coming from below – a light that undoes the world.” As Levinas 
concludes, “Far from elucidating the world,” art in Blanchot “exposes 
the desolate, lightless substratum underlying it.”547
Following Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology 
Blanchot finds from Heidegger the same metaphysical connection 
made between “truth” and “light” of which Heidegger accuses 
Husserl’s phenomenology: in Husserl it is the light of consciousness 
that brings objects into view, whereas in Heidegger – as Levinas puts 
it –  light (“Light of Being”) is an essential condition of truth.548 Even 
if Blanchot thus accepts Heidegger’s analysis of vision as presence in 
the philosophical discourse from Plato to Husserl, as well as 
Heidegger’s criticism of representative thinking, he does not accept 
Heidegger’s analysis of art as the place where truth (even if truth as 
aletheia) appears. For Heidegger, in opposition to Blanchot, poetry is 
still a way of thinking about the truth, whereas in Blanchot, as he 
sums up in The Space of Literature,
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The work brings neither certitude nor clarity. It assures us of 
nothing, nor does it shed any light upon itself. It is not solid, it does 
not furnish us with anything indestructible or indubitable upon 
which to brace ourselves. These values belong to Descartes and to 
the world where we succeed in living. Just as every strong work 
abducts us from ourselves, from our accustomed strength, makes us 
weak and as if annihilated, so the work is not strong with respect to 
what it is. It has no power, it is impotent: not because it is simply 
the obverse of possibility’s various forms, but rather because it 
designates a region where impossibility is no longer deprivation, 
but affirmation.549
Heidegger claims that because of its estrangement and exteriority art 
can open our eyes to something to which we have become blind. For 
Blanchot, the exteriority of art is without meaning in the sense of 
truth. It is not that writing would not be true or non-true, but we don’t 
know what it is at each moment.550 For Blanchot language is not the 
“house of Being” which the poet would create and then guard, nor is it 
possible to find from a work of art “a dwelling place”551. Language is 
not a secure basis for anything; it is not a house but rather a place or a 
space governed by the laws of fascination.  
Literature against Revelation
Blanchot writes in “Literature and the Right to Death” that literary 
language “protests against revelation”.552 As I interpret Blanchot, with 
these words he resists Hegel’s idea of language as the revelation of the 
totality of Being. As Kojève understands, the progressive revelation 
(understanding) of the Real is in Hegel achieved in speech and 
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through speech only.553 To reveal Being in speech means that every 
concept reveals and refers to a part of conceptually understood reality. 
A concept is thus to be defined as “Being revealed by Speech or 
Thought”.554 The goal of philosophical thought is in turn “the goal of 
revealing, through the meaning of a coherent discourse (Logos), Being 
(Sein) as it is and exists in the totality of its objective-Reality 
(Wirklichkeit).”555 In Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, “The 
philosopher must describe the totality of what is and exists.”556 The 
final goal of the progressive revealing with concepts is the complete 
understanding of the whole of Being, “a total revelation of real Being 
or an entirely revealed Being.”557 The totality of Being created in the 
movement of negation is the sum total of the movement of discourse, 
which means that the totality of Being can be achieved only at the end 
of its dialectical and historical becoming.558
As was already discussed, in order to to challenge the Hegelian 
view of language as revealing Being, Blanchot proposes that the 
poetical language seeks to be the realm of “the unrevealed”:559 in 
poetry, language “reveals nothing”, but “allies itself with the reality of 
language.”560 In contrast to the idea of language as the revelation of 
Being, Blanchot refers to Mallarmé’s idea of poetry as the elimination 
of things that it seeks to name. In “Literature and the Right to Death” 
Blanchot describes literary language as the successive movement of 
negation that seeks to get control of the totality of its own movement, 
i.e. the totality of Being:  
Literature is not content to accept only the fragmentary, successive 
results of this movement of negation: it wants to grasp the 
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movement itself and it wants to comprehend the results in their 
totality. If negation is assumed to have gotten control of everything, 
then real things, taken one by one, all refer back to that unreal 
whole which they form together, to the world which is their 
meaning as a group, and this is the point of view that literature has 
adopted – it looks at things from the point of view of this 
imaginary whole which they would really constitute if negation 
could be achieved. Hence its non-realism – the shadow which is its 
prey. Hence its distrust of words, its need to apply the movement of 
negation to language itself and to exhaust it by realizing it as that 
totality on the basis of which each term would be nothing.561
Although poetical language would fail in its effort to avoid conceptual 
meaning, what it nevertheless can do is to challenge the idea of 
meaning as a whole. The conditional formula in Blanchot’s text cited 
above is crucial: “[Literature on the first side] looks at things from the 
point of view of this imaginary whole which they would really
constitute if negation could be achieved.”562 – Why is it, then, in 
Blanchot’s view that totality remains uncompleted in literary 
language? In “Literature and the Right to Death” the explanation is 
found in Blanchot’s idea of language as “the savage freedom” of 
words, thanks to which singular words – or singular poems in a 
collection of poems – do not refer to some “imaginary whole” 
consisting of words. There is no fixed context, to which a word would 
refer. Instead, there is “within the limits of the word […] access to 
other names, names which are less fixed, still vague, more capable of 
adapting to the savage freedom of the negative essence – they are 
unstable groups, no longer terms but the movement of terms, an 
endless sliding of ‘turn of phrase’ which does not lead anywhere.”563
From the endlessness of the signifying process (or of the “chain of 
signifiers”, as one could say) it follows that the movement of language 
is not to be understood as a process which in aiming to create the 
whole of Being could have a beginning or an end; rather, language 
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turns out to be an anonymous and subjectless neural force, that is able 
to break with the idea of the “whole of Being.” 564
I propose that Blanchot’s question concerning the origin of 
language in “Literature and the Right to Death” can also be read in 
relation to Heidegger’s idea of language as naming, and not only in 
relation to Hegel. Also Heidegger condemns the traditional notion of 
language in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. As Heidegger argues, 
according to the common view, language is only a vehicle which 
communicates and represents pre-existing thoughts and ideas without 
having an effect of its own on the transmitted meaning.565 In defining 
language as the representation of pre-existing representative thoughts, 
the conventional notion of language as communication misses the 
ontological function of all language. In Heidegger’s ontological 
analysis of language, language does not represent, but “brings beings 
as beings into the open for the first time.”566
From Heidegger’s way of understanding language 
ontologically it follows that he understands the function of linguistic 
naming in a different way than Hegel. In “The Origin of the Work of 
Art” he defines language as naming, not in the sense of referring or 
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pointing out to something that already exists, but in the sense of 
making something appear for the first time as something: “Language, 
by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to 
appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their Being from 
out of their Being. Such saying is a projecting of clearing, in which 
the announcement is made of what it is that beings come into the open 
as.”
567
In Hegel’s philosophy the condition of meaning is to negate 
being, which happens by negating the being of being in the act of 
naming. What Hegel’s dialectics according to Heidegger forgets or is 
unable to think of is the distinction between Being and beings. As 
Blanchot explicates Heidegger’s starting place in The Infinite 
Conversation, “From the perspective of ontology, the dialectic cannot 
pronounce on the being of the dialectic itself, any more than on the 
this is that is prior to the work of negation: the dialectic can begin only 
on the basis of a given that is devoid of meaning, and out of which it 
can then make meaning; the meaning of non-meaning is what without 
which there could be no meaning. One can only negate what was first 
posited, but this ‘positive’ and the ‘first’ remain outside the 
question.”568
From this criticism it follows that Heidegger, in contrast to 
Hegel, does not define naming as giving names to objects or referents, 
but rather as a linguistic act that “calls into the word”, as a kind of 
linguistic “happening” or event. As he writes in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art”, “language alone brings beings into the open for the first 
time”.569 Whereas in Kojève’s interpretation of naming in Hegel the 
emphasis is put on the negative power of language to control the 
world, and to construct the world for the man who speaks, in 
Heidegger poetic language “summons to presence” that which it 
names, and inaugurates the world by giving to things their 
567
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appearance.570 From this it follows in turn that all modes of 
“presencing” are effects of language. In giving existence to something 
that previously did not exist, language has an ontological dimension. 
Understood as a linguistic happening or a performative, language is 
like an archaic enchantment or spell, Dichtung calls things into 
Being.571 Heidegger’s slogan Sprache spricht (language speaks) 
underlines the idea of language as the condition of Being in general. 
That language names something means that language names, and not a 
subject who uses language to name. As defined according to its 
performative function, language does not refer outside itself but to 
itself, to its own Being.  
In Heidegger’s view, because of its exteriority, poetic language 
questions the idea of truth as correspondence: in poetry truth is no 
longer assertions, statements or propositions but rather an event, 
Ereignis, which resists conceptualization and exceeds the 
intentionality of both its author and the reader. Not only is writing a 
poem a poetic act, but also reading a poem presupposes an open 
attitude, a willingness to “remove ourselves from our commonplace 
routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring 
our own essence itself to take a stand in the truth of beings.”572 The 
exteriority or the otherness of a work of art “thrusts down the ordinary 
or what we believe to be such”, from which it follows that “the truth 
that discloses itself in the work can never be proved or derived from 
what went before.”573 In suggesting that poetical language follows the 
structure of aletheia, Heidegger defines art in general as “the clearing 
projection of truth,” i.e., as a place where truth as aletheia “happens”. 
For Heidegger as the philosopher, poesy is, as he notes in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art”, “only one mode of the clearing projection of 
truth”.574
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In my analysis, Blanchot remains sceptical about Heidegger’s 
way of defining poetical language as a way to reveal the truth. Even 
though he agrees with Heidegger’s interpretation of a work of art as an 
unpredictable event, or as the unnameable, he refuses to accept 
Heidegger’s definition of poetry as a “projective saying” which could 
reveal the truth of Being (to Dasein). For Blanchot, as the most 
problematic aspect in Heidegger’s view on poetry remains his idea of 
poetry as a possibility for founding a place for truth. Although 
Blanchot in many ways accepts the analysis of art in “The Origin of 
the Artwork”, he departs from Heidegger’s interpretation of art as a 
place for truth to appear. Whereas in Heidegger poetry reveals the 
truth, in Blanchot literary language as resemblance is not able to 
reveal anything. 
For Blanchot, to speak of poetry as a non-violent way of seeing 
the truth does not make sense, since literary language as ambiguity is 
beyond both truth and non-truth. The fact that Heidegger names this 
truth as ontologically defined aletheia does not make a difference to 
Blanchot. He affirms Heidegger’s criticism of representation but not 
his analysis of language as aletheia as revealing Being, illuminating 
Being or as a more truthful way of seeing. In my analysis, Blanchot’s 
disappointment concerns particularly the homology Heidegger makes 
between poetical saying as revelation and truth as aletheia. For 
Blanchot, the space of literature is not – in the final analysis – the 
place where seeing as staring could change into seeing as Umsicht, but 
the place where fascination prevents any seeing, revealing, 
illuminating or appearance of truth to happen, and which for this 
reason challenges the opposition between seeing and non-seeing. 
Blanchot, unlike Heidegger, does not believe that literature could 
teach us how to “see” otherwise. Reading as fascination is not a 
revealing or learning. As he writes in “Sleep, Night”: “One seeks the 
original model, wanting to be referred to a point of departure, an 
initial revelation. But there is none.”575
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It seems to me that eventually Blanchot agrees with Levinas’s 
(much criticized) interpretation of Heidegger. In “The Poet’s Gaze” 
Levinas claims that even if for Heidegger error is simultaneous with 
truth, in Heidegger “all that is human can be said, in the final analysis, 
in terms of truth”.576 According to Levinas, Heidegger and Blanchot 
are opposed to each other, since in Blanchot, he cries, “the work 
uncovers, in an uncovering that is not truth, a darkness. In an 
uncovering that is not truth!” Levinas claims that although for 
Heidegger “the revelation of being is also its dissimulation”, 
eventually in Heidegger truth “conditions all wanderings”.577
Françoise Collin makes the same interpretation in her study on 
Blanchot: as she writes, even if a work of art does not reveal for 
Heidegger anything which one could “know”, it nevertheless reveals 
to us the truth.578
Blanchot criticizes Heidegger’s terminology, when speaking of 
language and art, for being too metaphysical. As the anonymous 
speaker argues in “Speaking Is Not Seeing”, the word ‘reveal’ (used 
by Heidegger) is not suitable to define writing, since to reveal is “to 
remove the veil, to expose directly to view. Revealing implies that 
something shows that did not show itself. Speech (at least the one we 
are attempting to approach: writing) lays bare even without unveiling, 
and sometimes, on the contrary (dangerously), by reveals a way that 
neither covers nor uncovers.”579 As Françoise Collin also interprets 
Blanchot, in Heidegger the notion of revelation is connected to seeing 
and light. From Blanchot’s notion of “resemblance”, for instance, 
these characteristics are missing.580
For Blanchot, as I understand him, language in Heidegger is 
‘towards’ Being, whereas in Blanchot language is rather towards 
nothingness or disappearance. For Blanchot, who already in his early 
essays on language takes as his starting point the idea of absence as 
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the ground of meaning, it is important to ask how language restores its 
relation to nothingness, from which it is born. As was discussed, 
Blanchot disagrees with the idea that even death, negativity itself, 
could be conceptualized. For Blanchot, language and poetry exist 
precisely because the immediate is not possible. For Heidegger, 
instead, at least as Blanchot interprets him, at stake is an interrogation 
of the nature of Being’s coming into presence. In Heidegger, poetical 
language as naming makes the world appear in its plenitude, here and 
now.
Blanchot does not put the emphasis on the ability of (literary) 
language to let something appear or to be seen but rather to let that 
which is said to withdraw. In Blanchot’s notion of literary language, it 
seeks to make us conscious of absence which is not only the absence 
of being but also the absence of truth. Since the ultimate ground is 
missing, the event of disappearing always remains stronger than the 
event of appearing. As I interpret Blanchot to say, for Heidegger, in 
his turn, language as naming makes Being appear; it is the condition 
of the possibility of anything to appear and to be present at all. As 
Levinas interprets, “Light from on high in Heidegger, making the 
world, founding a place. In Blanchot it is black light, a night coming 
from below – a light that undoes the world”.581 Françoise Collin notes 
in turn that for Heidegger art is an element that “calls Being” and 
makes it appear, whereas for Blanchot art is most of all absence.582
Although Blanchot’s dislike of Heidegger’s philosophical 
terminology of truth is understandable, one can nevertheless doubt the 
correctness of his interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of language. In 
the light of Heidegger’s later essays on language (for instance On the 
581
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Way to Language, 1950-59) one can ask, isn’t the function of 
language in both the same: not to make the unthought manifest but to 
let it disappear at the moment of its appearing? Doesn’t Heidegger 
already write in his early essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” that 
what is, is only in virtue of its concealment: “Every being which we 
encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of 
presencing, and in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a 
concealment. The clearing in which it stands is in itself at the same 
time concealment”.583
Gerald Bruns points out in his study on Heidegger, Modern
Poetry and the Idea of Language, that in comparison to the early 
Heidegger, for the later Heidegger after Being and Time the function 
of language is not a “revelation of Being” but rather its withdrawal, 
“letting be of things”, or “speaking that disrupts signification”.584
Blanchot, however, seems to base his criticism mostly on Being and 
Time, The Origin of the Work of Art, The Letter on Humanism and The 
Ground of Reason.
As I propose, Blanchot’s criticism of Heidegger seems to 
follow Levinas’s early interpretation according to which Heidegger’s 
thinking is ultimately more towards the affirmation of the totality of 
Being than towards the affirmation of exteriority. For Levinas, 
Heidegger’s ontological difference remains also violent against the 
singularity of existents, or of singular beings: Levinas accuses 
Heidegger for privileging the universality of Being over the 
singularity of the personal other. Analogically, Blanchot says that the 
privilege Heidegger gives to the truth of Being precludes him from 
taking into account the special characteristics of language. Blanchot 
claims – if I have understood him right – that although Heidegger 
opposes poetry to philosophy in the traditional sense, he still regards 
poetry as a way of thinking of the truth.
In analysing Levinas’s early work in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” Derrida shows that Levinas’s accusation of the 
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totalizing tendency of Heidegger’s philosophy is ultimately not 
justified. In Heidegger’s ontology, Being does not subsume or efface 
the existent, because in Heidegger there is no Being without the 
existent; it is not possible to imagine Being without beings because 
Being always appears as the Being of beings. If we accept Derrida’s 
criticism of Levinas’s reading of Heidegger, as I do, Blanchot’s 
accusation of the totalizing tendency of Heidegger’s philosophy also 
seems groundless. However, although I can admit that Blanchot’s 
criticism of Heidegger is at some point baseless, his own point is in 
my opinion nevertheless clear: we should seek to define language in a 
way that would remain beyond the opposition between Being and non-
Being. This happens by turning from Being to writing.  
From Being to Writing 
Blanchot does not accuse Heidegger, as did Levinas, of forgetting 
ethics in his ontological philosophy. Blanchot remains, instead, 
skeptical as to whether Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology has 
found a language for speaking of the other, i.e., of exteriority. Despite 
its good intentions, Blanchot claims, Heidegger’s ontology has not 
found a language in which it would express its intentions without 
metaphysical presuppositions; as Blanchot writes, “the very language 
in which it [ontology] speaks remains a language that belongs to the 
domain of what is. This supposed ontology is thereby formulated in 
the language of metaphysics.”585
Blanchot claims that Heidegger’s difficulty finding non-
metaphysical language emerges in his effort to replace the 
metaphysically problematic notion of seeing with the notion of 
hearing (hören). In The Infinite Conversation Blanchot’s term for the 
narrative voice (le voix narrative) challenges Heidegger’s notion of 
“hearing”: whereas hearing entails an allusion to someone (Dasein) 
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who hears, the term “voice” refers to writing itself. In Blanchot’s 
interpretation, Heidegger claims that the being of the other must be 
heard in speech, since in order to catch what remains beyond the 
whole of being it is not enough to make a question of the being of the 
other. As Blanchot interprets it, Heidegger thinks that the question of 
being must be “transmitted to us by way of voice.” In his 
interpretation, for Heidegger only “hearing is authentic”586:
Heidegger says initially: “questioning is the piety of thought”; he 
then takes back his assertion and later substitutes another for it: 
questioning is not what authentically bears thought, only hearing is 
authentic, the fact of hearing the saying wherein what must come 
into question announces itself. A decisive remark. It signifies: (a) 
that the question of being is not authentic, at least is not the most 
authentic question inasmuch as it is still a question; (b) that in 
whatever manner we question being, this question must have 
announced itself as speech, and that this speech must have 
announced itself, been transmitted to us by way of the voice; (c) 
that only hearing is authentic and not questioning.587
Blanchot’s criticism is directed to Heidegger’s identification of 
speaking with listening.588 In “The Most Profound Question”, he pays 
attention to the metaphysical presuppositions Heidegger’s notion of 
hearing bears: does not Heidegger with the notion of hearing privilege 
presence in a similar way as the history of metaphysics does in 
privileging vision? Doesn’t hearing remain, despite Heidegger’s 
criticism of the visually informed theoria, tied to the metaphysics of 
presence? Is not hearing in Heidegger “hearing that looks”?  
As an example of Heidegger’s ontology formulated in the 
language of metaphysics, Blanchot cites Heidegger writing in The 
Essence of Reason that “to hear is to seize by sight, to enter into 
586
 EI 33, IC 439. 
587
 IC 439, n. 3. 
588
 In The Way to Language (“Der Weg zur Sprache”) Heidegger explains the 
connection between speaking and listening in the following way: “Speaking is 
listening to the language we speak […] a listening not while but before we are 
speaking […] We do not merely speak the language – we speak by way of it. We can 
do so solely because we always have already listened to the language. What do we 
hear there? We hear language speaking (das Sprechen der Sprache)” (US 254, OWL 
123-24).  
196
seeing” (entendre, c’est saisir par la vue, entrer dans le voir”).589
From the idea that “to hear is to seize by sight” it follows in turn that 
“thought is an appearing by hearing that apprehends by looking”590
which in Blanchot’s reading corresponds to Heidegger’s idea that 
“Being is shining”. He writes:591
In The Essence of Reason, Heidegger says: Man speaks only when 
he responds to language according to what is meted out. But in the 
same work, he says that to hear is to seize by sight, to enter into 
seeing; “in Greek thought to say signifies to bring to show, to make 
a thing appear in the figure that is proper to it, to show it in the 
manner in which it regards us, and this is why, saying it, we see 
(understand) it clearly.” […] This corresponds to the idea that 
“being is shining.” Hence the inordinate privilege accorded to 
sight: a privilege originally and implicitly presupposed not only by 
all metaphysics, but by all ontology (and, needless to add, all 
phenomenology), and according to which everything that is 
thought, everything that is said, has as its measure light or the 
absence of light (“tout ce qui se pense, tout ce qui se dit a pour 
mesure la lumière ou l’absence de lumière”).592
For Blanchot, Heidegger’s formulation that “to hear is to seize by 
sight, to enter into seeing” signifies that Heidegger is not taking 
seriously enough his own terminology in order to be able to recognize 
its metaphysical presuppositions. Heidegger’s ontology – and with it 
all ontology and all phenomenology – ends up with the same 
“inordinate privilege accorded to sight”, for which Heidegger himself 
had blamed the tradition of metaphysics.  
In my view, taking into account Heidegger’s disapproval of the 
privilege given in the metaphysical tradition to seeing over the other 
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senses, one has good reason to ask, as Blanchot does, why is it that 
Heidegger still wants to speak of language in terms of “light”, “truth”, 
“revealing” and “seeing”?593 It is interesting to note that Being and 
Time already is embedded with terms relating to seeing and looking; 
eventually all the elements that somehow constitute Dasein’s Being 
are described with vocabulary more or less related to seeing. Despite 
Heidegger’s ontological determination of these terms, one can wonder 
why he chooses to speak of poetry as the way to “reveal the truth” of 
Being and of Being as the “light of Being”, as he at the same time 
underlines the problematic nature of these metaphysically loaded 
terms. As Blanchot concludes, “one of the traits of philosophy as it 
manifests itself in Heidegger can be expressed in this way: Heidegger 
is essentially a writer, and therefore also responsible for a writing that 
is compromised (this is even one of the measures of his political 
responsibility).”594 As Blanchot concludes in a footnote of his essay 
“The Most Profound Question”, Heidegger’s ontology “has not found 
a language in which it can be said; the very language in which it 
speaks remains a language that belongs to the domain of what is. This 
supposed ontology is thereby formulated in the language of 
metaphysics.”595 One could also cite the rude words of the anonymous 
speaker from Blanchot’s philosophical dialogue “Speaking Is Not 
Seeing”: “Despite your efforts to avoid having to evoke light in 
speaking of the obscure, I cannot help but refer everything you say 
back to day as the sole measure.”596
As discussed, Blanchot criticizes the correspondence 
Heidegger in his interpretation makes between Sein and Dasein. For 
Blanchot, it seems to me, Heidegger’s mistake is to think of language 
as revealing, hearing or appearing in the sense of making something 
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appear as something to Dasein. In The Infinite Conversation, where 
Blanchot turns from language to writing, he seems to replace the 
notion of both Being and language with that of “fragmentary 
writing”.597 In so doing, Blanchot announces explicitly that the notion 
of writing alone is for him able to question those prejudices and 
oppositions that follow from the dominance of seeing and light. To 
challenge the metaphysical distinctions does not succeed in the 
context of Being but in the context of writing as neutral, since only 
the neutrality of writing by its nature deconstructs all metaphysical 
oppositions. Blanchot argues in his essay entitled “The Narrative 
Voice (the ‘he,’ the neutral)” in the following way:  
Neutral speech does not reveal, it does not conceal. This does not 
mean that it signifies nothing (by claiming to abdicate sense in the 
form of non-sense); it means that the neutral does not signify in the 
same way as the visible-invisible does, but rather opens another 
power in language, one that is alien to the power of illuminating (or 
obscuring), or comprehension (or miscomprehension). It does not 
signify in the optical manner; it remains outside the light-shadow 
reference that seems to be the ultimate reference of all knowledge 
and all communication, to the point of making us forget that it only 
has the value of a venerable, that is to say inveterate, metaphor.598
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In The Infinite Conversation Blanchot also claims that the notion 
ofwriting challenges Heidegger’s idea of meaning as appearing 
(l’Apparaître) which only establishes a connection between meaning 
and seeing in a way that makes a concession to the “ontological 
logos”599: “Writing conceives of itself on the basis neither of vocal nor 
of visible manifestation, these being merely opposed through a 
complicitous opposition of what is roused where Appearing reigns as 
meaning, and light as presence: the pure visibility is also pure 
audibility. And this is why Heidegger, in his faithful belonging to the 
ontological logos, can still affirm that thought is a seizing by hearing 
that seizes by the way of the gaze” (“la pensée est une saisie par 
l’ouïe qui saisit par le regard” )600.
As an alternative to the metaphysical idea of language 
Blanchot proposes the idea of language as writing, i.e., the idea of 
“speech” as language that is “in advance always already written”.601
With writing it would become possible to get beyond both Hegel’s 
dialectics (and the idea of being as Totality) and Heidegger’s ontology 
(and the idea of language as Being): “[T]hrough the exigency of 
speech that is in advance always already written, it may be that an 
entirely different relation announces itself – a relation that challenges 
the notion of being as continuity or as a unity or gathering of beings; a 
relation that would except itself from the problematic of being and 
would pose a question that is not one of being. Thus, in this 
questioning, we would leave dialectics, but also ontology.”602
In Blanchot’s philosophical dialogue entitled “Speaking is not 
Seeing” the speaker explains that he is searching for “a speech such 
that to speak would no longer be to unveil with light.”603 The 
conversation goes as follows: 
“Speaking frees thought from the optical imperative that in the 
Western tradition, for thousands of years, has subjugated our 
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approach to things, and induced us to think under the guaranty of 
light or under the threat of its absence. I’ll let you count all the 
words through which it is suggested that, to speak truly, one must 
think according to the measure of the eye.”  
“You don’t wish to oppose one sense to another, hearing to sight?”  
“I would not fall into that trap.”  
“Especially since writing – which is your own way, and no doubt 
the first way – would be lacking to you in this case”. 604
Later in the essay entitled “Atheism and Writing. Humanism and the 
Cry” Blanchot explains why it is not possible to reduce writing to 
hearing:  
Writing is not speaking. This brings us back to the other exclusion: 
speaking is not seeing, and thus leads to rejecting everything – 
hearing or vision – that would define the act that is at stake in 
writing as the immediate seizing of a presence, be it of interiority 
or exteriority. The break required by writing is a break with thought 
that gives itself as an immediate proximity; it is also a break with 
all empirical experience of the world. In this sense, writing also 
entails a rupture with all present consciousness, it being already 
engaged in the experience of the non-manifest or the unknown 
(understood as neutral).605
In Blanchot’s words, language understood as always already written, 
“has ever and always, nonetheless never now, broken with language, 
whether it be a discourse that is spoken or written.” He continues with
a performative: “Let us admit what this rupture entails: a rupture with 
language as that which represents, and with language understood as 
that which receives and gives meaning; therefore also with this 
composite of the signifying-signified which today has replaced, in the 
distinctions of linguistics (already outmoded, it is true), the old 
division of form and formulated; a duality always ready to become 
unified and such that the first term receives its primacy only by 
immediately restoring it to the second term into which it necessarily 
changes.”606
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Blanchot’s thesis is as follows: Only in taking writing as the 
starting point in analysing language it is possible to get rid of the 
metaphysical assumption of meaning as presence, as well as beyond 
the metaphysical distinctions between Being and non-Being, light and 
darkness, truth and non-truth, violence and non-violence, and sensible 
and non-sensible. The neutral in Blanchot is not Being or non-Being, 
but both at the same time.  
In my analysis, however, the purpose of Blanchot’s 
fragmentary writing is not to be a new ‘hyper concept’ into which 
Being and non-Being as well as all the other metaphysical oppositions 
could be reduced. Taking fragmentary writing as a starting point is 
thinking without a presupposing of a totality, a ground or an origin. Or 
as Mark Taylor suggests, thinking without presupposing an origin or a 
ground of being, demands us “to think otherwise by learning to write 
differently”. From this follows the question, “How to do nothing with 
words?”607 Taylor argues, “Different philosophical and theological 
positions represent contrasting accounts of the original ground from 
which everything emerges and to which (the) all returns. The ground 
is always the ground of being – even when the notion of being is not 
explicitly invoked or appears in the guise of a being rather than being 
as such. Being, moreover, is that which is present. To be is to be 
present, though presence need not always be immediately present. If 
being is primal, everything else is secondary or derivative.”608 As I 
proposed at the beginning of this study, the starting point of 
Blanchot’s analysis of language is the same as Heidegger’s: to 
challenge the tradition of Western metaphysics which “attempts to 
comprehend everything by returning all things to their origin”.609 In 
my analysis, Blanchot’s thesis is that his concept of the neuter 
succeeds is this aim better than Heidegger’s notion of Being.  
For Blanchot, writing in its essence opposes the primal values 
of phenomenology, i.e., “The visible, the evident, elucidation, ideality, 
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the superior light of logic – or, through a simple reversal, the invisible, 
the indistinct, the illogical or silent sedimentation.”610 Blanchot speaks 
of the “exigency of writing” which demands that we give up the 
notion of writing “that has always (through a necessity in no way 
avoidable) been in the service of the speech or thought that is called 
idealist (that is to say, moralizing).” Instead of this metaphysical 
notion of writing we should admit about the idea of writing “that 
through its own slowly liberated force (the aleatory force of absence) 
it seems to devote itself solely to itself as something that remains 
without identity, and little by little brings forth possibilities that are 
entirely other: an anonymous, distracted, deferred, and dispersed way 
of being in relation, by which anything is put into question.”611
Fragmentary Writing 
The drive to totality is striving to form a whole circle: if the human 
eye (as the eye of the intellect) is the first circle, then the world as a 
total circle (the all-seeing eye of the Absolute) is the final vision that 
is attained through the procession of temporal horizons. The world as 
a totality or a whole is seeing without limitations. However, if 
thinking is not seeing but rather seeing and non-seeing, the idea of the 
literary work as a visually formed whole is also challenged. In The 
Infinite Conversation, the idea of the literary work as a whole is 
opposed by the notion of “fragmentary writing” (l’écriture 
fragmentaire, la parole fragmentaire, la parole de fragment). In my 
analysis, fragmentary writing puts the emphasis on language as 
textuality which Heidegger in Blanchot’s interpretation neglects. 
Blanchot’s later fragmentary essays from the 1960s onwards 
can be interpreted as radical repudiations of phenomenological 
perception as such: by challenging the idea of language as seeing, 
revealing, representing and thinking, they question the power of vision 
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and perception, and aim to fill the needs of “less violent language”, to 
which Heidegger already aimed with his idea of art as a way of 
aletheic seeing, and to which Derrida famously refers in his analysis 
of Levinas’s thinking in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics”. In The
Infinite Conversation, if compared to The Space of literature, the 
starting point is not a literary work but non-uniform, fragmentary 
writing, which nevertheless comes close to what Blanchot intends 
earlier with his concept of désœuvrement.
Although the distinction between fictional narration and 
philosophical discourse is challenged in Blanchot’s work from the 
beginning, in his later work the distinction between these two genres 
seems finally to disappear. From 1960s onwards, Blanchot adopts the 
fragmentary manner of writing which characterizes his writings 
collected in The Infinite Conversation, Awaiting Oblivion (L’Attente 
l’oublie, 1962), The Step Not Beyond (Le pas au-delà, 1971) and The 
Writing of the Disaster (L’Ècriture du désastre, 1980). These 
collections, though not fictional texts in a traditional sense, contain 
extensive fictional passages, questioning the distinctive line between 
discursive and narrative prose. As I argued in my analysis of 
Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death”, this is what Blanchot 
aims to do from the beginning.  
As is clear, the form of fragmentary writing questions the 
ideals of scientific writing – clarity, coherence, continuity, linearity, 
etc. Needless perhaps to say, this fragmentary writing does not seek to 
end up to a totality that would reconcile all impasses and 
contradictions the writer might have had in writing. To the contrary, 
the fragmentary, discontinuous and consciously temporal form of 
writing questions the possibility of writing to achieve a totality of any 
kind. As such, the notion of fragmentary writing challenges the 
metaphysical idea of form. Blanchot’s fragmentary dialogues do not 
represent conversations with a beginning and an end, but rather the 
event or process of dialogue that continues infinitely, i.e., writing in 
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its infinite incompleteness as désœuvrement.612 One could say that 
Blanchot’s fragmentary writing aims to fill the needs of “less violent 
language”, to which also Heidegger’s idea of art as a way of aletheic
seeing aimed, but without the presupposition of the truth which with 
language could be achieved.613
Derrida suggests in Margins of Philosophy that the 
metaphysics of presence can be traced back to Plato’s emphasis on 
form. As Derrida reminds, the etymology of the notion eidos refers 
back to the theme of presence: “All the concepts by means of which 
eidos or morph? have been translated or determined refer to the theme 
of presence in general. Form is presence itself. Formality is whatever 
aspect of the thing in general that presents itself, lets itself be seen, 
gives itself to thought. That metaphysical thought – and consequently 
phenomenology – is a thought of Being as form, that in metaphysics 
thought thinks of itself as a thought of form, and the formality of 
form, is nothing but what is necessary; a last sign of this can be seen 
in the fact that Husserl determines the living present (lebendige
Gegenwart).614
The dominant textual ‘form’ of the essays in The Infinite 
Conversation is that of a dialogue, where philosophical discussion 
moves back and forth without pre-determined concepts and without a 
final conclusion. The anonymous speakers in these essays do not 
assert; they rather ask, ponder, blunder, and listen to each other’s 
questions: in its “infinite” dialogues they participate in the same event 
of conversation, or in a philosophical or literary community, which is 
not based on sight, but rather on listening to – and reading – the 
movement of endless conversation. As Timothy Clark says, dialogue 
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in Blanchot is an “implicit model of community”, which gives it “a 
certain ethical force”. In his later work, The Writing of the Disaster, a
collection of philosophical fragments, Blanchot writes of the gift the 
poem brings to thought – a “ruinous” or “disastrous” fragment that 
breaks linear thinking.  
Although Blanchot in The Infinite Conversation condemns 
Heidegger’s language for being the language of metaphysics, it is 
evident that the dialogue form of his essays in The Infinite 
Conversation has its model in Heidegger’s philosophical dialogues. 
The following excerpt is from Heidegger’s Conversation on a Country 
Path (1959):
SCIENTIST: Then we can’t really describe what we have named. 
TEACHER: Any description would reify it. Nevertheless it lets 
itself be named, and being named it can be thought about… 
SCHOLAR: …only if thinking is no longer re-presentation. 
SCIENTIST: But what else could it be? 
TEACHER: Perhaps we now are close to being released into the 
nature of thinking. 
SCHOLAR: … through waiting for its nature. 
TEACHER: Waiting, all right; but never awaiting, for awaiting 
already links itself with re-resenting and what is re-presented. 
SCHOLAR: Waiting, however, lets go of that; or rather, I should 
say that waiting lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really has no 
object. SCIENTIST: Yet if we wait we always wait for something. 
SCHOLAR: Certainly, but as soon as we re-present to ourselves 
and fix upon that for which we wait, we really wait no longer.615
In his study Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. Sources of Derrida’s 
notion and practice of literature, Timothy Clark argues that the 
dialogue form in Heidegger, Blanchot and Derrida expose the limits of 
philosophical models of coherence.616 In Clarks view, what makes 
dialogue ethical is that it necessarily embodies an event, which gives 
power to the “midwifery of new, unanticipated ideas”. In Clark’s 
interpretation, dialogue is an implicit model of community, which 
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gives it a certain ethical force. As his words, a form of heteronomic 
philosophical writing engages otherness in writing in a way that is 
“inaccessible to theoretical texts”.617
If in realistic prose, where sentences only express thoughts, 
language is like a transparent window, which does not show its own 
material, fragmentary poetry is more like a broken and opaque 
window, which questions its own ability to express thoughts with 
language. By making vision textual Blanchot’s writing resists and 
questions the metaphysics of presence upon which, as Heidegger 
shows, the dominance of vision is grounded. In Blanchot’s essay 
“Speaking Is Not Seeing”, one of the speakers says that he would at 
least want that “we not give ourselves in language a view that is 
surreptitiously corrected, hypocritically extended, deceiving.”618
Fragmentary dialogue breaks the argumentative line of 
assertative conversation, and thus defies the idea of the whole both 
visually and logically. One can also say that it questions the idea of 
language as “seeing” or thinking of the hermeneutical whole. As 
Blanchot writes later in The Writing of the Disaster, “fragmentation is 
the pulling to pieces (the tearing) of that which never has pre-existed 
(really or ideally) as a whole, nor can it ever be reassembled in any 
future presence whatever.”619 One could claim that whereas Heidegger 
made vision hermeneutical, in Blanchot vision is made textual. In 
Blanchot’s words, fragmentary writing, “withdrawing from discourse 
any power to totalize, assigns it to multiple regions; a plurality that 
does not tend to unity (be it vain) nor is constructed with relation to 
unity – as lying to its hither side or beyond – but that has always 
already set it aside.”620
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Fragmentary writing is also fragmentary thinking, the 
“madness of the day”, “la folie du jour”, to cite the title of Blanchot’s 
late story from 1973. Although fragmentary writing is “ruinous”, as 
Blanchot puts it in his late collection of essays The Writing of the 
Disaster, a fragment (a sentence, for instance) is not a part of a larger 
philosophical system, neither is it a past or a future whole.621 As an 
anonymous speaker says in “Speaking is not Seeing”, “To write is not 
to give speech to be seen. The game of common etymology makes of 
writing a cutting movement, a tear, a crisis”, which is “simply a 
reminder that the proper tool for writing was also proper for incising: 
the stylet.” Writing is “a cutting operation, if not a butchery: a kind of 
violence.” 622 Fragmentary writing is “disastrous”, i.e. based on a 
“disaster”. (In Blanchot désastre refers also to “desire” or 
“destruction” of stars, i.e., it does not mean ascension to heights where 
one would possess a larger vision and understanding, but rather the 
destruction and fragmentation of all thinking.  
The literary tradition into which Blanchot relates the 
fragmentary writing is Jena romanticism. In The Infinite Conversation,
he refers to the “discontinuous form” of Jena romanticism as a way of 
writing that is able to overlap discourse and silence.623 However, as 
Bruns notes, for Blanchot the mistake of the romantics was that they 
wanted to “reduce madness to a style”.624 As Bruns argues, for 
Blanchot, “The fragment, after all, is not the expression of madness, 
as if madness or the fragment) were the disintegration, lack, or 
negation of something. Whatever it is, madness is outside affirmation 
and negation; neither discourse nor silence, neither system nor 
incoherence”.625 For Blanchot, I would add, fragmentary writing is not 
621
 In The Writing of the Disastre, Blanchot writes: “Le fragmentation, marque 
d’une coherence d’autant plus ferme qu’il lui faudrait se défaire pour s’atteindre, 
nor par un système disperse, ni la dispersion comme système; mais la mise en pieces 
(le déchirement) de ce qui n’a jamais préexisté (réellement ou idèalement) comme 
ensemble, ni advantage ne pourra se rassembler dans quelque presence d’avenir 
que ce soit. L’espacement d’une temporalisation qui ne saisit – fallacieusement – 
que comme absence du temps” (ED 99).  
622
 IC 28. 
623
 IC 358, EI 526.  
624
 Bruns 1997, 149.  
625
 Bruns 1997, 149.  
208
self-expression. As he argues: “In truth and particularly in the case of 
Friedrich Schlegel, the fragment often seems a means for 
complacently abandoning oneself to the self rather than an attempt to 
elaborate a more rigorous mode of writing. Then to write 
fragmentarily is simply to welcome one’s own disorder, to close up 
upon one’s own self in a contended isolation, and thus to refuse the 
opening that the fragmentary exigency represents; an exigency that 
does not exclude totality, but goes beyond it”.626
Fragmentation is violence not only to language and thought but 
also to vision. In “Speaking Is Not Seeing”, the anonymous speaker 
confesses that he is seeking a speech with which we would arrive at a 
mode of “manifestation that would not be one of unveiling-veiling. 
Here what reveals itself does not give itself up to sight, just as it does 
not take refuge in simple invisibility.”627 Also the experience of 
fascination challenges the idea of language as seeing or revealing: 
fascination is not seeing in which a specific object is seen or not seen. 
Rather, fascination “implies a reversal to the possibility of seeing.”628
The Narrative Voice – Writing Otherwise Than Seeing  
In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot introduces not only the concept 
of fragmentary writing but also the concept of writing as the “neutral”. 
According to Blanchot, writing as neutrality is grounded neither on 
hearing nor on vision. Although language as sound or as written marks 
is always materiality, and although poetical writing has the ability to 
seduce with its optical properties, neutral (or fragmentary) writing 
cannot be reduced to its materiality either. If language is in advance 
“always already written”629, i.e., based on the materiality and 
iterability of words, it is also temporal, and as temporal, non-visible 
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and visible at the same time. In his later work Friendship (L’Amité, 
1971) Blanchot writes,  
To write under the pressure of the neuter: to write as if in the 
direction of the unknown. This does not mean to speak the 
unspeakable, to recount the unrecountable, to remember the 
immemorable, but to prepare language for a radical and discreet 
mutation, as can be foreseen if we recall the following statement 
that I will be content to repeat: the unknown as the neuter, whether 
it is, whether it is not, could not find its determination there, but 
only insofar as the relation to the unknown is the relation that light 
will not open, that the absence of light will not close – a neuter 
relation; which means that to think in the neuter is to think, that is 
to write while turning away from all that is visible and all that is 
invisible. 630
Blanchot cuts the neuter off from the category of presence which the 
tradition of metaphysics in Heidegger’s interpretation has attached to 
Being: writing as the neuter is not Being, neither is it non-Being, since 
it is nothing that “is”. As I interpret Blanchot to say, we should not 
think of the neuter as a structure which has a relation to Being as 
Heidegger understands it. In my view Blanchot claims that the notion 
of writing can challenge the metaphysics of presence only if it has not 
been understood as secondary or derivative to Being.  
Since for Blanchot the function of literature is not to make the 
unthought manifest but rather to let it disappear at the moment of its 
appearing, the neutral is not appearance, nor should language as 
neutrality be understood as a way of communicating pre-existing 
meanings. In my view, Blanchot’s definition of the neutral as 
something which neither reveals nor conceals opposes both Hegel’s 
idea of naming as the revelation of being and Heidegger’s view of a 
work of art as the revelation of truth as aletheia.631 Between Hegel’s 
notion of language as negativity and Heidegger’s notion of naming as 
creating Being there is a third way of “saying that would say being 
without saying it, and yet without denying it either.”632
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To the concept of fragmentary or neutral writing is related the 
notion of the narrative voice. With the “narrative voice”, claims 
Blanchot, it is “no longer a question of vision”.633 Unlike a 
hermeneutical vision, the narrative voice is not tied to a single place or 
a fixed centre.634 Blanchot proposes that the narrative voice governs 
the stories that do not follow the rule of aesthetic disinterestedness, 
which has been “an essential category in the judgement of taste since 
Kant and even Aristotle”. Blanchot’s example is Kafka: in his stories 
the writer’s and the reader’s distance from the work turn into the 
distance in the work itself, where it appears of the form of “irreducible 
strangeness”.635
In a classic story governed by an aesthetic distance, the author 
keeps his distance from the work, from which it follows that the 
reader or the spectator can do the same: “The ideal is still the form of 
representation of classical theatre: the narrator is there only to raise 
the curtain. The play is performed on the stage, from time immemorial 
and as though without him; he does not tell, he shows, and the reader 
does not read, he looks, attending, taking part without 
participating.”636 In Flaubert’s stories, governed by the rule of 
impersonality, “to tell is to show, to let be or to make exist”.637
In contrast to the storytelling of Flaubert, the narrator of 
Thomas Mann (who knows that his readers have lost their naïveté) 
constantly breaks the rule of non-intervention by involving himself in 
what he is telling. Mann makes of the aesthetic illusion his game, 
plays with it, and makes it so visible that the reader also becomes 
drawn into the game. In this way, says Blanchot, Thomas Mann 
succeeds in restoring a “feast of narrative illusion”: “if aesthetic 
distance is denounced in his work, it is also proclaimed, affirmed by a 
narrative consciousness that takes place as a theme, whereas in the 
633
 IC 384. 
634
 IC 386-7. The concepts of the “narrative voice” and the “neutral” are close to 
each other, but as Blanchot explains, the narrative voice encompasses or “bears” the 
neutral, which wants to say that the realm of the narrative voice is neutral. 
635
 IC 383. 
636
 IC 382. 
637
 IC 382. 
211
more traditional impersonal novel it disappeared, placing itself in 
parenthesis.”638
However, in the story governed by the narrative voice the 
distance is no longer between the reader and the story, but becomes, in 
a similar way to the experience of fascination, the object and the 
substance of the narrative. In this kind of narrative it is not possible 
for the reader to maintain the role of the disinterested spectator: the 
reader “is no longer allowed to look at things afar, to keep between 
things and himself the distance that belongs to the gaze, because the 
distant in its non-present presence is not available either close up or 
from afar; it cannot be the object of the gaze. Henceforth it is no 
longer a question of vision.”639
Or as the narrator of Thomas the Obscure tells us: “It was a 
story of emptied events, emptied to the point that every memory and 
all perspective were eliminated, and nevertheless drawing from this 
absence its inflexible direction which seemed to carry everything 
away in the irresistible movement toward an imminent catastrophe. 
What was going to happen? She did not know, but devoting her entire 
life to waiting, her impatience melted into the hope of participating in 
a general cataclysm in which, at the same time as the beings 
themselves, the distances which separate beings would be 
destroyed.”640 In contrast to the narrative of Flaubert, governed by 
aesthetic disinterestedness, in the narration of Kafka – and of Blanchot 
himself – narration no longer presents “something to be seen through 
the intermediary of, and from the viewpoint of, a chosen actor-
spectator.”641
Although both the “narrative voice” and the “neutral” 
substitute the notion of a subject, neither of them simply takes the 
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“place traditionally occupied by a subject”. First of all the narrative 
voice “modifies what we mean by place: a fixed location, unique or 
determined by its placement”.642 The experience of the neutral affects 
our relation to the text in a similar way as the experience of 
fascination: the distance is no longer between the reader and the text, 
but in the text itself as its profundity and indeterminate meaning. It is 
not experienced as a whole or as a structure with a centre, nor does the 
narrative voice create a centre or speak out of a centre; in contrast, it 
prevents the work from having a centre. As such, it challenges the 
hermeneutical idea of the interpreted text as a whole.643
Neither does Blanchot substitute the writing subject with the 
characters of the story: as he says, the narrative event cannot be 
reduced to the analysis of “the use of personal pronouns in the 
story”.644 One could also interpret the narrative voice as Blanchot’s 
effort to speak of the narrative world without the “conventional 
psychology” that he criticized Sartre’s Nausea of.645 In Blanchot’s 
words, the narrative voice speaking in the text does not “designate 
another me”, nor “aesthetic disinterestedness” – it is not “that impure 
contemplative pleasure that allows the reader and the spectator to 
participate in the tragedy through distraction”. What therefore remains 
to be discovered, says Blanchot, “is what is at stake when writing 
responds to the demands of this uncharacterizable ‘he’.”646 As I 
interpret Blanchot to say, we have to ask who comes after the subject: 
what or who is the neutral voice that speaks in the text?  
That the neutral voice is “neutral in the decisive sense” wants 
to say that it is not the voice of the character, nor the voice of the 
author, nor the voice of Levinas’s Other, but rather another voice, the 
voice that is anonymous, impersonal, and does not belong to anybody. 
The otherness of which Blanchot speaks is not otherness that first of 
all would be “otherwise than being”, since the otherness of writing is 
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beyond the opposition Being/non-Being. For Blanchot, the otherness 
of writing is not otherness brought first of all in the realm of ethics, 
either. It is rather otherness that is, as I propose, “otherwise than 
seeing”. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues that the relation to the 
other is not a relation of knowledge; ethics is “Autrement que savoir”.
The absolute alterity is “an exteriority which can be neither derived, 
nor engendered, nor constituted on the basis of anything other than 
itself”.647 Levinas’s later book Autrement qu’Être (Otherwise than 
Being, 1974) which has been read as a response to Derrida’s critical 
reading in “Violence and Metaphysics”, seeks to describe the ethical 
relation to the other in a language that would break free from the 
violence of ontology. Language is here no longer reducible to 
propositional form. Levinas makes a distinction between the Saying 
and the Said, which could be seen as somewhat analogous to 
Blanchot’s early distinction between two sides of language in 
“Literature and the Right to Death”. The difference between the 
Saying (Dire) and the Said (le Dit) corresponds to a difference 
between ethical language and the logical construction of identity, or 
the distinction “between the kind of speech that foregrounds the 
relation to its addressee, and a denotative speaking that absorbs 
alterity into thematization”.648 The goal of Levinas is to pass 
discursively to what is other than being, even if, as Jill Robbins 
interprets, “such effort always risks falling into a being otherwise, that 
is, into a modality of being”.649
In Otherwise than Being the intention of Levinas’s ethics is to 
be something other than Heidegger’s ontology, which according to 
him fails to do justice to the otherness of the Other. Whereas 
Heidegger’s primal question concerned our possibility to remain open 
with regards to the openness of Being, Levinas seeks a way to 
encounter the other beyond the metaphysical vocabulary of ontology. 
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Derrida, especially in his later essays on Levinas, focuses on a certain 
syntax that permits Levinas to say “the otherwise than being” and to 
protect its ontological insecurity. In Otherwise than Being Levinas 
asks: “Is it necessary and is it possible that the saying on the other side 
be thematized, that is, manifest itself, that it enter into a proposition 
and a book?” And he answers: “It is necessary. The responsibility for 
another is precisely a saying prior to anything said. The surprising 
saying which is a responsibility for another is against ‘the winds and 
tides’ of being, is an interruption of essence, a disinterestedness 
imposed with a good violence”.650 This saying must be fixed as a 
philosophy that “makes this astonishing adventure (…) intelligible”.651
In Levinas’s “good violence” one can hear an allusion not only to 
Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics” but also to Blanchot’s idea of 
language as our only “hope”. 
As Blanchot writes in The Infinite Conersation, writing is “not 
yet a gaze”, which means also that it is “otherwise than seeing”: for 
Blanchot, the anonymous consciousness of language, its way to be 
“consciousness without anyone being conscious” which means that it 
is not tied to a singular meaning giving consciousness, makes of 
writing something other than “seeing”, if seeing is defined as 
objectifying and knowing in the presence of an object. Language as 
neutrality is Blanchot’s answer to the question Derrida posed in 
“Violence and Metaphysics”: If language as light is violence of the 
day, and if non-language as silence is the realm of the night and of the 
insignificant, would it be possible to imagine language that would 
remain outside this metaphysical opposition? For Blanchot, writing as 
neutrality is not pure visibility or invisibility, not pure seeing or non-
seeing, but is beyond these metaphysical opposites. 
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Language as the Other 
In her study L’être et le neutre à partir de Maurice Blanchot, Marlène 
Zarader claims that Blanchot ends up, with his concept of “the 
neutral” to “think of the impossible”.  In Zarader’s analysis, Blanchot 
proceeds in The Infinite Conversation from literature to thinking. 
Before this, exteriority had, in Blanchot’s work, been “under the 
shelter of literature”. From now on, the poet who “lives in language” 
finds from language “a shelter” for his experiences. For Zarader, 
Blanchot’s defence of exteriority remains contradictory: according to 
her analysis, Blanchot claims to “think” of that which by definition 
cannot be thought (“penser le interdit”), to name that which cannot be 
named, and to say something of the “unsayable”. As Zarader reminds 
us, if exteriority is something that remains beyond all knowledge and 
vision and shatters the power of a conscious subject, we should not be 
able to think of it. For Zarader, “Blanchot’s lesson” is that one must 
“be faithful” to the experience of the night, since only by being “a 
guardian” of his experience does a poet remain faithful to the 
experience of the other, which Blanchot names the experience of the 
neutre.
Although I am in agreement with Zarader’s interpretation, 
according to which the unnameable in Blanchot is the other which can 
only be encountered in language, I disagree with her claim that 
Blanchot would prepare us to think of the other with his concept of the 
neuter. In Blanchot, writing does not seek to be thinking about 
anything, if by thinking we mean an act which has an object existing 
prior to this act (the night, for instance) or an object which should be 
attained during this act (the experience of the other night in 
literature).652 Although I agree with Zarader’s interpretation according 
to which Blanchot asks if it is possible to remain faithful to the 
experience of exteriority and at the same time avoid transforming this 
experience to a figure of the mind, I disagree with her claim that 
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Blanchot would, from The Infinite Conversation onwards, think of this 
experience using the concept of the neuter. In his practice of writing 
Blanchot does not end in naming the other, as Zarader claims; instead 
he creates a “heteronomic” style of writing that does not lean against 
the representative notion of language, and that understands language 
as the space of alterity.  
I am not proposing that with his concept of the neuter Blanchot 
would oppose literature to thinking and to philosophy: as I will claim, 
for Blanchot, writing as neutrality challenges all metaphysical 
oppositions, and among them is unquestionably the opposition 
between thinking/non-thinking, seeing/non-seeing. As Blanchot 
writes, with the neutral voice the “reign of circumspect consciousness 
[…] has been subtly shaken, without, of course, coming to en end.”653
As I interpret it, henceforth it is no longer a question of seeing, or of 
not-seeing, but of writing otherwise than seeing.  
In opposition to Zarader, I have claimed that Blanchot does not 
name the other, although he speaks of language as neutral, as image, 
as unworking, and as the third. For Blanchot, it is not the written (or 
“the Said”, le Dit, as Levinas would say) but rather that which has 
been left unwritten, that is decisive in the encounter with the textual 
other. For Blanchot, the ambiguity of literary language is not 
something that could be comprehended by returning it to some origin, 
i.e., the writer or the reader. This is also what Derrida notes in his 
essay “Violence and Metaphysics”. In analysing Levinas’s way to 
determine the other, Derrida refers to Blanchot’s disapproval of
Levinas’s theological vocabulary in defining the other, and thus 
implicitly to Blanchot’s way of leaving the other without definition. 
He then asks: “Independent of its ‘theological context’ […] does not 
this entire discourse collapse?”654 Isn’t it impossible to think of the 
other without a specific context?  
My central claim has been that for Blanchot the other can be 
spoken of only as exteriority and through exteriority; language does 
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not only “express” exteriority or “name” it after the experience of 
exteriority is over, but language is this exteriority. The question in 
Blanchot is thus not of the other of negative theology. If we define 
negative theology the way Derrida does in his essay “How to avoid 
speaking: denials”, it is not possible to situate Blanchot’s work under 
the loose heading of negative theology: we cannot find in his thinking 
the presupposition of the “hyperessentiality” of God, nor the promise 
of the immediacy of the mystical, silent union with the unspeakable 
(that one finds at work for example in Dionysius and in Meister 
Eckhart).655 Blanchot does not ask what is or is not beyond knowledge 
and language, but what and where is the limit of experience or how is 
this limit expressed in the “limit-experience” of literature.  
For Blanchot, the condition of writing is absence, the trace of 
the absent other, which every act of writing repeats. This structure of 
repetition, or the “structure of trace”, as Derrida calls it, is also the 
possibility of an experience of finitude, or of an experience in 
general.656 We can only desire someone or something that we do not 
possess. If there is a link between negative theology and Blanchot it is 
this essential absence, rather than the supposed hyperessentiality of 
which nothing can be said. As Derrida writes: “Perhaps there would 
be no prayer, no pure possibility of prayer, without what we glimpse 
as a menace or as a contamination: writing, the code, repetition, 
analogy or the – at least apparent – multiplicity of addresses, 
initiation. If there were a pure experience of prayer, would one need 
religion and affirmative or negative theologies? Would one need a 
supplement of prayer?”657
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The presence (silent union with the divine) is excluded from 
writing from the beginning, which is the paradox of language: our 
only possibility of approaching the absent, of reliving it, is to 
represent it in language which is a medium based on absence. For 
Blanchot, the nameless alterity is not something transcendental, but 
immanent in language itself. The movement of writing is without a 
controlling subjectivity, the presence of an author, be it God or the 
writer of the text. It is a nameless alterity,658 which Blanchot calls 
“neutrality”.659
In his article “How to do Nothing with Words”, in pondering 
the possibility of a third way to think of language which would remain 
beyond both its “constative” and “performative” function, Mark C. 
Taylor proposes that we should call this third possibility “parapraxis”.  
Language as parapraxis is drawn toward nothing, which however is 
not the nothing of negative theology. Taylor explains: “While negative 
theologians tend to regard nothing as the binary or dialectical opposite 
of being, the atheologian interprets nothing as neither being nor 
nonbeing. Parapraxis, therefore, is no more positive than negative, no 
more assertion than negation.”660 As Taylor suggests, “for the 
atheologian, the question that repeatedly returns is: How to do nothing 
with words?”661
As I proposed at the beginning of this study, for Blanchot, too, 
the question is how to speak without saying anything, or without 
revealing anything. For Blanchot, the task of literary language is not 
to ask “how to do things with words” but to ask “how to speak without 
saying anything”, or how to do nothing with words. In Blanchot, 
however, as in Derrida, it is eventually not possible to avoid speaking, 
because, as Derrida writes, “Language has started without us, is us and 
before us. This is what theology calls God, and it is necessary, it will 
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have been necessary, to speak.”662 It is not possible to avoid speaking 
of God, either, since “every negation of God (that is to say, 
affirmation of the absence of God) is still always a discourse that 
speaks of and to God in God’s absence.”663 Common to both atheistic 
and theological discourse is the impossibility of freeing the Other 
from the One: “The presence of man excludes – because it includes it 
– all presence that is radically other,664 and: “For God can very well be 
the Other and the Wholly Other, but he remains ever and always the 
unity of the Unique.”665
However, as Blanchot suggests, poetic discourse, instead, is in 
relation to the neutral, “without reference to the Same, without 
reference to the One.”666 As he writes in “Atheism and Writing. 
Humanism and the Cry”, “Let us now attempt to ask of discourse what 
would happen to it if it were possible for it to break free of the 
domination exercised by the theological, be it the humanized form of 
atheism. It may well come down by asking whether to write is not, 
from the start and before anything else, to interrupt what has not 
ceased to reach us in light; to ask as well if writing is not, always from 
the start and before all else, to hold oneself, by way of this 
interruption, in relation with the Neutral (or in a neutral relation): 
without reference to the Same, without reference to the One, outside 
everything visible and everything invisible.” For Blanchot, the man of 
the atheistic discourse is only “a pseudonym of God who dies in order 
to be reborn in his creature.”667 Humanism calls up God in human 
form in order that he may construct the world. “To meddle with man 
is to meddle with God.”668 True atheism, instead, requires excluding 
any response in the first person: “The ego, in its autonomy, secures 
and constitutes itself by way of the unmitigated theological 
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project.”669 “As long as knowledge requires unity and light we speak 
of God even when we pretend to speak of man. […] where there is 
man with his divine attributes – consciousness in the first person, the 
transparency of light, a speech that sees and says meaning, a speaking 
gaze that reads it – there the theological has already been 
preserved.”670 “God is there as a sign and as the future each time the 
same categories that have served in thinking of the divine logos, be 
they profaned, are turned over to the understanding of man at the same 
time they are entrusted to history.”671 The absence of a controlling 
subjectivity differentiates the poetic discourse not only from 
theological but also from atheistic discourse. As Blanchot in The 
Infinite Conversation writes, when engaged “in the experience of the 
non-manifest or the unknown (understood as neutral)” writing entails 
a rupture with all present consciousness.672 It is the neutrality of poetic 
language rather than the denial or avoidance of speaking that 
differentiates it both from negative theology and atheism.  
As was discussed in the Introduction of this study, in Derrida’s 
essay on Levinas, “Violence and Metaphysics”, Blanchot’s work is 
not analysed, except for two passing references to his essays on 
Levinas. How, then, is Blanchot present in Derrida’s famous essay? In 
outlining the problems leading to Levinas’s way to determine the 
other, Derrida remarks that Blanchot leaves the other without 
determination. Derrida also refers to Blanchot’s disapproval of
Levinas’s theological vocabulary in defining the other. He then 
continues by asking a rhetorical question: Isn’t it impossible to think 
of the other without a specific context. “Independent of its 
‘theological context’ […] does not this entire discourse collapse?”673
Isn’t it impossible to approach the other, if we don’t define the other 
somehow?  
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If I should name two constants in Blanchot’s thinking, these 
would be his idea of language as violence, and his idea of language as 
our only way to approach the other, to approach the impossible, that 
which language – based on the power to name and to negate –
excludes and forgets. What is of primal importance for Blanchot is to 
reach for language that would leave such concepts as “other”, 
“impossible”, and “the unnameable” without a determination. In 
Blanchot’s view, we can approach the other only by leaving the 
question of the other unanswered.674
Marlène Zarader makes the same claim in her study on 
Blanchot: she proposes that by refusing to define the other as the 
personal other Blanchot fails to have ethics. She asks: If Blanchot 
does not define the other as the personal other, but understands 
otherness rather as neutrality that escapes all definition, how can 
Blanchot anymore speak of the other in an ethical sense?675 As I 
argue, not naming the other is precisely the cornerstone of Blanchot’s 
ethics. Since language is for him both the structure of alterity (as it 
was for Heidegger) as well as a way to be in contact with the other (as 
it is for Levinas), from this it follows that the other cannot eventually 
be named. Since language is otherness and since there is not – as 
Heidegger already underlined – “a name for language”, we cannot 
ultimately answer the question “Who is the Other”, as Blanchot 
concludes in The Infinite Conversation. 676
As I have suggested, Blanchot follows Levinas in relating the 
problematic of seeing to violence and thus to ethics. For Levinas, 
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however, the most central question is that of ethics, to which all other 
questions are subordinated, whereas for Blanchot all questions – 
including the question of the other – derive from the question of
language. This is the primal difference between them, the difference 
that remains even in their later writings, despite Levinas’s effort to 
protect the ontological insecurity of the other in Otherwise than Being.
Levinas approaches another human being as the absolutely other, in 
his/her transcendence or exteriority. His answer to the pressing 
question, “how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into a 
relationship with another without immediately divesting it of its 
alterity”, is thus an attempt to think of both the exteriority of 
transcendence and the other as a human being.677 For Levinas, the 
notion of exteriority equals the notion of transcendence, whereas for 
Blanchot exteriority is characterized by its immanence; for Levinas, 
exteriority is first of all the exteriority of God, whereas for Blanchot 
exteriority is immanent and impersonal. 
As Derrida also observes in “Violence and Metaphysics”, the 
disagreement between Levinas and Blanchot is based on Blanchot’s 
sceptical view of the theological vocabulary of Levinas’s ethics. 
Derrida’s remark is more pertinent than Levinas’s, who claims that 
Blanchot, by privileging language, “abstains from ethical 
preoccupations”.678 Language becomes an ethical problem for 
Blanchot already in its ability to “kill” its object – in its power to deny 
and annihilate the “existence” of the “existent”. For Blanchot, the 
most essential question concerning our comprehension of language is 
how to fulfil our ethical responsibility as human beings and answer to 
the other, if all language by its essence is violence of light and 
consciousness. As Derrida writes in “Violence and Metaphysics” (it 
seems as if he was summarizing the dialogue between Levinas and 
Blanchot without mentioning Blanchot’s name): “How to think of the 
other, if the other can be spoken of only as exteriority and through
677
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exteriority, that is, nonalterity?”679 In his later work, Blanchot’s 
interest as a writer and as a philosopher is to formulate a notion of a 
literary community that, as ethical, would not base itself on the 
vocabulary of light and vision.
Zarader claims that Blanchot turns from the exteriority of 
language (“alterité) in his “earlier” works to the exteriority of the 
other human being (“autrui entendu comme mon prochain”) in his 
“later” works.680 In her analysis, Blanchot turns from language 
defined as exteriority to the exteriority of another person only in his 
essays in and after The Infinite Conversation, in discussing Levinas’s 
definition of the other in The Infinite Conversation. According to her 
reading, Blanchot adopts from Levinas the idea of the other as the 
ethical other, i.e., as another human being.681 Zarader claims further 
that Blanchot is incapable of justifying this turning from the otherness 
of language (ontology) to the otherness of the other human being 
(ethics).682
I oppose Zarader’s claim concerning the unjustified place of 
the ethical other in Blanchot’s thinking. Language has an ethical status 
for Blanchot from the beginning, although he does not privilege ethics 
as a “first philosophy”, as Levinas does. With its capability to create 
loss and absence, language carries with itself the force of negativity 
and death. Blanchot proposes, however, that we can have access to the 
other only because we are human beings who are always already tied 
to communicating with language. There is the other, and 
communication exists, only because of this linguistic relation to the 
other. It is only in language as the otherness as such that we can 
approach the other.
In The Infinite Conversation Blanchot also suggests that we 
should stop asking “who is the other”, since this is a question for 
which we cannot, after all, have an ethical answer (the other as truly 
other cannot be defined); instead, we should ask “what is the human 
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community”; i.e., how should the notion of community be defined – is 
there an ethical definition of community?683 Can we think of 
community as the community of those who “have nothing in 
common”? In his later work Blanchot turns from the question of the 
other and from the question of writing – questions which saturate the 
essays of The Infinite Conversation – to the question concerning the 
meaning of community. For the later Blanchot, the question is whether 
there is an ethical definition of community, and if it would it be 
possible to think of a non-visual community, i.e., a community that 
would not be built on visual interaction. What would a community 
without the violence of light be? Blanchot’s notion of a “textual 
community” understood as a community of readers challenges the 
idea of community based on the dominance of vision.684
Blanchot’s fictional stories, as well, can be read as efforts to 
reach for something which cannot appear as such, and which remains 
beyond our ability to conceptualize. The task of literary language, says 
Blanchot, is not to ask “how to do things with words” (which was 
Austin’s question) but to ask “how to speak without saying anything”, 
or how to do nothing with words. Although Blanchot defines language 
as otherness, as exteriority, he at the same time emphasizes that 
language is our only way to communicate with the other and to the 
other. The crucial question Blanchot poses is how to approach the 
other without doing violence to the otherness of the other, and this, as 
I claim, happens by defining language as, not only “otherwise than 
being” but also “otherwise than seeing”.  
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